scholarly journals “Tiesības tikt aizmirstam” kā tiesības uz privātumu un to tiesiskais regulējums

Author(s):  
Svetlana Sitņikova

“Tiesības tikt aizmirstam” ir samērā jauns tiesību institūts, kura aktualizēšanas priekšnosacījums ir tehnoloģiju attīstība un globalizācija, kas šobrīd ļauj padarīt informāciju, tostarp arī personas datus un sensitīvus datus, publiski pieejamu visā pasaulē. Iepriekš minētais rada nepieciešamību veicināt personas datu aizsardzību. “Tiesības tikt aizmirstam” īpaši tika aktualizētas saistībā ar Eiropas Savienības tiesas lēmumu lietā C-131/12 Google Spain SL, Google Inc. pret Agencia de Protección de Datos, Mario Costeja González (t. s. Google v Spain lieta). Arī Eiropas Cilvēktiesību tiesa saskaras ar jaunām koncepcijām, no kurām viena ir “tiesības tikt aizmirstam”. Veicot pētījumu, tika iegūtas šādas atziņas: “tiesības tikt aizmirstam” var tikt iekļautas zem privātuma tiesībām, un šīs tiesības izriet no spēkā esošiem gan Eiropas Savienības tiesību aktiem, gan Latvijas Republikas normatīvajiem aktiem. The “right to be forgotten” is a relatively new legal institution and the prerequisites for it are rapid technological developments and globalisation, which now allow to make information, including personal data and sensitive data, publicly available worldwide. The above mentioned requires the enhancement of the personal data protection. The “right to be forgotten” had been brought up to date particularly in relation to the EU Court of Justice’s decision in case C-131/12 Google Spain SL and Google Inc. v Agencia Española de Protección de Datos (AEPD) and Mario Costeja González. The European Court of Human Rights is facing new concepts such as that of the “right to be forgotten”. The following conclusions are made when conducting the research: the “right to be forgotten” is the element of the right to privacy, and it can be derived from the existing EU law and Latvian regulation.

Author(s):  
Svetlana Sitņikova

“Tiesības tikt aizmirstam” ir samērā jauns tiesību institūts, kura aktualizēšanas priekšnosacījums ir tehnoloģiju attīstība un globalizācija, kas šobrīd ļauj padarīt informāciju, tostarp arī personas datus un sensitīvus datus, publiski pieejamu visā pasaulē. Iepriekšminētais rada nepieciešamību veicināt personas datu aizsardzību. “Tiesības tikt aizmirstam” īpaši tika aktualizētas saistībā ar Eiropas Savienības tiesas lēmumu lietā C-131/12 Google Spain SL, Google Inc. pret Agencia de Protección de Datos, Mario Costeja González (t. s. Google v Spain lieta). Arī Eiropas Cilvēktiesību tiesa saskaras ar jaunām koncepcijām, no kurām viena ir “tiesības tikt aizmirstam”. Veicot pētījumu, tika gūtas šādas atziņas: Latvijas Republikas normatīvajos aktos paredzētie aizsardzības līdzekļi, atbildība un sankcijas tikai daļēji veicina “tiesību tikt aizmirstam” ievērošanu. Pētījumā iesaistītās valsts iestādes neapzinās ar fizisko personu datu apstrādi saistītos potenciālos riskus un tos novērsa (veica nepieciešamās izmaiņas datu apstrādes sistēmās) tikai pēc privātpersonas(-u) iesnieguma saņemšanas. Šī iemesla dēļ, lai stiprinātu Latvijas iedzīvotāju uzticēšanos valsts iestādēm jautājumā par tiešsaistē atrodamiem datiem un panāktu jaunu pakalpojumu, tostarp arī publisko e-pārvaldības pakalpojumu izmantošanu, tādējādi sekmējot ekonomikas izaugsmi, valsts iestādēm ir jāpārskata sava prakse saistībā ar personas datu apstrādi un pieejamību tiešsaistē. The “right to be forgotten” is a relatively new legal institution and the prerequisite for it are rapid technological developments and globalisation allowing information, including personal data and sensitive data, publicly available worldwide. The above mentioned requires the enhancement of the personal data protection. The “right to be forgotten” had been brought up to date particularly in relation to the EU Court of Justice decision in case C-131/12 Google Spain SL and Google Inc. v Agencia Española de Protección de Datos (AEPD) and Mario Costeja González. The European Court of Human Rights is being faced with new concepts such as that of the “right to be forgotten”. The following conclusions are drawn when conducting the research: the remedies, liability and sanctions as provided in Latvian regulation only partially contribute to the compliance with the “right to be forgotten”. The state institutions interviewed while carrying out this research are not aware of the potential risks concerning processing of personal data and make necessary changes in their data processing systems only in response to the individual/-s application. Therefore, to strengthen the trust of Latvian inhabitants in online data kept by public authorities and to enhance usage of e-government services, thus facilitating economic growth, the public authorities must review their existing practices regarding the processing of personal data and access online.


