The "Just War" and the Right of Self-Defense

Ethics ◽  
1971 ◽  
Vol 82 (1) ◽  
pp. 48-55 ◽  
Author(s):  
Frederick R. Struckmeyer
Keyword(s):  
Just War ◽  
Self Defense ◽  
The Right

Introduction

2019 ◽  
pp. 1-20
Author(s):  
Alec D. Walen
Keyword(s):  
Just War ◽  
Just War Theory ◽  
Philosophical Work ◽  
Self Defense ◽  
Current State ◽  
History Of ◽  
The Right

Much contemporary just war theory is modeled on the theory of self-defense. The dominant account of rights used by people interested in the right of self-defense is doubly problematic: its internal tensions undermine the plausibility of the views people try to defend, and it is in some ways morally distorting. This book is primarily concerned with developing and then deploying a new account of rights, one that will put the discussion of the right to defend against threats on more solid footing. The introductory chapter covers four themes. First, to explain why the current state of just war theory calls for a new account of rights, the chapter traces a brief history of recent discussions of the right of self-defense. Second, the chapter describes when it is permissible to defend against threats. Third, it explains how this relates to current law and to other philosophical work on the topic. Finally, it sketches an outline of the rest of the book.

Beyond National Defense

2004 ◽  
Vol 18 (1) ◽  
pp. 93-98 ◽  
Author(s):  
David Rodin
Keyword(s):  
Just War ◽  
Just War Theory ◽  
Moral Authority ◽  
National Defense ◽  
Moral Value ◽  
Self Defense ◽  
Personal Rights ◽  
Legitimate State ◽  
Basic Features ◽  
The Right

In War and Self-Defense I attempt to generate a dilemma for the just war theory by arguing that the right of national defense cannot be reduced to personal rights of self-defense, nor can it be explained through an analogy with them. Jeff McMahan, David Mapel, and Fernando Tesón doubt this conclusion. In response I argue, first, that their objections are not as opposed to my basic project as they may at first appear. This is because they are premised on a conception of national defense that differs substantially from mainstream just war theory and international law. Second, I argue that McMahan's and Mapel's defense of the reductive argument is unconvincing because (among other things) it is premised on an inadequate view of the norm of proportionality. On the other hand Tesón's defense of the analogical view, based on a conception of the moral value of the just institutions of a legitimate state, cannot account for certain basic features of the international legal and moral order. These include the presumption that even unjust states can possess the right of self-defense against aggression and that it is impermissible for one just state to conquer and rule another just state. Finally I argue that the attempt to bolster the right of national defense through the concept of punishment is inappropriate because it ignores the crucial requirement for proper moral authority in the agent of punishment.

Warum wir das Konzept des gerechten Krieges brauchen. Erwägungen aus römisch-katholischer Perspektive

2015 ◽  
Vol 75 (4) ◽  
pp. 259-268
Author(s):  
Heinz-Günther Stobbe
Keyword(s):  
Just War ◽  
Humanitarian Intervention ◽  
Responsibility To Protect ◽  
Second Step ◽  
Self Defense ◽  
Pros And Cons ◽  
Just War Doctrine ◽  
International Responsibility ◽  
Law And Justice ◽  
The Right

Abstract This contribution first sketches the problem (of why the concept of ›just war‹ is still indispensable) by contrasting two positions representing the pros and cons of the just war doctrine. It also presents some reasons that forbid a seamless continuation of this doctrine. In a second step, the development of catholic doctrine is shown exemplified by three episcopal letters, which argue in favour of the right of self-defense and the criteria of just war as indispensable core values of the tradition and towards an integration of both within the concept of humanitarian intervention. Final considerations supplement this perspective by hinting to the inevitable tension between law and justice as well as legality and legitimacy within the context of the debate on the concept of international Responsibility to Protect.

License to kill: is legitimate authority a requirement for just war?

