scholarly journals Financial background of controlling shareholder and corporate financialization

2021 ◽  
pp. 1-25
Author(s):  
Xiangyan Shi ◽  
Danlu Bu ◽  
Caihong Wen ◽  
Zong Lan
Keyword(s):  
Controlling Shareholder

Auditors and the Principal-Principal Agency Conflict in Family Controlled Firms

2020 ◽  
Vol 39 (4) ◽  
pp. 31-55
Author(s):  
Chiraz Ben Ali ◽  
Sabri Boubaker ◽  
Michel Magnan
Keyword(s):  
Risk Assessment ◽  
Negative Relationship ◽  
Audit Fees ◽  
Data Availability ◽  
Audit Risk ◽  
Controlling Shareholder ◽  
Voting Power ◽  
The Public ◽  
Agency Conflict ◽  
Jel Classifications

SUMMARY This paper examines whether multiple large shareholders (MLS) affect audit fees in firms where the largest controlling shareholder (LCS) is a family. Results show that there is a negative relationship between audit fees and the presence, number, and voting power of MLS. This is consistent with the view that auditors consider MLS as playing a monitoring role over the LCS, mitigating the potential for expropriation by the LCS. Therefore, our evidence suggests that auditors reduce their audit risk assessment and audit effort and ultimately audit fees in family controlled firms with MLS. Data Availability: Data are available from the public sources cited in the text. JEL Classifications: G32; G34; M42; D86.

Controlling shareholders' stock pledges and strategic change: the moderating effects of corporate governance

2021 ◽  
Vol ahead-of-print (ahead-of-print) ◽  
Author(s):  
Xi Zhong ◽  
He Wan ◽  
Qiuping Peng
Keyword(s):  
Fixed Effects ◽  
Family Firms ◽  
Strategic Change ◽  
Balance Of Power ◽  
Controlling Shareholder ◽  
Analyst Coverage ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Controlling Shareholders ◽  
Change Behavior ◽  
Negative Effect

PurposeThe authors analyze the effects of controlling shareholders' stock pledging on firms' strategic change behavior, and investigate how the balance of power between shareholders and analyst coverage moderates those effects.Design/methodology/approachEmploying fixed effects models, the authors test hypotheses based on Chinese listed company data from 2011 to 2017.FindingsControlling shareholders' stock pledges has a negative effect on strategic change. As the balance of power among shareholders and/or analyst coverage increases, it mitigates the effect of controlling shareholder stock pledges on strategic change. In particular, the balance of power between shareholders and analyst coverage weakened the relationship between controlling shareholder stock pledges and strategic change. Lastly, after distinguishing family from nonfamily firms, the authors discovered that these findings only held for family firms.Originality/valueThis study makes important contributions to strategic change, stock pledge and family firm literature, and also provides guidance on firms' strategic change practices.

Ultimate parent's board reform and controlling shareholder entrenchment: Evidence from a quasi-natural experiment in China

2019 ◽  
Vol 38 ◽  
pp. 389-403 ◽  
Author(s):  
Guilong Cai ◽  
Sujuan Xie ◽  
Yue Xu ◽  
Yamin Zeng ◽  
Junsheng Zhang
Keyword(s):  
Natural Experiment ◽  
Controlling Shareholder ◽  
Board Reform

scholarly journals Corporate governance and firm valuation – the case of China

2009 ◽  
Vol 7 (2) ◽  
pp. 21-29 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ohannes George Paskelian ◽  
Stephen Bell
Keyword(s):  
Firm Value ◽  
Cash Holdings ◽  
Firm Valuation ◽  
Government Ownership ◽  
Private Benefits ◽  
Controlling Shareholder ◽  
Foreign Investors ◽  
High Government ◽  
Corporate Cash Holdings ◽  
Strong Inverse Relationship

We examine the determinants and implications of Chinese corporate cash holdings in the 1993- 2006 period. Agency theories assert that firms with a large controlling shareholder have relatively large cash holdings because of the greater ability of the controlling shareholder to extract private benefits from the cash holdings. Our findings show a very strong inverse relationship between cash holdings and firm valuation in high government ownership firms. Also, we find that in firms with high government ownership, dividend payouts are highly valued. We conclude that Chinese investors see government ownership as a factor that reduces firm value. They prefer relatively higher dividends from firms having high government ownership. Conversely, investors assign much higher value to firms with relatively low government ownership and they tend to be neutral about the dividends payouts of such firms. Also, investors value highly the presence of foreign investors in Chinese firms and tend to be neutral about dividend payouts of firms with high foreign ownership concentration.

scholarly journals A Relação de Poder e as Ações de Responsabilidade do Controlador nas Sociedades Anônimas ## The Relationship of Power and Responsibility Actions of the Controller in Corporations

2021 ◽  
Vol 10 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Thales Janguiê Silva Diniz
Keyword(s):  
Empirical Analysis ◽  
Power Relations ◽  
Real Case ◽  
Controlling Shareholder ◽  
Control Power ◽  
Relationship Of ◽  
The Relationship

O presente estudo tem como objetivo analisar as relações de poder e a responsabilidade do acionista controlador, conjuntamente com suas ações correlatas, nas sociedades anônimas. Serão analisados quais os modelos de controle na sociedade anônima, os deveres e responsabilidades do controlador e os tipos de ação para sua responsabilização em caso de abuso do poder desse controle. Um caso real foi apresentado para demonstrar como é possível discutir a responsabilidade do controlador por possível abuso na companhia. Foram utilizados os métodos dedutivo, com análise legislativa e doutrinária e o empírico. ABSTRACTThis study aims to analyze the power relations and the responsibility of the controlling shareholder, together with their related actions, in public limited companies. It will be analyzed what are the types of control in the corporation, the duties, and responsibilities of the controller and what are the types of actions for its accountability in case of abuse of the control power. A real case was presented to demonstrate how it is possible to discuss the controller's responsibility for possible abuse in the company. Deductive methods were used, with legislative and doctrinal and empirical analysis.

scholarly journals Women Do the Job: The Reasons to Set Quota for Women on Boards

2018 ◽  
Vol 13 (12) ◽  
pp. 167
Author(s):  
Sara De Masi ◽  
Agnieszka Słomka-Gołębiowska ◽  
Andrea Paci
Keyword(s):  
Audit Committee ◽  
Empirical Support ◽  
Board Structure ◽  
Corporate Boards ◽  
Controlling Shareholder ◽  
Female Directors ◽  
Women On Boards ◽  
Board Monitoring ◽  
Women On Corporate Boards ◽  
Family Connection

In 2012 Italy introduced quota to increase the number of women on corporate boards. The aim of our research is to shed more lights on how women on boards, after the enforcement of quota law, improve the board functions and the board structure. Our study focuses on all Italian FTSE MIB companies from 2008 to 2015. Italy is a country where the percentage of female directors was very low before quota. Female directors, when present, were linked through a family connection to the controlling shareholder. Our research demonstrates that a higher percentage of women on boards, after the quota, leads to a higher board members attendance and more board meetings, thus a better board monitoring. We document that, after quota, one more women to the board results in increasing the board involvement in strategy and the independence of audit committee. Our findings provide empirical support on the effectiveness of female directors, suggesting important implications of the quota legislation on the “type” of women elected.

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