Author(s):  
NATALIA V. VARLAMOVA

Among the digital rights, besides the right for internet access that was the subject of consideration in the first part of the article, there are also a right to per-so nal data protection and a right to be forgotten (right to erasure).The right to personal data protection is usually enshrined at the supranational and national levels and is protected by the courts as an aspect of the right to privacy. As an independent fundamental right of a constitutional nature the right to personal data protection is enshrined in EU law. Nevertheless, all attempts to doctrinally justify the existence of certain aspects of this right, beyond the claims to the right to privacy, can not be considered successful. The Court of Justice of the EU, while dealing with the relevant cases in order to determine whether certain methods of processing personal data are legitimate, also refers to the right to privacy, considering these rights to be closely interrelated. The right to personal data protection provides additional (including procedural) guarantees of respect for privacy, human dignity and some other rights, but the purpose of these guarantees is precisely the content of the providing rights. The right to be forgotten (right to erasure) is one of the positive obligations with regard to the personal data protection. This right implies correction, deletion or termination of the processing of personal data at the request of their subject in the presence of a reason for this (when the relevant actions are carried out in violation of the principles of data processing or provisions of the legislation). Analogs of this right are the Latin American orders of habeas data, as well as the right of a person to demand the refutation of information discrediting his honor, dignity and business reputation, in case of their inconsistency with reality under civil law and the legislation on mass media. In digital age the importance of this right is increased by the fact that information posted on the Internet remains easily accessible for an indefinite, almost unlimited, time.This caused the extension of the right to be forgotten to information that is consistent to reality, but has lost its relevance and significance, however, continues to have an adverse impact on the reputation of the person concerned. At the same time, the realization of the right to be forgotten in respect of information posted online is connected with a number of technical problems that require legal solutions.In general, digitalization does not create new human rights of a fundamentally different legal nature. It only actualizes or smooths certain aspects of long-recognized rights, transfers their operation into the virtual space, creates new opportunities for their realization and generates new threats to them. Ensuring human rights in modern conditions involves the search for adequate legal solutions, taking into account the opportunities and limitations generated by digital technologies.


2020 ◽  
pp. 99-110
Author(s):  
Arben Murtezić

The purpose of this paper is to highlight the significance of the Convention for the Protection of Individuals with regard to Automatic Processing of Personal Data (Convention 108) in the overall system of personal data protection, especially from the perspective of non-EU countries that are members of the Council of Europe. This is attempted primarily through the evaluation of correlation between the Convention 108 and ECHR and GDPR in its segment that regulates relationship between the EU and third countries. The interest for the issue of personal data protection has been increasing among legal and ICT professionals, academics, government officials and even a general public over the years. This has been particularly intensified by adopting General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR). However, the adoption of the GDPR did not diminish importance of the Convention 108. On the contrary, it seems that the 'adequacy' principle regarding the third countries proclaimed by the GDPR, stresses its importance. The paper begins with the brief overview of the Convention 108 principles and the modernization that is brought by Protocol of 2018, which coincides with the entry into force of much-mentioned GDPR. It continues with analysis of the relationship between the GDPR and Convention 108, with focus on elements decisively influencing the assessment of the adequacy of the level of protection. Even though there is no sign of equivalence between the right to privacy and personal data protection these matters inevitably intersect in practice. Therefore, the final section of the text summarizes the cases of the European Court of Human Rights invoking Convention 108, with the aim to demonstrate how it is interpreted by the highest judicial instance in Europe.


2021 ◽  
pp. 99-109
Author(s):  
MARIJANA MLADENOV ◽  
JELENA STOJŠIĆ DABETIĆ

Should we consider the right to be forgotten as a threat to free speech or the mechanism of the right to privacy? This most controversial element of the right to privacy and personal data protection caused the global debate on privacy and freedom of speech. Despite the fact that the right to be forgotten is codified in Article 17 of the General Data Protection Regulation and that fundamental postulates of this right were defined in Google v. Spain, there still remain unresolved issues. In order to gain a clear idea of the content of the right to be forgotten, as the principle of data protection in accordance with the latest European perspective, the subject matter of the paper refers to analyses of the developments of this right in the light of relevant regulations, as well as of the jurisprudence of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU). The article firstly provides an overview of the concept of the right to be forgotten, from the very early proposals that gave rise to it, to the latest ones contained in recent regulations. Furthermore, the special attention is devoted to the new standards of the concept of the right to be forgotten from the aspect of recent rulings of the CJEU, GC et al v. CNIL and CNIL v. Google. Within the concluding remarks, the authors highlight the need for theoretical innovation and an adequate legal framework of the right to be forgotten in order to fit this right within the sociotechnical legal culture. The goal of the article is to provide insight regarding the implementation of the right to be forgotten in the European Union and to identify the main challenges with respect to the issue.