2013 ◽  
Vol 5 (1) ◽  
pp. 64-93 ◽  
Author(s):  
Magnus Reitberger
Keyword(s):  
Human Rights ◽  
Political Power ◽  
Just War ◽  
Just War Theory ◽  
Legitimate Authority ◽  
Self Defense ◽  
Privileged Status ◽  
The Right

In traditional just war theory, legitimate authority is regarded as a necessary requirement for war to be just. This article challenges this requirement by arguing that a right to wage war can be derived from the right to self-defense and the justifiability of exercising political power to protect basic human rights. Arguments for the legitimate authority-requirement are then surveyed and rejected as insufficient to defend the principle's privileged status. It is argued that just war theory does not need the legitimate authority-requirement and may benefit from its removal.

scholarly journals Toleration as the Balance Between Liberty and Security

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Anna Elisabetta Galeotti ◽  
Federica Liveriero
Keyword(s):  
Social Security ◽  
Harm Principle ◽  
Social Tolerance ◽  
Individual Liberty ◽  
Self Defense ◽  
The Right ◽  
The Harm Principle

AbstractTraditionally, an adequate strategy to deal with the tension between liberty and security has been toleration, for the latter allows the maximization of individual liberty without endangering security, since it embraces the limits set by the harm principle and the principle of self-defense of the liberal order. The area outside the boundary clearly requires repressive measures to protect the security and the rights of all. In this paper, we focus on the balance of liberty and security afforded by toleration, analyzing how this strategy works in highly conflictual contexts and sorting out the different sets of reason that might motivate individual to assume a tolerant attitude. We contend that toleration represents a reliable political solution to conflicts potentially threatening social security when it is coupled with social tolerance. Hence, we examine the reasons the agents may have for endorsing toleration despite disagreement and disapproval. In the range of these reasons, we argue that the right reasons are those preserving the moral and epistemic integrity of the agent. The right reasons are however not accessible to everyone, as for example is the case with (non-violent) religious fundamentalists. Only prudential reasons for toleration seem to be available to them. And yet, we argue that an open and inclusive democracy should in principle be hospitable towards prudential and pragmatic reasons as well, which may potentially lay the grounds for future cooperation. We conclude therefore that the tolerant society has room for the fundamentalists, granted that they do not resort to violence.

Can there be a just war?

Think ◽  
2004 ◽  
Vol 3 (8) ◽  
pp. 7-16
Author(s):  
Richard Norman
Keyword(s):  
Just War ◽  
The Right ◽  
Self Defence

Richard Norman examines justifications for war that are rooted in the right of self-defence.

Reflections on the existence of the science of criminal law

2021 ◽  
pp. 156-161
Author(s):  
I. Mytrofanov
Keyword(s):  
Social Justice ◽  
Public Relations ◽  
Criminal Law ◽  
The State ◽  
Crime And Punishment ◽  
Self Defense ◽  
Illegal Acts ◽  
The Subject ◽  
The Individual ◽  
The Right

The article states that today the issues of the role (purpose) of criminal law, the structure of criminal law knowledge remain debatable. And at this time, questions arise: whose interests are protected by criminal law, is it able to ensure social justice, including the proportionality of the responsibility of the individual and the state for criminally illegal actions? The purpose of the article is to comprehend the problems of criminal law knowledge about the phenomena that shape the purpose of criminal law as a fair regulator of public relations, aimed primarily at restoring social justice for the victim, suspect (accused), society and the state, the proportionality of punishment and states for criminally illegal acts. The concepts of “crime” and “punishment” are discussed in science. As a result, there is no increase in knowledge, but an increase in its volume due to new definitions of existing criminal law phenomena. It is stated that the science of criminal law has not been able to explain the need for the concept of criminal law, as the role and name of this area is leveled to the framework terminology, which currently contains the categories of crime and punishment. Sometimes it is not even unreasonable to think that criminal law as an independent and meaningful concept does not exist or has not yet appeared. There was a custom to characterize this right as something derived from the main and most important branches of law, the criminal law of the rules of subsidiary and ancillary nature. Scholars do not consider criminal law, for example, as the right to self-defense. Although the right to self-defense is paramount and must first be guaranteed to a person who is almost always left alone with the offender, it is the least represented in law, developed in practice and available to criminal law subjects. Today, for example, there are no clear rules for the necessary protection of property rights or human freedoms. It is concluded that the science of criminal law should develop knowledge that will reveal not only the content of the subject of this branch of law, but will focus it on new properties to determine the illegality of acts and their consequences, exclude the possibility of using its means by legal entities against each other.

