Tinkering with executive term limits: partisan imbalances and institutional legacies in Latin America

2021 ◽  
pp. 1-19
Author(s):  
Gabriel L. Negretto
Keyword(s):  
Latin America ◽  
Term Limits ◽  
Institutional Legacies ◽  
Executive Term Limits

Manipulating Term Limits in Latin America

2014 ◽  
Vol 25 (4) ◽  
pp. 157-168 ◽  
Author(s):  
Javier Corrales ◽  
Michael Penfold
Keyword(s):  
Latin America ◽  
Term Limits

The Abuse of Constituent Power

2021 ◽  
pp. 116-151
Author(s):  
Rosalind Dixon ◽  
David Landau
Keyword(s):  
Human Rights ◽  
Latin America ◽  
International Law ◽  
Term Limits ◽  
Constitutional Amendment ◽  
Military Coup ◽  
Elected Officials ◽  
Constituent Power ◽  
The People ◽  
Constitutional Identity

This chapter explores the abusive borrowing of ideas related to constituent power—the concept that all power ultimately stems from the people, and which thus reserves power to the people to replace their constitution, while limiting the ability of ‘constituted’ institutions to make fundamental changes. It shows how constituent power theory has been abused to legitimate anti-democratic Constituent Assemblies, including twice in recent years in Venezuela. It also demonstrates how the unconstitutional constitutional amendment doctrine has been wielded throughout Latin America to eradicate presidential term limits, on the argument that they are infringements of the human rights of both voters and elected officials. Finally, it explores the anti-democratic use of international law doctrines related to constituent power: the abuse of ‘unconstitutional government’ norms to justify a military coup in Fiji, and the wielding of the European Union’s constitutional identity doctrines for illiberal or anti-democratic ends in Hungary and Poland.

Presidential Term Limits in Latin America: c.1820–1985

2019 ◽  
pp. 103-122
Author(s):  
Leiv Marsteintredet
Keyword(s):  
Latin America ◽  
Latin American ◽  
Term Limits ◽  
Third Wave ◽  
American Experience ◽  
The Third ◽  
History Of ◽  
Democratic Rule

Latin America holds a 200-year-long history of presidential constitutions. The region’s constitutional and democratic experimentation throughout history makes it an interesting laboratory to study the origins, development, and effects of presidential term limits. Based primarily on data from constitutions, this chapter provides an overview of presidential term limits in Latin America from independence until 1985. The chapter shows how term limits have varied across countries and time, and that the implementation of strict term limits often came as a reaction to prior dictatorial rules. Whereas both proponents and critics of consecutive reelection invoked arguments of democracy in their favour, the Latin American experience up until the Third Wave of Democracy shows that stable, republican, and democratic rule has only been possible under a ban on immediate presidential re-election.

Term Limits and the Unconstitutional Constitutional Amendment Doctrine

2019 ◽  
pp. 53-74 ◽  
Author(s):  
David Landau ◽  
Yaniv Roznai ◽  
Rosalind Dixon
Keyword(s):  
Latin America ◽  
Costa Rica ◽  
Term Limits ◽  
Constitutional Amendment ◽  
Constitutional Court ◽  
Constitutional Change ◽  
Term Limit ◽  
Constitutional Decisions

This chapter examines the interaction between term limit provisions and the unconstitutional constitutional amendment doctrine in Latin America. It illustrates the varied approaches of courts concerning the validity of attempts to amend presidential term limits. In Colombia, the Constitutional Court intervened to prevent what it saw as an undue easing of term limits (after permitting one round of easing); in Venezuela, Ecuador, and Bolivia, courts generally allowed attempts to ease or eliminate term limit using less demanding rather than more demanding procedural routes; and in Costa Rica, Nicaragua, Honduras, and Bolivia, judiciaries deployed the unconstitutional constitutional amendment doctrine in order to eliminate rather than to protect term limits. After mapping the major constitutional decisions issued on this issue in Latin America in recent years, the authors argue that transnational anchoring holds some promise in clarifying the proper scope of control of constitutional change regarding term limits.