2019 ◽  
Vol 31 (5) ◽  
pp. 1509-1514
Author(s):  
Biljana Karovska-Andonovska ◽  
Zoran Jovanovski

The reforms in the communications monitoring system as part of the wider reform of the security services in the Republic of Macedonia, resulted with creation of a package of several laws whose adoption was supposed to provide the legislative basis for a system that would really work in accordance with the goals for which it was established. The communications monitoring system should provide a balanced protection of the right to security, on the one hand, and the right to privacy, on the other. Only on that way a priori primacy of the right to security over the right to privacy will it be disabled. Hence, the reforms in communications monitoring system are a precondition for the effective protection, primarily for the right to privacy and the secrecy of communications, but also for the right to personal data protection, the inviolability of the home as well as for the right to presumption of innocence. It is a complex and delicate matter where opening of a real debate through which the present deficiencies will be perceived in order to create an appropriate legal solutions was very important. However, the new Law on Interception of Communications as the most important in this area, retained a certain part of the provisions that were debatable in the previous legal solutions. The provisions regarding the model for interception of communications, which stipulates the establishment of a separate agency that mediates between the operators and the authorized bodies for interception of communications, were questionable as well. Also, new measures for monitoring communications in the interest of security and defense, as well as the provisions which regulate the disposition and delivery of metadata for security and defense, are also debatable. On the other side, the reform laws made an evident progress in a positive sense through the provisions for oversight and control over the interception of communications. With these changes, certain debatable elements have been overcome, especially those that have hindered it so far, and in some cases completely paralyzed the oversight and control over the monitoring of communications. In this paper we analyzed the debatable elements in the reform package of laws on interception of communications as well as some positive aspects contained in the provisions of the reform laws.


Author(s):  
Agnese Reine-Vītiņa

Mūsdienās tiesības uz privāto dzīvi nepieciešamas ikvienā demokrātiskā sabiedrībā, un šo tiesību iekļaušana konstitūcijā juridiski garantē fiziskas personas rīcības brīvību un vienlaikus arī citu – valsts pamatlikumā noteikto – cilvēka tiesību īstenošanu [5]. Personas datu aizsardzības institūts tika izveidots, izpratnes par tiesību uz personas privātās dzīves neaizskaramību saturu paplašinot 20. gadsimta 70. gados, kad vairāku Eiropas valstu valdības uzsāka informācijas apstrādes projektus, piemēram, tautas skaitīšanu u. c. Informācijas tehnoloģiju attīstība ļāva arvien vairāk informācijas par personām glabāt un apstrādāt elektroniski. Viena no tiesību problēmām bija informācijas vākšana par fizisku personu un tiesību uz privātās dzīves neaizskaramību ievērošana. Lai nodrošinātu privātās dzīves aizsardzību, atsevišķas Eiropas valstis pēc savas iniciatīvas pieņēma likumus par datu aizsardzību. Pirmie likumi par personas datu aizsardzību Eiropā tika pieņemti Vācijas Federatīvajā Republikā, tad Zviedrijā (1973), Norvēģijā (1978) un citur [8, 10]. Ne visas valstis pieņēma likumus par datu aizsardzību vienlaikus, tāpēc Eiropas Padome nolēma izstrādāt konvenciju, lai unificētu datu aizsardzības noteikumus un principus. Nowadays, the right to privacy is indispensable in every democratic society and inclusion of such rights in the constitution, guarantees legally freedom of action of a natural person and, simultaneously, implementation of other human rights established in the fundamental law of the state. The institute of personal data protection was established by expanding the understanding of the content of the right to privacy in the 70’s of the 19th century, when the government of several European countries initiated information processing projects, such as population census etc. For the development of information technology, more and more information on persons was kept and processed in electronic form. One of the legal problems was gathering of information on natural persons and the right to privacy. In order to ensure the protection of privacy, separate European countries, on their own initiative, established a law on data protection. The first laws on the protection of personal data in Europe were established in the Federal Republic of Germany, then in Sweden (1973), Norway (1978) and elsewhere. Not all countries adopted laws on data protection at the same time, so the Council of Europe decided to elaborate a convention to unify data protection rules and principles.


