The Development of Legal Reasoning

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Tom R. Tyler ◽  
Rick Trinkner
Keyword(s):  
Moral Development ◽  
Social Order ◽  
Legal Reasoning ◽  
Developmental Model ◽  
Legal Authority ◽  
Legal Institutions ◽  
Legal Socialization ◽  
The Law ◽  
Legal Judgments ◽  
The Relationship

The cognitive developmental model of legal socialization is discussed in chapter 5. This approach emphasizes the development of legal reasoning and focuses on how such thinking shapes legal judgments about the purpose of laws, how legal authority should be used, and whether people should feel obligated to obey legal institutions. Basically, legal reasoning provides a framework to understand the nature of society and the requirements of social order, leading to judgments about the legitimacy of the law. Building on Kohlberg’s work in moral development, the legal reasoning perspective argues that people develop increasingly abstract and sophisticated models of the relationship between society and the law with respect to the position and duties of the law and the responsibilities and obligations of citizens. This provides a basis for understanding when to follow appropriate laws and when to violate laws viewed as unjust or unprincipled.

scholarly journals ISSUES OF LEGAL SOCIALIZATION OF YOUTH

2020 ◽  
Vol 71 (3) ◽  
pp. 121-126
Author(s):  
M.O. Zhumagulov ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Social Institutions ◽  
Legal Order ◽  
Legal Knowledge ◽  
Legal Institutions ◽  
Legal Socialization ◽  
Knowledge And Beliefs ◽  
The Law ◽  
Relationship Of ◽  
The Relationship ◽  
Theoretical Issues

The author's comprehensive research on the problem of legal socialization is aimed at studying the theoretical issues of legal socialization, as well as the influence of social institutions on these processes, the relationship of legal socialization with the legitimacy of laws and statebodies. Legal socialization is a process by which people acquire legal knowledge and beliefs about the law, state bodies that are called to observe the legal order, and legal institutions.

Fiduciary Law as Equity’s Child

Equity ◽  
2018 ◽  
pp. 113-151
Author(s):  
Irit Samet
Keyword(s):  
Common Law ◽  
Legal Reasoning ◽  
Active Role ◽  
Fiduciary Duties ◽  
Contractual Obligation ◽  
The Law ◽  
Duty Of Loyalty ◽  
Contractual Obligations ◽  
The Relationship ◽  
The Way

This chapter challenges the argument that one of Equity’s most distinctive doctrines, fiduciary law, must be fused with a common law doctrine—the law of contract. In particular, it highlights the disadvantages of transforming the equitable duty of loyalty into an ordinary contractual obligation. The chapter first considers the ‘contractarian’ interpretation of fiduciary law according to which fiduciary duties are no more than a species of contractual obligations before explaining why, in contrast with the contractarian argument, Equity was right in claiming that the fiduciary relationship was essentially different from contract. After making the case of why fiduciary law should be treated as a sui generis equitable doctrine, the chapter examines two features of equitable fiduciary law that will change dramatically if the fusion suggestion is adopted (the language in which it is set and the way into the relationship) and shows the adverse consequences of moving in that direction. It concludes with the contention that the concept of ‘conscience’ still has an active role to play in the legal reasoning about fiduciaries.

Legal Socialization across the Spheres of Childhood and Adolescence

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Tom R. Tyler ◽  
Rick Trinkner
Keyword(s):  
Legal Reasoning ◽  
Childhood And Adolescence ◽  
Legal Institutions ◽  
Socialization Process ◽  
Legal Socialization ◽  
Rule Making

This part of the book examines the legal socialization process across three crucial domains. These domains are as follows: family and parents, schools and teachers, and legal institutions and authorities. The aim is to discuss the degree to which experiences with authority and rule-making and enforcement influence the acquisition of supportive legal values, formation of law-related attitudes, and development of legal reasoning competencies.

Conflicts of Laws and Codes

2019 ◽  
pp. 275-288
Author(s):  
Florian Möslein
Keyword(s):  
Smart Contracts ◽  
Legal Institutions ◽  
Conflict Of Laws ◽  
Blockchain Technology ◽  
Computer Codes ◽  
The Law ◽  
The Relationship

Blockchain technology promises to perform tasks that have traditionally been assigned to the law and the realm of legal institutions. Smart contracts create agreements that are both automatable by computers and enforceable via the tamper-proof execution of computer codes. Based on such smart contracts, some providers of blockchain technologies offer ‘to act as a digital jurisdiction’. The promise seems to be that law of the relevant jurisdiction is entirely substituted by the rules codified in the blockchain. However, even if it has often been argued that the ‘Code Is Law’, the law is not—and arguably never will be—entirely redundant. Therefore, the challenge is to identify the boundaries of such digital jurisdictions by clarifying the relationship between law and code and to develop new principles for conflicts of laws or rather principles for the conflict of laws and codes.

