scholarly journals Proactive and reactive control mechanisms in navigational search

2020 ◽  
pp. 174702182095892
Author(s):  
Josie Briscoe ◽  
Iain D Gilchrist

Reactive and proactive cognitive control are fundamental for guiding complex human behaviour. In two experiments, we evaluated the role of both types of cognitive control in navigational search. Participants searched for a single hidden target in a floor array where the salience at the search locations varied (flashing or static lights). An a-priori rule of the probable location of the target (either under a static or a flashing light) was provided at the start of each experiment. Both experiments demonstrated a bias towards rule-adherent locations. Search errors, measured as revisits, were more likely to occur under the flashing rule for searching flashing locations, regardless of the salience of target location in Experiment 1 and at rule-congruent (flashing) locations in Experiment 2. Consistent with dual mechanisms of control, rule-adherent search was explained by engaging proactive control to guide goal-maintained search behaviour and by engaging reactive control to avoid revisits to salient (flashing) locations. Experiment 2 provided direct evidence for dual mechanisms of control using a Dot Pattern Expectancy task to distinguish the dominant control mode for a participant. Participants with a reactive control mode generated more revisits to salient (flashing) locations. These data point to complementary roles for proactive and reactive control in guiding navigational search and propose a novel framework for interpreting navigational search.

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
◽  
Laura Kranz

<p>According to the Dual Mechanisms of Control (DMC) framework (Braver, 2012) distraction can be controlled either proactively (i.e., before the onset of a distractor) or reactively (i.e., after the onset of a distractor). Research clearly indicates that, when distractors are emotionally neutral, proactive mechanisms are more effective at controlling distraction than reactive mechanisms. However, whether proactive control mechanisms can control irrelevant emotional distractions as effectively as neutral distraction is not known. In the current thesis I examined cognitive control over emotional distraction. In Experiment 1, I tested whether proactive mechanisms can control emotional distraction as effectively as neutral distraction. Participants completed a distraction task. On each trial, they determined whether a centrally presented target letter (embedded amongst a circle of ‘o’s) was an ‘X’ or an ‘N’, while ignoring peripheral distractors (negative, neutral, or positive images). Distractors were presented on either a low proportion (25%) or a high proportion (75%) of trials, to evoke reactive and proactive cognitive control strategies, respectively. Emotional images (both positive and negative) produced more distraction than neutral images in the low distractor frequency (i.e., reactive control) condition. Critically, emotional distraction was almost abolished in the high distractor frequency condition; emotional images were only slightly more distracting than neutral images, suggesting that proactive mechanisms can control emotional distraction almost as effectively as neutral distraction. In Experiment 2, I replicated and extended Experiment 1. ERPs were recorded while participants completed the distraction task. An early index (the early posterior negativity; EPN) and a late index (the late positive potential; LPP) of emotional processing were examined to investigate the mechanisms by which proactive control minimises emotional distraction. The behavioural results of Experiment 2 replicated Experiment 1, providing further support for the hypothesis that proactive mechanisms can control emotional distractions as effectively as neutral distractions. While proactive control was found to eliminate early emotional processing of positive distractors, it paradoxically did not attenuate late emotional processing of positive distractors. On the other hand, proactive control eliminated late emotional processing of negative distractors. However, the early index of emotional processing was not a reliable index of negative distractor processing under either reactive or proactive conditions. Taken together, my findings show that proactive mechanisms can effectively control emotional distraction, but do not clearly establish the mechanisms by which this occurs.</p>


2014 ◽  
Vol 2014 ◽  
pp. 1-20 ◽  
Author(s):  
Tanya Dash ◽  
Bhoomika R. Kar

Background. Bilingualism results in an added advantage with respect to cognitive control. The interaction between bilingual language control and general purpose cognitive control systems can also be understood by studying executive control among individuals with bilingual aphasia.Objectives. The current study examined the subcomponents of cognitive control in bilingual aphasia. A case study approach was used to investigate whether cognitive control and language control are two separate systems and how factors related to bilingualism interact with control processes.Methods. Four individuals with bilingual aphasia performed a language background questionnaire, picture description task, and two experimental tasks (nonlinguistic negative priming task and linguistic and nonlinguistic versions of flanker task).Results. A descriptive approach was used to analyse the data using reaction time and accuracy measures. The cumulative distribution function plots were used to visualize the variations in performance across conditions. The results highlight the distinction between general purpose cognitive control and bilingual language control mechanisms.Conclusion. All participants showed predominant use of the reactive control mechanism to compensate for the limited resources system. Independent yet interactive systems for bilingual language control and general purpose cognitive control were postulated based on the experimental data derived from individuals with bilingual aphasia.


