The ‘right to be forgotten’ beyond the EU: an analysis of wider G20 regulatory action and potential next steps

2021 ◽  
pp. 1-35
Author(s):  
David Erdos
Author(s):  
Edward L. Carter

The right to be forgotten is an emerging legal concept allowing individuals control over their online identities by demanding that Internet search engines remove certain results. The right has been supported by the European Court of Justice, some judges in Argentina, and data-protection regulators in several European countries, among others. The right is primarily grounded in notions of privacy and data protection but also relates to intellectual property, reputation, and right of publicity. Scholars and courts cite, as an intellectual if not legal root for the right to be forgotten, the legal principle that convicted criminals whose sentences are completed should not continually be publicly linked with their crimes. Critics contend that the right to be forgotten stands in conflict with freedom of expression and can lead to revisionist history. Scholars and others in the southern cone of South America, in particular, have decried the right to be forgotten because it could allow perpetrators of mass human rights abuses to cover up or obscure their atrocities. On the other hand, those in favor of the right to be forgotten say that digital technology preserves memory unnaturally and can impede forgiveness and individual progress. The right to be forgotten debate is far from resolved and poses difficult questions about access to, and control of, large amounts of digital information across national borders. Given the global nature of the Internet and the ubiquity of certain powerful search engines, the questions at issue are universal, but solutions thus far have been piecemeal. Although a 2014 decision by the Court of Justice of the European Union (EU) garnered much attention, the right to be forgotten has been largely shaped by a 1995 European Union Directive on Data Protection. In 2016, the EU adopted a new General Data Protection Regulation that will take effect in 2018 and could have a major impact because it contains an explicit right to be forgotten (also called right to erasure). The new regulation does not focus on the theoretical or philosophical justification for a right to be forgotten, and it appears likely the debate over the right in the EU and beyond will not be resolved even when the new rule takes effect.


2020 ◽  
Vol 9 (1) ◽  
pp. 86-101
Author(s):  
Aleksandra Gebuza

AbstractThe main aim of the article is to provide analysis on the notion of the right to be forgotten developed by the CJEU in the ruling Google v. AEPD & Gonzalez and by the General Data Protection Regulation within the context of the processing of personal data on the Internet. The analysis provides the comparison of approach towards the notion between European and American jurisprudence and doctrine, in order to demonstrate the scale of difficulty in applying the concept in practice.


Author(s):  
Svetlana Sitņikova

“Tiesības tikt aizmirstam” ir samērā jauns tiesību institūts, kura aktualizēšanas priekšnosacījums ir tehnoloģiju attīstība un globalizācija, kas šobrīd ļauj padarīt informāciju, tostarp arī personas datus un sensitīvus datus, publiski pieejamu visā pasaulē. Iepriekš minētais rada nepieciešamību veicināt personas datu aizsardzību. “Tiesības tikt aizmirstam” īpaši tika aktualizētas saistībā ar Eiropas Savienības tiesas lēmumu lietā C-131/12 Google Spain SL, Google Inc. pret Agencia de Protección de Datos, Mario Costeja González (t. s. Google v Spain lieta). Arī Eiropas Cilvēktiesību tiesa saskaras ar jaunām koncepcijām, no kurām viena ir “tiesības tikt aizmirstam”. Veicot pētījumu, tika iegūtas šādas atziņas: “tiesības tikt aizmirstam” var tikt iekļautas zem privātuma tiesībām, un šīs tiesības izriet no spēkā esošiem gan Eiropas Savienības tiesību aktiem, gan Latvijas Republikas normatīvajiem aktiem. The “right to be forgotten” is a relatively new legal institution and the prerequisites for it are rapid technological developments and globalisation, which now allow to make information, including personal data and sensitive data, publicly available worldwide. The above mentioned requires the enhancement of the personal data protection. The “right to be forgotten” had been brought up to date particularly in relation to the EU Court of Justice’s decision in case C-131/12 Google Spain SL and Google Inc. v Agencia Española de Protección de Datos (AEPD) and Mario Costeja González. The European Court of Human Rights is facing new concepts such as that of the “right to be forgotten”. The following conclusions are made when conducting the research: the “right to be forgotten” is the element of the right to privacy, and it can be derived from the existing EU law and Latvian regulation.


Author(s):  
Maria Tzanou

The right to be forgotten as established in the CJEU's decision in Google Spain is the first online data privacy right recognized in the EU legal order. This contribution explores two currently underdeveloped in the literature aspects of the right to be forgotten: its unexpected consequences on search engines and the difficulties of its implementation in practice by the latter. It argues that the horizontal application of EU privacy rights on private parties, such as internet search engines—as undertaken by the CJEU—is fraught with conceptual gaps, dilemmas, and uncertainties that create confusions about the enforceability of the right to be forgotten and the role of search engines. In this respect, it puts forward a comprehensive legal framework for the implementation of this right, which aims to ensure a legally certain and proportionate balance of the competing interests online in the light of the EU's General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR).


Author(s):  
Maria Tzanou

The right to be forgotten as established in the CJEU's decision in Google Spain is the first online data privacy right recognized in the EU legal order. This contribution explores two currently underdeveloped in the literature aspects of the right to be forgotten: its unexpected consequences on search engines and the difficulties of its implementation in practice by the latter. It argues that the horizontal application of EU privacy rights on private parties, such as internet search engines—as undertaken by the CJEU—is fraught with conceptual gaps, dilemmas, and uncertainties that create confusions about the enforceability of the right to be forgotten and the role of search engines. In this respect, it puts forward a comprehensive legal framework for the implementation of this right, which aims to ensure a legally certain and proportionate balance of the competing interests online in the light of the EU's General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR).


2020 ◽  
Vol 21 (S1) ◽  
pp. 31-39
Author(s):  
Ana Bobić

AbstractThe relationship between the Court of Justice and the Bundesverfassungsgericht is perhaps one of the most explored relationships in all of EU’s legal history. In attempting to understand and operationalize the uncertainty surrounding the positioning between EU and national constitutional orders, they have in some respects followed the footsteps of a typical life-long love story: in the early years of European integration, both courts appeared to be in denial of any romance, and entered into a conflict over the question of the final arbiter; they subsequently turned to flirting by moving away from an institutionally based conflict towards finding a common substantive ground; which resulted in finally abandoning the competition for domination, but rather embracing mutual respect and a heterarchical relationship. This brief piece follows these developments in fundamental rights review that for now end with the second German decision concerning the right to be forgotten.


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