Going it Alone: The Adverse Effect of Executive Term Limits on Bargaining

2021 ◽  
pp. 0160323X2110207
Author(s):  
Alexandra G. Cockerham
Keyword(s):  
Adverse Effect ◽  
Empirical Analysis ◽  
Empirical Support ◽  
Term Limits ◽  
Executive Power ◽  
Perfect Correlation ◽  
American States ◽  
Time Served ◽  
Remaining Time ◽  
Executive Term Limits

It is widely accepted that executive term limits provide a check on executive power. I challenge this assumption by arguing that executive term limits pose an obstacle to inter-branch bargaining because they both limit tenure potential and force an executive from office precisely when she is most prone to bargain. While previous research has assumed that an executive’s tenure potential remains constant throughout his time in office, I argue that the tenure potential of a term-limited executive varies with time left in office. The perfect correlation between time served (experience) and maximum remaining time in office (tenure potential) among U.S. presidents precludes empirical analysis about the effects of tenure potential and experience. Accordingly, I turn to the American states for analysis, and find strong empirical support for my theory.

Fixing Democracy

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Javier Corrales
Keyword(s):  
Latin America ◽  
Term Limits ◽  
The Other ◽  
Economic Conditions ◽  
Power Asymmetry ◽  
Constitutional Amendments ◽  
Class Differences ◽  
Approval Ratings ◽  
The Difference

This book explores the origins of presidential powers in new constitutions. Much is known about the effects of different presidential powers—less on the conditions that lead to their emergence. The book focuses on the origins of these powers. It argues that the most important predictor of whether a new constitution will expand (instead of restrict) presidential powers is power asymmetry, or more specifically, the difference in power assets between the Incumbent and the Opposition. These power assets can include electoral results, seats at key institutions such as the negotiating table, and even approval ratings. This argument draws from bargaining theories on self-dealing. Power asymmetry is a more powerful variable in explaining variations in presidential powers than others, such as the president’s ideology, class differences, or overall economic conditions. To make the case for this argument, the book reviews all the constituent assemblies from Latin America since the late 1980s, as well as several failed assemblies, and thereby provides one of the most comprehensive reviews of constitutional overhaul in Latin America thus far. The book also examines constitutional amendments that affect presidential powers, especially term limits. The conclusion is that to get more balanced constitutions (i.e., those that strengthen checks on presidential powers), neither side of the debate should have a huge power advantage over the other.

The Politics of Presidential Term Limits in Latin America

2019 ◽  
pp. 517-534
Author(s):  
José Antonio Cheibub ◽  
Alejandro Medina
Keyword(s):  
Latin America ◽  
Historical Record ◽  
Term Limits ◽  
Conventional Wisdom ◽  
Descriptive Statistics ◽  
Alternative View ◽  
Incumbency Advantage ◽  
Term Limit ◽  
Electoral Accountability ◽  
Shed Light

This chapter revisits the conventional wisdom about term limits in Latin America by bringing into perspective the inherent tradeoffs between electoral accountability and restrictions to incumbency advantage. While the changes in constitutional term limits that have occurred in recent decades have mostly been understood as attempts by incumbents to usurp power, this chapter suggests that a large number of these changes can instead be attributed to a process of constitutional adjustment. Movement towards less restrictive term limits need not be solely the result of dictatorial ambitions. The chapter presents the historical record, as well as a series of descriptive statistics which help shed light into this alternative view of changes to term limits over the years with evidence suggesting the increasing prevalence of a term limit regime that implies de facto longer terms for presidents, but conditional on voters’ approval.

Term Limits and Succession in Dictatorships

2019 ◽  
pp. 269-288 ◽  
Author(s):  
Natasha Ezrow
Keyword(s):  
Term Limits ◽  
Authoritarian Regime ◽  
Authoritarian Regimes ◽  
Military Regimes ◽  
Leadership Turnover ◽  
Executive Term Limits

This chapter explores executive term limits in authoritarian regimes. Though it may seem counter-intuitive, authoritarian regimes often willingly implement term limits. This chapter explains why this is the case and how term limits might help to maintain autocratic stability. The chapter also explains how term limits are enforced and what type of authoritarian regime is most likely to have term limits, looking at personalist regimes, single-party regimes, and military regimes. As the chapter will argue, many single-party regimes implement executive term limits because they ensure leadership turnover and prolong the tenure of the regime. Nevertheless, term limits do not always lead to stability. This chapter also explores the cases where term limits may lead to the downfall of a regime or at least have a liberalizing effect on the regime.

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