2021 ◽  
Vol 12 (1) ◽  
pp. 50
Author(s):  
Linda Truong ◽  
Kesaan Kandasamy ◽  
Lixia Yang

The dual mechanisms of control framework (DMC) proposes two modes of cognitive control: proactive and reactive control. In anticipation of an interference event, young adults primarily use a more proactive control mode, whereas older adults tend to use a more reactive one during the event, due to age-related deficits in working memory. The current study aimed to examine the effects of mood induction on cognitive control mode in older (ages 65+) compared to young adults (ages 18–30) with a standard letter-cue (Experiment 1) and a modified face-cue AX-CPT (Experiment 2). Mood induction into negative and/or positive mood versus neutral mood was conducted prior to the cognitive control task. Experiment 1 replicated the typical pattern of proactive control use in young adults and reactive control use in older adults. In Experiment 2, older adults showed comparable proactive control to young adults in their response time (RT). Mood induction showed little effect on cognitive control across the two experiments. These results did not reveal consistent effects of mood (negative or positive) on cognitive control mode in young and older adults, but discovered (or demonstrated) that older adults can engage proactive control when dichotomous face cues (female or male) are used in AX-CPT.


2021 ◽  
Vol 15 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sebastian P. H. Speer ◽  
Ale Smidts ◽  
Maarten A. S. Boksem

There is a long-standing debate regarding the cognitive nature of (dis)honesty: Is honesty an automatic response or does it require willpower in the form of cognitive control in order to override an automatic dishonest response. In a recent study (Speer et al., 2020), we proposed a reconciliation of these opposing views by showing that activity in areas associated with cognitive control, particularly the inferior frontal gyrus (IFG), helped dishonest participants to be honest, whereas it enabled cheating for honest participants. These findings suggest that cognitive control is not needed to be honest or dishonest per se but that it depends on an individual’s moral default. However, while our findings provided insights into the role of cognitive control in overriding a moral default, they did not reveal whether overriding honest default behavior (non-habitual dishonesty) is the same as overriding dishonest default behavior (non-habitual honesty) at the neural level. This speaks to the question as to whether cognitive control mechanisms are domain-general or may be context specific. To address this, we applied multivariate pattern analysis to compare neural patterns of non-habitual honesty to non-habitual dishonesty. We found that these choices are differently encoded in the IFG, suggesting that engaging cognitive control to follow the norm (that cheating is wrong) fundamentally differs from applying control to violate this norm.


2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Bruna Martins ◽  
Lyneé A. Alves ◽  
Kimberly Sarah Chiew

Emotion regulation relies on cognitive processing, but the foundational cognitive control mechanisms engaged remain unclear. The process model of emotion regulation posits that different strategies occur at different points in time, with antecedent strategies occurring early and response-focused strategies later in the affective timecourse, with cognitive processing supporting these strategies following a similar timecourse. In parallel, the Dual Mechanisms of Control (DMC) theoretical framework (Braver, 2012; Braver, Gray, &amp; Burgess, 2007; Chiew &amp; Braver, 2017) proposes that cognitive control operates via two temporally-distinct modes: anticipatory preparation to perform cognitive tasks (proactive), and momentary engagement in cognitive tasks as they arise (reactive). However, empirical investigations of the role of proactive and reactive control in emotion regulation have been limited. In this paper, we summarize and integrate these two theoretical perspectives. We first posit that any emotion regulation strategy may take place either early or late in the affective timecourse, depending on whether it is proactively or reactively enacted. We next provide examples of different strategies from the process model and their engagement in both control modes. In addition, we discuss how strategic dependence on the downstream emotional stimulus and response could further affect the timecourse and cognitive load of emotion regulation strategies. We conclude by discussing how controlling for timing in future research designs may clarify how populations with reduced cognitive control may demonstrate intact emotion regulation (i.e., through greater reliance on reactive strategies), and how incorporation of the DMC perspective may inform applied emotion regulation interventions for clinical populations.


