The commitments of a liberal foreign policy agenda

1993 ◽  
Vol 1 (3) ◽  
pp. 1-3 ◽  
Author(s):  
André Ouellet
Keyword(s):  
2016 ◽  
Vol 5 (2) ◽  
pp. 342-370
Author(s):  
Alexandre César Cunha Leite ◽  
Thamirys Ferreira Cavalcante

Desde a última década tem se observado um movimento brasileiro em direção à África cada vez mais forte. Embora as relações do Brasil com a África remontem a própria história brasileira, só na última década é que o vizinho africano passou a ser prioridade na agenda da política externa brasileira. Muitos estudiosos afirmam que o ex-presidente Lula da Silva desempenhou um papel importante por trás do dinamismo observado nos anos recentes. O objetivo do presente trabalho foi analisar a política externa brasileira voltada para a África durante os governos Luís Inácio Lula da Silva (2003-2010) e Dilma Rousseff (2011-2014), identificando suas continuidades e descontinuidades. Para identificar qual o teor e extensão das continuidades e descontinuidades entre os dois governos foi utilizado o modelo elaborado por Hermann (1990).Palavras-chave: Política externa. Brasil. África. Cooperação. Diplomacia.  Abstract: A growing movement from Brazil toward Africa has been observed in the last decade. Although Brazil's relations with Africa date back Brazilian history itself, only in the last decade is that the African neighbor became a priority in Brazil's foreign policy agenda. Many scholars claim former President Lula da Silva has played an important role in the dynamism observed in recent years. The objective of this study analyzes the Brazilian foreign policy towards Africa during the governments Luis Inácio Lula da Silva (2003-2010) and Dilma Rousseff (2011-2014), identifying its continuities and discontinuities. To identify the content and extent of the continuities and discontinuities between the two governments the model developed by Hermann (1990) served as the theoretical and methodological basis.Keywords: Foreign policy. Brazil. Africa. Cooperation. Diplomacy.


Author(s):  
Joseph S. Nye

This chapter examines Barack Obama’s foreign policy agenda. The Obama administration referred to its foreign policy as ‘smart power’, which combines soft and hard power resources in different contexts. In sending additional troops to Afghanistan, his use of military force in support of a no-fly zone in Libya, and his use of sanctions against Iran, Obama showed that he was not afraid to use the hard components of smart power. The chapter first considers power in a global information age before discussing soft power in U.S. foreign policy. It then explains how public diplomacy came to be incorporated into American foreign policy and concludes by highlighting problems in wielding soft power.


1985 ◽  
Vol 8 (2) ◽  
pp. 21-23
Author(s):  
Robert J. Dole
Keyword(s):  

Subject Chinese 'sharp power' in Europe. Significance Beijing is pursuing its foreign policy agenda in Europe using ‘sharp power’ tools, inserting its voice into the European media sphere and attempting to shape the tone and content of output by Western think tanks and universities. It is also using its economic leverage to undermine EU unity on disputes between China and the major European countries. Impacts Smaller EU economies are most susceptible to Chinese influence; they may exploit fear of China to win concessions in Brussels. Major European media outlets will remain effective watchdogs. Europe did not traditionally share US geopolitical concerns about China’s ‘rise’; Chinese interference in European politics changes that. A less mercurial US administration would find much scope to cooperate with the EU to counter China’s illiberal influence. Exposure of ‘sharp power’ efforts will worsen the suspicion Chinese firms and individuals face on account of presumed government links.


Significance The senior leadership seeks to defend its position within China, first and foremost by preserving and strengthening the power of the Party through which it rules. China’s growing wealth and power create new opportunities for the Party to bolster its power -- and give rise to new threats that could undermine it. Impacts China’s ambitions centre on itself; they do not involve remaking the world in China’s image. China’s interests converge with other states' on climate change and economic cooperation; disputes concern how gains and costs are shared. China’s pursuit of its self-interest may sometimes have positive spill-overs, such as when it shares innovations, freely or otherwise. Despite controversies and setbacks, the Belt and Road will provide infrastructure critical for economic development globally. Beijing, long a practitioner of commercial espionage, is becoming bolder in its use of cyber operations to pursue its foreign policy agenda.


Subject The Tunisian president's foreign policy agenda. Significance On February 7, President Kais Saied dramatically sacked Moncef Baati, Tunisia’s permanent representative at the UN. Baati had been sitting on the UN Security Council, where the country took up a seat last month, and was chairing its counter-terrorism committee. His dismissal, and the harsh criticism issued against him by the presidency, have alienated many civil servants. This carries risks for Saied, a retired law professor and political outsider, who as president is now solely responsible for determining foreign policy, on which he has some unconventional views, as well as ambitious goals. Impacts Civil servants are likely to obstruct or even actively sabotage initiatives by the presidency. Saied may seek to replace career diplomats with political appointees to bypass institutional resistance. Tunisia’s next UN ambassador will have little scope for autonomous action. Morocco will block Saied’s plans to initiate a regional dialogue over Western Sahara’s status.


Significance Biden and Republican President Donald Trump, seeking re-election, are already sparring over US-China policy; this and other differences over foreign policy will mark the candidates’ campaigning. Impacts Biden would reduce US tariffs on China, favouring more targeted tariffs, but still push for Chinese economic reform. He would increase US attention to the Asia-Pacific, and work with China on North Korean denuclearisation. The next president will likely have to trim US defence spending and commitments overseas. Biden will refer to the Obama administration’s record as evidence of his fitness to govern.


2012 ◽  
Vol 210 ◽  
pp. 435-455 ◽  
Author(s):  
Björn Conrad

AbstractThe contradiction between the astonishing dynamic of China's domestic climate policy agenda and its seemingly tenacious position in international climate negotiations presents a puzzle that, on closer inspection, reveals much about a nation at the crossroads, undecided which way to turn. The alterations in China's political interests connected to the issue of climate change are clearly evident in the domestic policy changes China introduced during previous years. However, China's leadership thus far has remained hesitant to translate this new set of interests fully into a coherent position in the international arena. China's mounting difficulties in reconciling its rapidly changing role on the international stage with its altered domestic situation, as well as its traditional foreign policy interests and principles, undermine its ability to pursue a consistent and effective strategy in international climate negotiations. China's reluctance to redefine its role in the international arena has led to a number of inconsistencies that particularly plagued its position during the Copenhagen conference, adding to the overall non-constructive dynamic of the proceedings that ultimately left China, as everyone else, with empty hands. The Copenhagen negotiations demonstrated that China's leadership will have to address these inconsistencies resolutely if it wants to realize the benefits that international climate cooperation offers.


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