scholarly journals Individual Laterality in Ghost Crabs (Ocypode saratan) Influences Burrowing Behavior

Symmetry ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 13 (8) ◽  
pp. 1512
Author(s):  
Reuven Yosef ◽  
Michal Daraby ◽  
Alexei Semionovikh ◽  
Jakub Z. Kosicki
Keyword(s):  
Natural Selection ◽  
Red Sea ◽  
Selection Pressure ◽  
Left Handed ◽  
Self Defense ◽  
Temporal Segregation ◽  
Ghost Crabs ◽  
Left And Right ◽  
Burrowing Behavior ◽  
The Right

Behavioral handedness is known to enhance an individual’s handling capabilities. However, the ecological advantages in brachyuran crustaceans remain unclear, despite the Ocypode species having been studied extensively. Thus, in this study, we analyzed the laterality of the endemic Red Sea ghost crab on one beach in Eilat, Israel. We successfully documented the laterality of the large cheliped in 125 crabs; in 60 (48.0%), the right cheliped was larger, and in 64 (51.2%), the left. We also observed temporal segregation between the right- and left-clawed crabs. The right-handed crabs start activity just after sunrise, while left-handed crabs appear ca. 40 min after it. Similarly, temporal segregations were also observed in the evening. The right-clawed crab activity peaked ca. 20 min before sunset, while the left-clawed crabs were active uniformly. Additionally, burrow entrances corresponded to the larger cheliped of the resident individual and is probably a self-defense-related behavior. We conclude that cheliped laterality in O. saratan populations should be considered as a bimodal trait, where left- and right-handedness is not under natural selection pressure.

scholarly journals Przyczyny i procedura wydalania duchownych z instytutu zakonnego

2011 ◽  
Vol 54 (3-4) ◽  
pp. 147-168
Author(s):  
Ambroży Skorupa
Keyword(s):  
Holy See ◽  
Self Defense ◽  
Religious Institute ◽  
The Right ◽  
The Church ◽  
The Way ◽  
Moral Questions

A religious in an institute fulfills his vocation by following the way adequate to the charism of the institute. An attitude unsuited to a religious’ priestly vocation as well as to the institute’s charism, can be the cause of dismissal from religious institute. Among the causes of dismissal can be diffusion of doctrine inconsistent with the magisterium of the Church or an attitude incompatible with position of the Church. In the article were presented some exemplary statements of the Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith regarding doctrinal and moral questions. Stubborn diffusion of views recognized by the Holy See as opposed to the Catholic doctrine, may be another cause for dismissal from an institute. Dismissal from religious institute may also result from an attitude incompatible with the ecclesiastical and religious discipline. Attitudes causing grave scandal require reaction of the competent religious superiors. The superiors are obliged to act in accordance with the process regulated by the norms included in the CCL 1983 and in other ecclesiastical documents. Choosing proper process depends on the nature of an offense committed by a religious. For offenses described in can. 694 a religious is dismissed by the fact itself of committing the offense (ipso facto). Therefore the process described in the cannon for this form of dismissal must be kept. In instances of offenses described in cannons 695 and 1395, for which the legislator provided an obligatory dismissal, the process is different. In case of offenses pointed out in can. 696 the superior is obliged to initiate process indicated in can. 697. The right of the accused to self-defense, participation of a notary in the process, required decision by the major superior and approval of a decree by ecclesiastical hierarchical authority – the Holy See or diocesan bishop, depending on the approval level of the institute, deserves attention.

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