2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
◽  
Laura Kranz

<p>According to the Dual Mechanisms of Control (DMC) framework (Braver, 2012) distraction can be controlled either proactively (i.e., before the onset of a distractor) or reactively (i.e., after the onset of a distractor). Research clearly indicates that, when distractors are emotionally neutral, proactive mechanisms are more effective at controlling distraction than reactive mechanisms. However, whether proactive control mechanisms can control irrelevant emotional distractions as effectively as neutral distraction is not known. In the current thesis I examined cognitive control over emotional distraction. In Experiment 1, I tested whether proactive mechanisms can control emotional distraction as effectively as neutral distraction. Participants completed a distraction task. On each trial, they determined whether a centrally presented target letter (embedded amongst a circle of ‘o’s) was an ‘X’ or an ‘N’, while ignoring peripheral distractors (negative, neutral, or positive images). Distractors were presented on either a low proportion (25%) or a high proportion (75%) of trials, to evoke reactive and proactive cognitive control strategies, respectively. Emotional images (both positive and negative) produced more distraction than neutral images in the low distractor frequency (i.e., reactive control) condition. Critically, emotional distraction was almost abolished in the high distractor frequency condition; emotional images were only slightly more distracting than neutral images, suggesting that proactive mechanisms can control emotional distraction almost as effectively as neutral distraction. In Experiment 2, I replicated and extended Experiment 1. ERPs were recorded while participants completed the distraction task. An early index (the early posterior negativity; EPN) and a late index (the late positive potential; LPP) of emotional processing were examined to investigate the mechanisms by which proactive control minimises emotional distraction. The behavioural results of Experiment 2 replicated Experiment 1, providing further support for the hypothesis that proactive mechanisms can control emotional distractions as effectively as neutral distractions. While proactive control was found to eliminate early emotional processing of positive distractors, it paradoxically did not attenuate late emotional processing of positive distractors. On the other hand, proactive control eliminated late emotional processing of negative distractors. However, the early index of emotional processing was not a reliable index of negative distractor processing under either reactive or proactive conditions. Taken together, my findings show that proactive mechanisms can effectively control emotional distraction, but do not clearly establish the mechanisms by which this occurs.</p>


Author(s):  
Matias M Pulopulos ◽  
Jens Allaert ◽  
Marie-Anne Vanderhasselt ◽  
Alvaro Sanchez-Lopez ◽  
Sara De Witte ◽  
...  

Abstract Previous research supports the distinction between proactive and reactive control. Although the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC) has been consistently related to these processes, lateralization of proactive and reactive control is still under debate. We manipulated brain activity to investigate the role of the left and right DLPFC in proactive and reactive cognitive control. Using a single-blind, sham-controlled crossover within-subjects design, 25 young healthy females performed the ‘AX’ Continuous Performance Task after receiving sham vs active high-frequency repetitive transcranial magnetic stimulation (HF-rTMS) to increase left and right DLPFC activity. Reaction times (RTs) and pupillometry were used to assess patterns of proactive and reactive cognitive control and task-related resource allocation, respectively. We observed that, compared to sham, HF-rTMS over the left DLPFC increased proactive control. After right DLPFC HF-rTMS, participants showed slower RTs on AX trials, suggesting more reactive control. However, this latter result was not supported by RTs on BX trials (i.e. the trial that specifically assess reactive control). Pupil measures showed a sustained increase in resource allocation after both active left and right HF-rTMS. Our results with RT data provide evidence on the role of the left DLPFC in proactive control and suggest that the right DLPFC is implicated in reactive control.


Author(s):  
Yael Salzer ◽  
Daniela Aisenberg ◽  
Tal Oron-Gilad ◽  
Avishai Henik

Cognitive control has been extensively studied using the auditory and visual modalities. In the current study, a tactile version of the Simon task was created in order to test control mechanisms in a modality that was less studied, to provide comparative and new information. A significant Simon effect – reaction time gap between congruent (i.e., stimulus and response in the same relative location) and incongruent (i.e., stimulus and response in opposite locations) stimuli – provided grounds to further examine both general and tactile-specific aspects of cognitive control in three experiments. By implementing a neutral condition and conducting sequential and distributional analysis, the present study: (a) supports two different independent mechanisms of cognitive control – reactive control and proactive control; (b) reveals facilitation and interference within the tactile Simon effect; and (c) proposes modality differences in activation and processing of the spatially driven stimulus-response association.


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