Approximate Truth and Scientific Realism

1992 ◽  
Vol 59 (1) ◽  
pp. 53-74 ◽  
Author(s):  
Thomas Weston
Keyword(s):  
Scientific Realism ◽  
Approximate Truth

Scientific Realism without the Quantum

2020 ◽  
pp. 19-34
Author(s):  
Carl Hoefer
Keyword(s):  
Scientific Realism ◽  
Physical Reality ◽  
Field Theories ◽  
Quantum Field Theories ◽  
Quantum Field ◽  
Scientific Theories ◽  
Quantum Theories ◽  
Approximate Truth ◽  
Clear Cut ◽  
Contemporary Science

Scientific realists often say that there should be belief in the approximate truth of ‘our best scientific theories.’ It is hard to hear the phrase ‘our best scientific theories’ without thinking of quantum mechanics and quantum field theories. But as numerous chapters in this collection make clear, it is unclear that some experts even know how to make sense of being a realist about quantum theories. They provide recipes for calculating incredibly precise predictions for observations, but beyond the recipes, they do not seem to offer a clear-cut or unambiguous picture of what physical reality is like at the fundamental level. After giving an overview of the problems that beset any attempt to believe in the truth or approximate truth of quantum theories, Chapter 2 turns to the question of how to protect scientific realism from the ills of the quantum. The aim is to show that it is possible to quarantine the worst of those ills, freeing us to adopt a robustly realistic attitude toward many other extremely successful areas of contemporary science, such as (parts of) geology, microbiology, and chemistry. The quarantine barrier may be imperfect and permeable in places, but is strong enough (the chapter argues) to help the cause of scientific realism.

scholarly journals A Fond Farewell to "Approximate Truth"?

2018 ◽  
Vol 9 (1) ◽  
pp. 78 ◽  
Author(s):  
P. Kyle Stanford
Keyword(s):  
Scientific Realism ◽  
Scientific Inquiry ◽  
High Probability ◽  
Historical Record ◽  
Scientific Theories ◽  
Scientific Realist ◽  
Approximate Truth ◽  
Different Types ◽  
Realism Debate

Most commonly, the scientific realism debate is seen as dividing those who do and do not think that the striking empirical and practical successes of at least our best scientific theories indicate with high probability that those theories are ‘approximately true’. But I want to suggest that this characterization of the debate has far outlived its usefulness. Not only does it obscure the central differences between two profoundly different types of contemporary scientific realist, but even more importantly it serves to disguise the most substantial points of actual disagreement between these two kinds of realists and those who instead think the historical record of scientific inquiry itself reveals that such realism is untenable in either form.

scholarly journals The Non-Miraculous Success of Formal Analogies in Quantum Theories

2020 ◽  
pp. 255-275
Author(s):  
Doreen Fraser
Keyword(s):  
Case Studies ◽  
History Of Science ◽  
Scientific Realism ◽  
Structural Realism ◽  
Higgs Model ◽  
Historical Case ◽  
Quantum Theories ◽  
No Miracles Argument ◽  
Approximate Truth ◽  
History Of

The Higgs model was developed using purely formal analogies to models of superconductivity. This is in contrast to historical case studies such as the development of electromagnetism, which employed physical analogies. As a result, quantum case studies such as the development of the Higgs model carry new lessons for the scientific (anti-)realism debate. Chapter 13 argues that, by breaking the connection between success and approximate truth, the use of purely formal analogies is a counterexample to two prominent versions of the ‘No Miracles’ Argument (NMA) for scientific realism: Stathis Psillos’ Refined Explanationist Defense of Realism and the Argument from History of Science for structural realism. The NMA is undermined, but the success of the Higgs model is not miraculous because there is a naturalistically acceptable explanation for its success that does not invoke approximate truth. The chapter also suggests some possible strategies for adapting to the counterexample for scientific realists who wish to hold on to the NMA in some form.

