scholarly journals A Fond Farewell to "Approximate Truth"?

2018 ◽  
Vol 9 (1) ◽  
pp. 78 ◽  
Author(s):  
P. Kyle Stanford
Keyword(s):  
Scientific Realism ◽  
Scientific Inquiry ◽  
High Probability ◽  
Historical Record ◽  
Scientific Theories ◽  
Scientific Realist ◽  
Approximate Truth ◽  
Different Types ◽  
Realism Debate

Most commonly, the scientific realism debate is seen as dividing those who do and do not think that the striking empirical and practical successes of at least our best scientific theories indicate with high probability that those theories are ‘approximately true’. But I want to suggest that this characterization of the debate has far outlived its usefulness. Not only does it obscure the central differences between two profoundly different types of contemporary scientific realist, but even more importantly it serves to disguise the most substantial points of actual disagreement between these two kinds of realists and those who instead think the historical record of scientific inquiry itself reveals that such realism is untenable in either form.

scholarly journals Editor's Introduction

2018 ◽  
Vol 9 (1) ◽  
pp. 1
Author(s):  
Curtis Forbes
Keyword(s):  
Philosophy Of Science ◽  
Empirical Evidence ◽  
Scientific Realism ◽  
Scientific Theories ◽  
The Future ◽  
Technical Details ◽  
Realism Debate

The debate over scientific realism, simply put, is a debate over what we can and should believe about reality once we've critically assessed all the available arguments and empirical evidence. Thinking earnestly about the merits of scientific realism as a philosophical thesis requires navigating contentious historiographical issues, being familiar with the technical details of various scientific theories, and addressing disparate philosophical problems spanning aesthetics, metaphysics, epistemology, and beyond. This issue of Spontaneous Generations: A Journal for the History and Philosophy of Science aims to make participating in the scientific realism debate easier for both newcomers and veterans, collecting over twenty invited and peer-reviewed papers under the title "The Future of the Scientific Realism Debate: Contemporary Issues Concerning Scientific Realism."

scholarly journals El contenido empírico del realismo científico

1970 ◽  
Author(s):  
Valeriano Iranzo
Keyword(s):  
Scientific Realism ◽  
Historical Record ◽  
Testable Hypothesis ◽  
Scientific Theories ◽  
Observational Consequence ◽  
Predictive Success ◽  
Scientific Hypothesis ◽  
Empirical Hypothesis

RESUMENUna forma común de entender el realismo científico (RC) en las últimas décadas ha sido plantearlo como una inferencia explicativa: RC es la mejor explicación del éxito predictivo-instrumental de la ciencia. Algunos de sus partidarios mantienen, además que es una hipótesis empíricamente constrastable. Intentaré argumentar, que, entendido así, RC no es empíricamente contrastable. En primer lugar, aunque el éxito predictivo-instrumental initerrumpido de una teoría T es una consecuencia observacional de la verdad de T, este hecho no hecho no constituye una evidencia empírica diferente del propio "explanandum". En segundo lugar, elaorar un registro histórico del éxito -no sólo empírico, sino teórico- obtenido mediante la postulación de entidades por consideraciones explicativas, confirmaría como mucho, y eso suponiendo que fuera posible, una cocincidencia entre una metodología determinada y unos resultados, pero no daría cuenta del vínculo explicativo entre éxito predictivo instrumental por un lado, y verdad y existencia, por otro. Por consiguiente, RC no es una hipótesis empírica en un sentido genuino; a fortiori, tampoco es una hipótesis científica. Esta conclusión, no obstante, no cierra el camino a un realismo científico de carácter local.PALABRAS CLAVEREALISMO CIENTÍFICO, OBSERVACIÓN, TEORÍA, INFERENCIA A LA MEJOR EXPLICACIÓNABSTRACTA common way of understanding scientific realism (SR) during the latest decades says that SR is the best explanation of the predictive success enjoyed by scientific theories. Some os this advocates claim, aslo, that SR is an empirically testable hypothesis. I will try to argue that, as an explanation of predictive sucess, SR is not empirically testable. Firstly, even though the uninterrupted preditive success of T is an observational consequence of T´s truth, this fact is not a kind of evidence distinguishable from the very explanandum. Secondly, a historical record of success obtained by postulating theoretical emities would confirm, at most, a correlation between some methodological norms and some particular results. But confirming such correlation is not the same as vindicating an explanotory link between truth and existence (the explanans), and predictive success (the explanandum). In sum, SR is not a genuine empirical hypothesis; a fortiori, it is neither a scientific hypothesis. Anyway, this conclusion does not forbid some kind of "local" scientific realism.KEYWORDSSCIENTIFIC REALISM, OBSERVATION, THEORY, INFERENCE TO THE BEST EXPLANATION

scholarly journals Deconstructing the Phantom: Duhem and the Scientific Realism Debate

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mateusz Kotowski ◽  
Krzysztof Szlachcic
Keyword(s):  
Philosophy Of Science ◽  
Scientific Realism ◽  
Scientific Realist ◽  
Realism Debate

AbstractFor many decades, Duhem has been considered a paradigmatic instrumentalist, and while some commentators have argued against classifying him in this way, it still seems prevalent as an interpretation of his philosophy of science. Yet such a construal bears scant resemblance to the views presented in his own works—so little, indeed, that it might be said to constitute no more than a mere phantom with respect to his actual thought. In this article, we aim to deconstruct this phantom, tracing the sources of the misconceptions surrounding his ideas and pinpointing the sources and/or causes of its proliferation. We subsequently point out and discuss those elements of his philosophy that, taken together, support the view of him as a scientific realist of a sophisticated kind. Finally, we defend our own interpretation of his thought against suggestions to the effect that it is oriented towards neither instrumentalism nor scientific realism.

