Effects of Presidential Term Limits

This chapter explores empirically what kind of effects presidential term limits have on political phenomena that are often of interest in political science. It first presents some of the existing empirical findings and also discusses a few tentative hypotheses on possible effects of presidential term limits on a variety of political outcomes. This serves as a brief overview of the possible effects of presidential term limits. It then focuses in greater detail on three political phenomena covering a broad range of leader behavior, which presidential term limits may influence: change in the composition of government expenditure, state repression, and international crises. This serves as detailed examples of how we can think of the effects that presidential term limits exert on leaders. The chapter set outs hypotheses regarding relationships between presidential term limits and these three phenomena, and tests these hypotheses, drawing on previously published papers and their replication datasets.

The Uses and Abuses of Presidential Term Limits in Russian Politics

This chapter explores how the operation of term limits in Russia is shaped by the interaction between both the formal and informal structures of political authority. First, it describes the evolution of formal rules on term limits from the late Soviet period, through the constitutional debates of the 1990s to the constitutional amendments of 2008, which extended the length of presidential terms from four to six years. Second, it considers how the informal structures of power have influenced the ways in which successive presidents and their supporters have sought to overcome the formal constraints that term limits have placed on their power. Finally, it discusses how the application of term limits has affected the institutional development of the presidency since the early 1990s and support for Russia’s political system more generally.

Presidential Terms in Kazakhstan

This chapter tracks the history of changes to presidential terms and term limits of President Nazarbayev, the first and only president of post-Soviet Kazakhstan. We show that the length of presidential terms was changed by Nazarbayev to ensure his longevity in an evolving political situation. He successfully avoided elections when opposition was more consolidated while maintaining plausible periodicity of contests. The two-term limit was manipulated by various means, including a referendum, new constitution, and ultimately exemption from term limits for the First President. These manipulations were enabled by gradual consolidation of Nazarbayev’s regime, which is now marked by nearly total control over the political space. Elections serve as a decorum deployed tactically to ensure symbolic democratic continuity and offer no realistic prospect of unseating the incumbent president.

The Politics of Presidential Term Limits in Tunisia

This chapter discusses the evolution of the politics of term limits in Tunisia, from independence in 1956 until the approval of the 2014 democratic constitution. Through the observation of the manipulation of term limits, we can retrace the political history of the country. It is interesting to examine how Bourguiba and Ben Ali managed to achieve their goals by stretching term limits, how and in which conditions they were prevented to do so and finally, whether there are some recurring patterns. This study then places in historical perspective the analysis on how term limits in Tunisia today have been discussed and implemented. Tunisians today are still coping with the recent political turmoil, which may lead them not to pay attention to creeping but substantial constitutional changes that might occur in light of the return to presidential practices in what is a semi-presidential system.

The Politics of Presidential Term Limits in Mexico

In Mexico’s presidential system, the struggle over term limits was at the heart of efforts to institutionalize regimes from 1857 through 1933. Before the 1910 Revolution, Porfirio Díaz both called for his predecessors’ overthrow by appealing to the principle of no-re-election and then manipulated that principle in order to stay in power. The rallying cry of the 1910 Revolution became “Effective Suffrage, No-Reelection.” Despite a late-1920s effort to backpedal from no-re-election, the principle has been scrupulously adhered to. It was extended to all electoral offices in 1933. As a consequence, the revolutionary party was able to avoid one-man rule during its 71 years in power. Term limits promoted the circulation of party militants in electoral office and appointed positions even while it weakened the legislature in its relationship to executive power. Even after the revolutionary party lost power in 2000, it kept reformers from amending non-re-election for legislators until 2014.

Presidential Term Limits as a Credible-Commitment Mechanism

Contra the conventional wisdom that term limits are meaningless in dictatorships, Brazil’s military regime developed term-limits for its chief executives and managed a durable political order. This chapter argue that term limits moderated intra-elite conflicts, thus contributing to regime stability. Term limits were key to reconcile two warring factions within the armed forces. The authors see term limits as a credible-commitment mechanism. Three elements are jointly sufficient to explain the adoption of term limits: (1) the armed forces’ decision in 1964 to part ways with the decades-old pattern of episodic, short political interventions and stay in office for the long haul; (2) a legalist tradition that led the new regime to keep a façade of constitutionalism through a myriad of political institutions; and (3) the ideological and political cleavages within the armed forces. We corroborate our arguments using a new dataset of tension events between the military and the government in 1946–85.

Presidential Term Limits in Latin America: c.1820–1985

Latin America holds a 200-year-long history of presidential constitutions. The region’s constitutional and democratic experimentation throughout history makes it an interesting laboratory to study the origins, development, and effects of presidential term limits. Based primarily on data from constitutions, this chapter provides an overview of presidential term limits in Latin America from independence until 1985. The chapter shows how term limits have varied across countries and time, and that the implementation of strict term limits often came as a reaction to prior dictatorial rules. Whereas both proponents and critics of consecutive reelection invoked arguments of democracy in their favour, the Latin American experience up until the Third Wave of Democracy shows that stable, republican, and democratic rule has only been possible under a ban on immediate presidential re-election.

Term Limits and the Unconstitutional Constitutional Amendment Doctrine

This chapter examines the interaction between term limit provisions and the unconstitutional constitutional amendment doctrine in Latin America. It illustrates the varied approaches of courts concerning the validity of attempts to amend presidential term limits. In Colombia, the Constitutional Court intervened to prevent what it saw as an undue easing of term limits (after permitting one round of easing); in Venezuela, Ecuador, and Bolivia, courts generally allowed attempts to ease or eliminate term limit using less demanding rather than more demanding procedural routes; and in Costa Rica, Nicaragua, Honduras, and Bolivia, judiciaries deployed the unconstitutional constitutional amendment doctrine in order to eliminate rather than to protect term limits. After mapping the major constitutional decisions issued on this issue in Latin America in recent years, the authors argue that transnational anchoring holds some promise in clarifying the proper scope of control of constitutional change regarding term limits.

Presidential Term Limits

This chapter introduces major research questions and themes in the politics of presidential term limits. The institution of term limits can be understood as the dependent variable, as the explanatory variable, as a focal point, and as an indicator—a tripwire. Because of a very “tight” relationship between democracy and term limits, it is more fruitful to approach the study of presidential term limits by carefully accounting for the time period, place and context, the power and preferences of political actors—as in the politics of presidential term limits. The chapter sketches some of the constitutional choices affecting presidential term limits, outlines the standard argument for and against, considers some of the issues involved in the decision to introduce, abolish, or amend term limits. It also points to some of the likely consequences of presidential term limits, distinguishing between direct and informational effects thereof.

Presidential Term Limits and the International Community

Proposed changes to presidential term limits are almost always highly contested and have attracted international and regional attention. A central question that faces the external actors is the extent to which it is legitimate to take a position in presidential term limit debates. This chapter considers the policy concerning presidential term limits of three major IGOs, the UN, the AU, and the OAS. It further discusses the way in which IDEA, an IGO with a softer mandate, has responded to the debate on term limits, as well as the role of the Venice Commission, ECOWAS, DRI, the Carter Center, and the West African Civil Society Forum (WACSOF). This review suggests an increasing international consensus that, in countries with a history of authoritarianism and weak democratic institutions, presidential term limits can play an important role in strengthening democratic processes and reducing the likelihood of conflict.