Age-related differences during visual search: the role of contextual expectations and cognitive control mechanisms

2019 ◽  
Vol 27 (4) ◽  
pp. 489-516 ◽  
Author(s):  
Miguel T. Borges ◽  
Eunice G. Fernandes ◽  
Moreno I. Coco
2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Miguel Borges ◽  
Eunice G. Fernandes ◽  
Moreno I. Coco

In visual search, the cognitive system controls the contextual information available by inhibiting irrelevant information to successfully orient attention towards the search target. As cognitive control is reduced in older adults they often experience more difficulties in such tasks. In two eye-tracking experiments, we investigated the interplay between contextual expectations and cognitive control during visual search in naturalistic scenes. A younger and an older group of participants had to find a target object varying in consistency with the search scene (e.g., a basket of bread vs a clothes iron in a restaurant scene) after being primed with contextual information either congruent or incongruent with it (e.g., a restaurant vs a bathroom), and administered as a scene (Experiment 1) or a word (Experiment 2, which included a scrambled word as neutral prime). Participants also completed two cognitive control tasks (Stroop and Flanker) to assess their cognitive control. Older adults had greater difficulty than younger adults with inconsistent objects, especially when primed with congruent information (Experiment 1), or a scrambled word (neutral condition, Experiment 2). Congruent expectations boost distractor objects which have to be suppressed when the semantics of the target object violates them. Neutral primes acted as low-level perceptual distractors that increased the attentional load of participants and needed to be suppressed. Higher cognitive control, especially in older participants, improved the search accuracy in these experimental conditions, but it did not mediate the eye-movement responses. These results shed new light on the links between cognitive control and visual attention in ageing.


2019 ◽  
Vol 31 (7) ◽  
pp. 1079-1090 ◽  
Author(s):  
Peter S. Whitehead ◽  
Mathilde M. Ooi ◽  
Tobias Egner ◽  
Marty G. Woldorff

The contents of working memory (WM) guide visual attention toward matching features, with visual search being faster when the target and a feature of an item held in WM spatially overlap (validly cued) than when they occur at different locations (invalidly cued). Recent behavioral studies have indicated that attentional capture by WM content can be modulated by cognitive control: When WM cues are reliably helpful to visual search (predictably valid), capture is enhanced, but when reliably detrimental (predictably invalid), capture is attenuated. The neural mechanisms underlying this effect are not well understood, however. Here, we leveraged the high temporal resolution of ERPs time-locked to the onset of the search display to determine how and at what processing stage cognitive control modulates the search process. We manipulated predictability by grouping trials into unpredictable (50% valid/invalid) and predictable (100% valid, 100% invalid) blocks. Behavioral results confirmed that predictability modulated WM-related capture. Comparison of ERPs to the search arrays showed that the N2pc, a posteriorly distributed signature of initial attentional orienting toward a lateralized target, was not impacted by target validity predictability. However, a longer latency, more anterior, lateralized effect—here, termed the “contralateral attention-related negativity”—was reduced under predictable conditions. This reduction interacted with validity, with substantially greater reduction for invalid than valid trials. These data suggest cognitive control over attentional capture by WM content does not affect the initial attentional-orienting process but can reduce the need to marshal later control mechanisms for processing relevant items in the visual world.


2019 ◽  
Vol 5 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Michiko Sakaki ◽  
Jasmine A. L. Raw ◽  
Jamie Findlay ◽  
Mariel Thottam

