The Infeasibility of Free Trade in Classical Theory: Ricardo's Comparative Advantage Parable has no Solution

2010 ◽  
Vol 22 (3) ◽  
pp. 419-437 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ron Baiman
2009 ◽  
Vol 2 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-33 ◽  
Author(s):  
Richard Peet

Powerful ideas that shape the world become taken-for-granted verities, in two senses of the term: as the only world that is known; and as the only world that can be imagined. When hegemony controls the imagination, fundamental criticism becomes difficult, and perhaps, impossible. Yet what if there were flaws in the original idea, from which new worlds were constructed, that have materialized in a political-economic geography beset with seemingly unsolvable problems? For example, what if there have always been fundamental flaws in the free trade, open market, competitive, global system that dominates both the world as we know it and the conventional political-economic-geographical thought we know it through? This article speculates that a psycho-discursive act of deconstruction might unravel the entire, subsequent discourse. It aims deconstruction at a founding statement in the free trade, global ideal, by looking critically at David Ricardo's theory of comparative advantage. Ricardo's argument that specialization and free trade are universally beneficial, became a founding premise of conventional economic theory and a basic prescription of liberal and neoliberal development policy. The article looks critically: at the logical consistency and representational accuracy of Ricardo's theory, especially the claim that all participants benefit from participation in a free trading scheme, so that trade brings about a far better world. The article reaches two main, critical conclusions: free trade theory based in comparative advantage has, from the beginning, been an ideology for creating economic spaces open to domination by powerful, leading countries; economics and economic geography have, since their classical beginnings, been biased in that their founding statements reverse the reality they pretend accurately to represent.


2021 ◽  
pp. 111-144
Author(s):  
Ryan Walter

This chapter examines the Corn Laws debate from 1813 to 1815, focusing on the contributions of Malthus, Ricardo, and Robert Torrens. This episode has traditionally been studied as a moment of conceptual progress for political economy, above all through the emergence of the concepts of diminishing returns and comparative advantage. The account here produces different results by returning the texts of Malthus, Ricardo, and Torrens to their historical context, which is shown to be one where casuistical argument was deployed to counsel Parliament on how to resolve a policy question. In particular, the issue was whether or not Parliament ought to diverge from the principle of free trade in the pursuit of other principles of statecraft, the stability and security of the food supply preeminently. Once the texts are read as instances of casuistry, Ricardo’s famed theoretical brilliance instead appears as clumsiness and detachment from the needs of Parliament.


2007 ◽  
Vol 6 (1) ◽  
pp. 25-44 ◽  
Author(s):  
SIMON KEMP

This paper reviews psychological reasons why the enthusiasm of the general public for free international trade might be less than that of the economist. Six specific reasons are advanced: (1) lay views of utility emphasize employment over consumption; (2) status quo bias results from loss aversion; (3) people think altruistically but parochially; (4) people often consider fairness in bargaining situations; (5) people may hold inappropriate fixed pie beliefs; and (6) people may misunderstand Ricardo's principle of comparative advantage. The reasons vary in their apparent rationality and appear to operate in concert rather than independently.


1988 ◽  
Vol 27 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-5 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jagdish Bhagwati

This note shows that protection induced export promotion can arise even in the absence of economies of scale , which have been long analysed as factors sliding an import substituting industry up the scale of comparative advantage and turning it into an exporter eventually. Even with an upward-sloping marginal-cost curve, a domestic monopolist can be protected and could then charge discriminatory prices in domestic and export markets, thus becoming an exporter whereas; free trade would have destroyed the monopoly and led to imports instead.