2021 ◽  
pp. 125
Author(s):  
GULNAZ AYDIN RZAYEVA ◽  
AYTAKIN NAZIM IBRAHIMOVA

The development of new technologies also has an impact on human rights. In the previous “epochs” of global information society, it was stated that that traditional rights can be exercised online. For instance, in 2012 (and again in 2014 and 2016), the UN Human Rights Council emphasized that ‘the same rights granted to people, so to speak, in an “offline” manner, must be protected online as well’. This, in its turn, implicitly brought to the reality that the new technetronic society did not create new rights. Though, we should take into consideration that in the digital world national legislative norms that guarantee the confidentiality of personal data often do not catch up with the technological development and, thus, can’t ensure confidentiality online. Therefore, the impact of digitalization on human rights within the frames of international and national laws should be broadly analysed and studied. The article’s objective is to analyze the impact of new technologies on human rights in the context of the right to be forgotten and right to privacy. Because the development of new technologies is more closely linked to the security of personal data. With the formation of the right to be forgotten, it is the issue of ensuring the confidentiality of certain contents of personal data as a result of the influence of the time factor. The authors conclude that, the right to be forgotten was previously defended more in the context of the right to privacy. However, they cannot be considered equal rights. The right to be forgotten stems from a person’s desire to develop and continue his or her life independently without being the object of criticism for any negative actions he or she has committed in the past. If the right to privacy contains generally confidential information, the right to be forgotten is understood as the deletion of known information at a certain time and the denial of access to third parties. Thus, the right to be forgotten is not included in the right to privacy, and can be considered an independent right. The point is that the norms of the international and national documents, which establish fundamental human rights and freedoms, do not regulate issues related to the right to be forgotten. The right to be forgotten should be limited to the deletion of information from the media and Internet information resources. This is not about the complete destruction of information available in state information systems. Another conclusion of authors is that the media and Internet information resources sometimes spread false information. In this case, there will be no content of the right to be forgotten. Because the main thing is that the information that constitutes the content of the right to be forgotten must be legal, but after some time it has lost its significance. The scope of information included in the content of the right to be forgotten should not only be related to the conviction, but also to other special personal data (for example, the fact of divorce).


Author(s):  
Ioannis Iglezakis

Digital libraries provide many advantages compared with traditional libraries, such as wide and round the clock availability of resources, lack of physical boundaries, etc. However, the disclosure of personally identifiable information in the course of processing activities may lead to an invasion of privacy of library users, without their being aware of it. In fact, privacy threats are increased in the digital environment, in which digital libraries operate. The right to privacy in the library is “the right to open inquiry without having the subject of one’s interest examined or scrutinized by others” (ALA, 2005). Users of digital libraries have similar privacy expectations when making use of their services. The issues concerning the privacy of digital libraries’ patrons are thus addressed in comparative perspective, in this chapter. In more particular, the legal regulations with regard to data protection in digital libraries in the EU and the US are presented. The comparative analysis of the two legal orders shows differences and similarities, but also highlights loopholes of protection.


2020 ◽  
Vol 21 (6) ◽  
pp. 1283-1308
Author(s):  
Jie (Jeanne) Huang

AbstractThe recent COVID-19 outbreak has pushed the tension of protecting personal data in a transnational context to an apex. Using a real case where the personal data of an international traveler was illegally released by Chinese media, this Article identifies three trends that have emerged at each stage of conflict-of-laws analysis for lex causae: (1) The EU, the US, and China characterize the right to personal data differently; (2) the spread-out unilateral applicable law approach comes from the fact that all three jurisdictions either consider the law for personal data protection as a mandatory law or adopt connecting factors leading to the law of the forum; and (3) the EU and China strongly advocate deAmericanization of substantive data protection laws. The trends and their dynamics provide valuable implications for developing the choice of laws for transnational personal data. First, this finding informs parties that jurisdiction is a predominant issue in data breach cases because courts and regulators would apply the law of the forum. Second, currently, there is no international treaty or model law on choice-of-law issues for transnational personal data. International harmonization efforts will be a long and difficult journey considering how the trends demonstrate not only the states’ irreconcilable interests but also how states may consider these interests as their fundamental values that they do not want to trade off. Therefore, for states and international organizations, a feasible priority is to achieve regional coordination or interoperation among states with similar values on personal data protection.


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