Older adults typically remember more positive than negative information compared to their younger counterparts; a phenomenon referred to as the ‘positivity effect.’ According to the socioemotional selectivity theory (SST), the positivity effect derives from the age-related motivational shift towards attaining emotionally meaningful goals which become more important as the perception of future time becomes more limited. Cognitive control mechanisms are critical in achieving such goals and therefore SST predicts that the positivity effect is associated with preserved cognitive control mechanisms in older adults. In contrast, the aging-brain model suggests that the positivity effect is driven by an age-related decline in the amygdala which is responsible for emotional processing and emotional learning. The aim of the current research was to address whether the age-related positivity effect is associated with cognitive control or impaired emotional processing associated with aging. We included older old adults, younger old adults and younger adults and tested their memory for emotional stimuli, cognitive control and amygdala-dependent fear conditioned responses. Consistent with prior research, older adults, relative to younger adults, demonstrate better memory for positive over negative images. We further found that within a group of older adults, the positivity effect increases as a function of age, such that older old adults demonstrated a greater positivity effect compared to younger older adults. Furthermore, the positivity effect in older old adults was associated with preserved cognitive control, supporting the prediction of SST. Contrary to the prediction of the aging-brain model, participants across all groups demonstrated similar enhanced skin conductance responses to fear conditioned stimuli – responses known to rely on the amygdala. Our results support SST and suggest that the positivity effect in older adults is achieved by the preserved cognitive control mechanisms and is not a reflection of the impaired emotional function associated with age.


2020 ◽  
pp. 174702182095892
Author(s):  
Josie Briscoe ◽  
Iain D Gilchrist

Reactive and proactive cognitive control are fundamental for guiding complex human behaviour. In two experiments, we evaluated the role of both types of cognitive control in navigational search. Participants searched for a single hidden target in a floor array where the salience at the search locations varied (flashing or static lights). An a-priori rule of the probable location of the target (either under a static or a flashing light) was provided at the start of each experiment. Both experiments demonstrated a bias towards rule-adherent locations. Search errors, measured as revisits, were more likely to occur under the flashing rule for searching flashing locations, regardless of the salience of target location in Experiment 1 and at rule-congruent (flashing) locations in Experiment 2. Consistent with dual mechanisms of control, rule-adherent search was explained by engaging proactive control to guide goal-maintained search behaviour and by engaging reactive control to avoid revisits to salient (flashing) locations. Experiment 2 provided direct evidence for dual mechanisms of control using a Dot Pattern Expectancy task to distinguish the dominant control mode for a participant. Participants with a reactive control mode generated more revisits to salient (flashing) locations. These data point to complementary roles for proactive and reactive control in guiding navigational search and propose a novel framework for interpreting navigational search.


2014 ◽  
Vol 15 (1) ◽  
pp. 7 ◽  
Author(s):  
Marine Manard ◽  
Delphine Carabin ◽  
Mathieu Jaspar ◽  
Fabienne Collette

2021 ◽  
Vol 15 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sebastian P. H. Speer ◽  
Ale Smidts ◽  
Maarten A. S. Boksem

There is a long-standing debate regarding the cognitive nature of (dis)honesty: Is honesty an automatic response or does it require willpower in the form of cognitive control in order to override an automatic dishonest response. In a recent study (Speer et al., 2020), we proposed a reconciliation of these opposing views by showing that activity in areas associated with cognitive control, particularly the inferior frontal gyrus (IFG), helped dishonest participants to be honest, whereas it enabled cheating for honest participants. These findings suggest that cognitive control is not needed to be honest or dishonest per se but that it depends on an individual’s moral default. However, while our findings provided insights into the role of cognitive control in overriding a moral default, they did not reveal whether overriding honest default behavior (non-habitual dishonesty) is the same as overriding dishonest default behavior (non-habitual honesty) at the neural level. This speaks to the question as to whether cognitive control mechanisms are domain-general or may be context specific. To address this, we applied multivariate pattern analysis to compare neural patterns of non-habitual honesty to non-habitual dishonesty. We found that these choices are differently encoded in the IFG, suggesting that engaging cognitive control to follow the norm (that cheating is wrong) fundamentally differs from applying control to violate this norm.


2017 ◽  
Vol 53 ◽  
pp. 169-180 ◽  
Author(s):  
Christine Mertes ◽  
Edmund Wascher ◽  
Daniel Schneider

2020 ◽  
Vol 12 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ayano Yagi ◽  
Rui Nouchi ◽  
Kou Murayama ◽  
Michiko Sakaki ◽  
Ryuta Kawashima

2014 ◽  
Vol 22 (3-4) ◽  
pp. 610-634 ◽  
Author(s):  
Eyal M. Reingold ◽  
Mackenzie G. Glaholt

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