Background Practices

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Hubert L. Dreyfus
Keyword(s):  
Scientific Realism ◽  
Distinctive Feature ◽  
Phenomenological Description ◽  
Existential Philosophy ◽  
Textual Exegesis ◽  
European Tradition ◽  
Continental Divide ◽  
European Philosophy ◽  
Anglophone World ◽  
Hubert Dreyfus

Hubert Dreyfus is one of the foremost advocates of European philosophy in the anglophone world. His clear, jargon-free interpretations of the leading thinkers of the European tradition of philosophy have done a great deal to erase the analytic–Continental divide. But Dreyfus is not just an influential interpreter of Continental philosophers; he is a creative, iconoclastic thinker in his own right. Drawing on the work of Heidegger, Husserl, Merleau-Ponty, Foucault, and Kierkegaard, Dreyfus makes significant contributions to contemporary conversations about mind, authenticity, technology, nihilism, modernity and postmodernity, art, scientific realism, and religion. This volume collects thirteen of Dreyfus’s most influential essays, each of which interprets, develops, and extends the insights of his predecessors working in phenomenological and existential philosophy. The essays exemplify a distinctive feature of his approach to philosophy, namely the way his work inextricably intertwines the interpretation of texts with his own analysis and description of the phenomena at issue. In fact, these two tasks—textual exegesis and phenomenological description—are for Dreyfus necessarily dependent on each other. In approaching philosophy in this way, Dreyfus is an heir to Heidegger’s own historically oriented style of phenomenology.

Introduction

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Daniel Stoljar
Keyword(s):  
Scientific Realism ◽  
Subject Matter ◽  
Main Thesis ◽  
The Subject

This chapter introduces the main thesis of the book, reasonable optimism, according to which there is progress on reasonably many of the big problems of philosophy. It also introduces two distinctions central to that thesis: between big questions in philosophy and small questions, and between the subject matter of philosophy, and the big questions that people have asked in different times and places about that subject matter. Examples of professional philosophers who endorse either pessimism or something close to it are set forth and analysed. Scientific realism, a position often associated with reasonable optimism about history or science, is also introduced.

Scientific realism, or the risks of importing research models into psychology

2021 ◽  
Vol 31 (3) ◽  
pp. 429-432
Author(s):  
David Carré
Keyword(s):  
Standard Model ◽  
Scientific Realism ◽  
Subject Matter ◽  
Human Person ◽  
Behavioral Research ◽  
Research Practice ◽  
Philosophical Basis ◽  
The Standard Model

In “Scientific Realism and the Issue of Variability in Behavior,” Arocha (2021) develops an acute critique of “the standard model of current research practice in psychology” (p. 376), sharply dissecting five unwarranted assumptions behind it. To address these issues, the author proposes adopting a nonpositivist philosophical basis for behavioral research: scientific realism. Behind this argumentation, however, it is implied that scientific realism is fit for becoming the metatheoretical framework for psychology because it addresses the shortcomings of the current positivist model. In this commentary, I argue that scientific realism is not fit for becoming that philosophical basis, because it is open to reducing the discipline’s subject matter—the human person—to make it fit with models that have been fruitful in other sciences. Three historical examples are presented to show the risks of adopting models from disciplines devoted to explaining other phenomena to tackle the complexity of psychology’s subject matter.

scholarly journals Scientific Ontology: Fact or Stance?

Dialogue ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 60 (1) ◽  
pp. 15-31 ◽  
Author(s):  
Stathis Psillos
Keyword(s):  
Scientific Realism ◽  
Epistemic Stance ◽  
Realism Debate ◽  
Scientific Ontology

ABSTRACTIn this paper, the key tenets of Anjan Chakravartty's book Scientific Ontology are critically discussed. After a brief presentation of the project of stance-based ontology (Section 2), I move on to criticize Chakravartty's account of metaphysical inference (Sections 2 and 3). Then, in Section 4, I take issue with Chakravartty's view that fundamental debates in metaphysics inevitably lead to irresolvable disagreement, while in Section 5, the concept of epistemic stance is scrutinized, noting that there are problems in Chakravartty's account of the rationality of stance-choice. Finally, Section 6 is about the implications of stance-based ontology for the scientific realism debate.

Reflections on a classic in scientific realism, 20 years later

Metascience ◽  
2018 ◽  
Vol 28 (1) ◽  
pp. 13-21
Author(s):  
Bas C. van Fraassen
Keyword(s):  
Scientific Realism
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