Scientific Realism without the Quantum

2020 ◽  
pp. 19-34
Author(s):  
Carl Hoefer
Keyword(s):  
Scientific Realism ◽  
Physical Reality ◽  
Field Theories ◽  
Quantum Field Theories ◽  
Quantum Field ◽  
Scientific Theories ◽  
Quantum Theories ◽  
Approximate Truth ◽  
Clear Cut ◽  
Contemporary Science

Scientific realists often say that there should be belief in the approximate truth of ‘our best scientific theories.’ It is hard to hear the phrase ‘our best scientific theories’ without thinking of quantum mechanics and quantum field theories. But as numerous chapters in this collection make clear, it is unclear that some experts even know how to make sense of being a realist about quantum theories. They provide recipes for calculating incredibly precise predictions for observations, but beyond the recipes, they do not seem to offer a clear-cut or unambiguous picture of what physical reality is like at the fundamental level. After giving an overview of the problems that beset any attempt to believe in the truth or approximate truth of quantum theories, Chapter 2 turns to the question of how to protect scientific realism from the ills of the quantum. The aim is to show that it is possible to quarantine the worst of those ills, freeing us to adopt a robustly realistic attitude toward many other extremely successful areas of contemporary science, such as (parts of) geology, microbiology, and chemistry. The quarantine barrier may be imperfect and permeable in places, but is strong enough (the chapter argues) to help the cause of scientific realism.

Explanation and Scientific Realism

1990 ◽  
Vol 27 ◽  
pp. 285-295
Author(s):  
Philip Gasper
Keyword(s):  
Scientific Realism ◽  
Good Explanation ◽  
Scientific Methodology ◽  
Van Fraassen ◽  
Scientific Theories ◽  
Scientific Realist ◽  
Technical Problems ◽  
Bas Van Fraassen ◽  
Long Time ◽  
Realist Perspective

A few years ago, Bas van Fraassen reminded philosophers of science that there are two central questions that a theory of explanation ought to answer. First, what is a (good) explanation—when has something been explained satisfactorily? Second, why do we value explanations? (van Fraassen, 1977, 1980, ch. 5). For a long time, discussions of explanation concentrated on technical problems connected with the first of these questions, and the second was by and large ignored. But, in fact, I think it is the second question which raises the more fundamental and interesting philosophical issues. I shall offer reasons for thinking that the answer to the first question requires acceptance of the sort of fullblown notion of causation that only a scientific realist can love, and that the answer to the second question requires a realist construal of scientific theories and scientific methodology. My argument will be mainly negative, surveying the problems facing some major alternative accounts of explanation. A full elaboration of the realist perspective will have to await the completion of work in progress.

scholarly journals Sobre el realismo convergente

1984 ◽  
Vol 16 (48) ◽  
pp. 53-78
Author(s):  
León Olivé
Keyword(s):  
History Of Science ◽  
Scientific Progress ◽  
Alternative View ◽  
Central Component ◽  
Scientific Theories ◽  
Theory Of Science ◽  
Scientific Realist ◽  
Approximate Truth ◽  
History Of ◽  
Empirical Hypothesis

This paper discusses Laudan´s claims (1981) that neither reference nor approximate truth explain the success of science as some realists have maintained; that the main realists theses about conceptual change and scientific progress are wanting, and that the history of science decisively confutes naturalistic scientific realist theses. Laudan´s arguments are examined in detail and it is shown that there are possible realist answers to his objections, provided a different view of scientific theories than the syntactic one normally accepted by naturalistic realists is assumed. This alternative view must include the notion of model as a central component of scientific theories, as developed e.g. by Harré (1970). It is also argued that Laudan´s arguments are based upon too narrow a conception of reference. It is shown that a more elaborated notion, e.g. that suggested by Kitcher (1978), can fruitfully be used by realists to explain convergence and also to rebut Laudan´s claim that there are theories, e.g. flogisto or ether theories, whose central terms did not refer but were nonetheless successful. The alternative view of reference sketched here according to Kitcher shows that some tokens of terms like ‘flogisto’ and ‘eter’ as used by the original flogisto and ether theorists did have genuine reference. The paper goes on to argue against the naturalistic idea that reference and approximate truth alone can explain why theories are accepted by scientists and why them follow, as a matter of fact, a retentionist methodology. Laudan shares the naturalistic idea that this is an empirical hypothesis, and so he tries to refute it on the basis of historical examples. The paper argues that this naturalistic view will not do. A broader theory of science is required which, besides realist theses, should develope adequate concepts to deal with the social factors of science; e.g. experimental practices, communication processes, exercises of power through them, etc. It is advocated that a theory of science of this type should be developed in order to defend realism. But then, most of the naturalistic premisses shared by realists and antirealists should be abandoned. An important consequence is that history of science, although not irrelevant for the realism-antirrealism debate, cannot be taken as a basis of neutral, hard facts, against which theories of science can founder. On the contrary, historical studies of science will necessary presuppose a theory of science. Therefore scientific realism must be seen as a philosophical doctrine to be disputed via philosophical arguments, and the idea that it is an empirical hypothesis should be abandoned. [L.O.]