Author(s):  
Michael Trebilcock

While economists overwhelmingly favor free trade, even unilateral free trade, because of the gains realizable from specialization and the exploitation of comparative advantage, in fact international trading relations are structured by a complex body of multilateral and preferential trade agreements. The article outlines the case for multilateral trade agreements and the non-discrimination principle that they embody, in the form of both the Most Favored Nation principle and the National Treatment principle, where non-discrimination has been widely advocated as supporting both geopolitical goals (reducing economic factionalism) and economic goals (ensuring the full play of theories of comparative advantage undistorted by discriminatory trade treatment). Despite the virtues of multilateral trade agreements, preferential trade agreements (PTAs), authorized from the outset under GATT, have proliferated in recent years, even though they are inherently discriminatory between members and non-members, provoking vigorous debates as to whether (a) PTAs are trade-creating or trade-diverting; (b) whether they increase transaction costs in international trade; and (c) whether they undermine the future course of multilateral trade liberalization. A further and similarly contentious derogation from the principle of non-discrimination under the multilateral system is Special and Differential Treatment for developing countries, where since the mid-1950s developing countries have been given much greater latitude than developed countries to engage in trade protectionism on the import side in order to promote infant industries, and since the mid-1960s on the export side have benefited from non-reciprocal trade concessions by developed countries on products of actual or potential export interest to developing countries. Beyond debates over the strengths and weaknesses of multilateral trade agreements and the two major derogations therefrom, further debates surround the appropriate scope of trade agreements, and in particular the expansion of their scope in recent decades to address divergences or incompatibilities across a wide range of domestic regulatory and related policies that arguably create frictions in cross-border trade and investment and hence constitute an impediment to it. The article goes on to consider contemporary fair trade versus free trade debates, including concerns over trade deficits, currency manipulation, export subsidies, misappropriation of intellectual property rights, and lax labor or environmental standards. The article concludes with a consideration of the case for a larger scope for plurilateral trade agreements internationally, and for a larger scope for active labor market policies domestically to mitigate transition costs from trade.


2011 ◽  
Vol 30 (2) ◽  
pp. 141-160 ◽  
Author(s):  
Anne Booth

The paper examines the development of China's economic ties with Southeast Asia over the last two decades, culminating in the inauguration of the ASEAN-China Free Trade Agreement (ACFTA) in 2010. Particular reference is made to China's trade ties with Indonesia. Although two-way trade between China and Indonesia has grown rapidly since 2000, Indonesian exports to China are dominated by primary products, while imports from China are dominated by manufactures. While this pattern might reflect short-term comparative advantage in both economies, it is causing some concern in Indonesia. The paper assesses these concerns, and possible political reactions.


2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Nken Moise

This dissertation studies the effect of continual reduction in the tariff bindings and its implications on the static and dynamic formation of preferential trade agreements (PTAs). Underlying trade model is a three country \competing exporters" model. First, utilizing a static game of endogenous trade agreement formation between three countries, we examine the effects of continual reduction in tariff bindings on the role of PTA formation in attaining global free trade. We show that, in the free trade agreement (FTA) formation game, when countries are completely symmetric, free trade always obtains as the coalition-proof Nash equilibrium (CPNE) of the FTA game. Under the customs union (CU) game, CU members exercise an exclusion incentive and free trade fails to be a CPNE. When countries are asymmetric with respect to their comparative advantage, the country with a weaker comparative advantage has an incentive to free ride on trade liberalization of the two others and continual reduction in tariff bindings facilitates FTA formation in attaining global free trade. Next, we employ a three country dynamic model of PTA formation where countries form PTAs over time and investigate the impact of multilateral tariff binding liberalization on the equilibrium extent of FTA and CU formation in isolation. When forming FTAs under relatively high tariff bindings, a myopic free riding incentive of FTA non-members constrains FTA formation. Thus, tariff binding liberalization can facilitate FTA expansion to global free trade. However, when forward looking countries do not value this myopic free riding incentive, tariff binding liberalization can impede FTA expansion to global free trade. In our CU game, CU formation proceeds to global free trade only for relatively high tariff bindings. Finally, we examine the PTA game where countries endogenously choose between CU and FTA formation. Under such a game, we show that the equilibrium emergence of CUs can prevent global free trade that would otherwise occur through FTAs. In contrast, the equilibrium emergence of FTAs can facilitate global free trade that would otherwise not occur through CUs.


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