Electron microscopic characterization of diamond thin films and substrates for diamond heteroepitaxial growth

1989 ◽  
Vol 47 ◽  
pp. 592-593
Author(s):  
J.B. Posthill ◽  
R.P. Burns ◽  
R.A. Rudder ◽  
Y.H. Lee ◽  
R.J. Markunas ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Thin Films ◽  
Wide Band ◽  
Deposition Process ◽  
Heteroepitaxial Growth ◽  
Electron Microscopic ◽  
Wide Band Gap ◽  
Lattice Matching ◽  
Different Types ◽  
Diamond Thin Films

Because of diamond’s wide band gap, high thermal conductivity, high breakdown voltage and high radiation resistance, there is a growing interest in developing diamond-based devices for several new and demanding electronic applications. In developing this technology, there are several new challenges to be overcome. Much of our effort has been directed at developing a diamond deposition process that will permit controlled, epitaxial growth. Also, because of cost and size considerations, it is mandatory that a non-native substrate be developed for heteroepitaxial nucleation and growth of diamond thin films. To this end, we are currently investigating the use of Ni single crystals on which different types of epitaxial metals are grown by molecular beam epitaxy (MBE) for lattice matching to diamond as well as surface chemistry modification. This contribution reports briefly on our microscopic observations that are integral to these endeavors.

Characterization of Different Types of Biomass Wastes Using Thermogravimetric and ICP-MS Analyses

2020 ◽  
Vol 70 (12) ◽  
pp. 4594-4600
Keyword(s):  
Thermogravimetric Analysis ◽  
Food Industry ◽  
Wood Waste ◽  
Biomass Ash ◽  
Minor Elements ◽  
Ms Analysis ◽  
Icp Ms ◽  
Different Types

The purpose of this study was to characterize some types of biomass wastes resulted from different activities such as: agriculture, forestry and food industry using thermogravimetric and ICP-MS analyses. Also, it was optimized an ICP-MS method for the determination of As, Cd and Pb from biomass ash samples. The ICP-MS analysis revealed that the highest concentration of metals (As, Cd, Pb) was recorded in the wood waste ash sample, also the thermogravimetric analysis indicated that the highest amount of ash was obtained for the same sample (26.82%). The biomass wastes mentioned in this study are alternative recyclable materials, reusable as pellets and briquettes. Keywords: ash, biomass, ICP-MS, minor elements, TG

Characterization of different types of broiler bedding including dehydrated grass and their influence on production

2021 ◽  
Vol 92 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Bruna B. Przybulinski ◽  
Rodrigo G. Garcia ◽  
Maria Fernanda de C. Burbarelli ◽  
Claudia M. Komiyama ◽  
Deivid Kelly Barbosa ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Different Types

scholarly journals Mutator-Suppressible Alleles of rough sheath1 and liguleless3 in Maize Reveal Multiple Mechanisms for Suppression

Genetics ◽  
2000 ◽  
Vol 154 (1) ◽  
pp. 437-446 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lisa Girard ◽  
Michael Freeling
Keyword(s):  
Untranslated Region ◽  
Mutant Allele ◽  
Negative Regulation ◽  
Wild Type ◽  
Knox Gene ◽  
Transcript Accumulation ◽  
Mu Suppression ◽  
Different Types ◽  
Rna Blot Analysis

Abstract Insertions of Mutator transposons into maize genes can generate suppressible alleles. Mu suppression is when, in the absence of Mu activity, the phenotype of a mutant allele reverts to that of its progenitor. Here we present the characterization of five dominant Mu-suppressible alleles of the knox (knotted1-like homeobox) genes liguleless3 and rough sheath1, which exhibit neomorphic phenotypes in the leaves. RNA blot analysis suggests that Mu suppression affects only the neomorphic aspect of the allele, not the wild-type aspect. Additionally, Mu suppression appears to be exerting its effects at the level of transcription or transcript accumulation. We show that truncated transcripts are produced by three alleles, implying a mechanism for Mu suppression of 5′ untranslated region insertion alleles distinct from that which has been described previously. Additionally, it is found that Mu suppression can be caused by at least three different types of Mutator elements. Evidence presented here suggests that whether an allele is suppressible or not may depend upon the site of insertion. We cite previous work on the knox gene kn1, and discuss our results in the context of interactions between Mu-encoded products and the inherently negative regulation of neomorphic liguleless3 and rough sheath1 transcription.

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