On The Pure Theory of Law

1966 ◽  
Vol 1 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-7 ◽  
Author(s):  
Hans Kelsen
Keyword(s):  
Social Order ◽  
Fundamental Difference ◽  
Legal Order ◽  
Legal Positivism ◽  
Legal Authority ◽  
Pure Theory ◽  
Legal Norms ◽  
Specific Meaning ◽  
The Law ◽  
Theory Of Law

The Pure Theory of Law is a theory of positive law, not of a definite legal order, but of the law in general. It is a general theory of law. As such it is the most consistent version of that school of jurisprudence which is called legal positivism because it considers as “law” only positive law and refuses to recognize as law any other normative social order even if, in the usage of language, it is called “law”, as e.g. so-called “natural law”.Law is—according to the Pure Theory of Law—by its very nature a definite type of norm. As a “norm” the law is the specific meaning of an act of will directed at a definite human behavior. This meaning is: that men ought to behave in a certain way. Hence an essential presupposition of the Pure Theory of Law as a positivistic theory is the recognition of the fundamental difference between the “ought” and the “is”, between norms and assertions. Assertions describe a certain object; they are true or false; norms are not describing, but prescribing; they are neither true nor false; they are valid or non-valid. Hence it is necessary to distinguish as clearly as possible between legal norms established by the legal authority, and assertions of the science of law about legal norms, the sentences by which this science describes its object.

Legal Socialization and the Elements of Legitimacy

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Tom R. Tyler ◽  
Rick Trinkner
Keyword(s):  
Juvenile Justice ◽  
Children And Adolescents ◽  
Use Of Force ◽  
Socialization Process ◽  
Legal Socialization ◽  
Rule Breaking ◽  
The Law ◽  
The Relationship ◽  
Do So

The chapters in Part I discuss the two basic models for understanding the relationship between people and law: coercive and consensual. The consensual model relies upon people’s willingness to obey laws because they think it is appropriate and proper to do so. The belief that law and legal authorities are legitimate and ought to be voluntarily obeyed develops during the childhood and adolescent socialization process. A coercive model of authority relies upon the use of force and credible threats of detection and punishment for rule-breaking to promote compliance. As children mature they move through three spheres of authority: family, school, and juvenile justice. In each sphere children and adolescents can develop the belief that the law is legitimate, and feel a duty to defer to law or they can come to view the law as coercive and comply out of fear of punishment.

scholarly journals The Relationship Between the Purposes of the Law and Legal Reasoning

2012 ◽  
Vol 6 (2) ◽  
pp. 223-227
Author(s):  
Hayatullah Laluddin ◽  
Amir Husin Mohd. Nor . ◽  
Abdel Wadoud Moustaf . ◽  
Ibnor Azli Ibrahim . ◽  
Ahmad Muhammad Husni . ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Legal Reasoning ◽  
The Law ◽  
The Relationship

The Transformation of the Trengganu Legal Order

1980 ◽  
Vol 11 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-29 ◽  
Author(s):  
Heather Sutherland
Keyword(s):  
Legal System ◽  
Social Order ◽  
The State ◽  
Legal Order ◽  
Institutional Framework ◽  
Law And Politics ◽  
The Will ◽  
The Law ◽  
The Relationship

The relationship between law and politics is both close and ambiguous. Ideally, the law provides impartial justice, but at the same time it expresses—both actually and symbolically—the will of the state. Consequently, a legal system usually embodies the establishment idea of proper social order, and should provide a legitimate means of enforcing compliance to that idea. It follows then that different societies have different kinds of law: underlying principles, procedure, and the institutional framework vary considerably from place to place.

On Hart's Way Out

Legal Theory ◽  
1998 ◽  
Vol 4 (4) ◽  
pp. 469-507 ◽  
Author(s):  
Scott J. Shapiro
Keyword(s):  
Legal Authority ◽  
Legal Institutions ◽  
Legal Institution ◽  
Legal Power ◽  
The Law

It is hard to think of a more banal statement one could make about the law than to say that it necessarily claims legal authority to govern conduct. What, after all, is a legal institution if not an entity that purports to have the legal power to create rules, confer rights, and impose obligations? Whether legal institutions necessarily claim the moral authority to exercise their legal powers is another question entirely. Some legal theorists have thought that they do—others have not been so sure. But no one has ever denied (how could they?) that the law holds itself out as having the legal authority to tell us what we may or may not do.

Hardly theTadićof Targeting: Missed Opportunities in the ICTY'sGotovinaJudgments

2015 ◽  
Vol 48 (3) ◽  
pp. 329-355 ◽  
Author(s):  
Roee Ariav
Keyword(s):  
International Criminal ◽  
Legal Reasoning ◽  
International Criminal Tribunal ◽  
Legal Issues ◽  
International Humanitarian Law ◽  
Humanitarian Law ◽  
Missed Opportunities ◽  
The Law ◽  
The Relationship

TheGotovinacase presented the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) with a unique opportunity to adjudicate on issues connected with the law of targeting and international humanitarian law (IHL) in a criminal context. This opportunity was especially important given the fact that legal issues arising out of complex, intense combat situations have only rarely been adjudicated. Although Gotovina was not formally charged with carrying out unlawful attacks on civilians, attacks by Croatia on four towns over the course of ‘Operation Storm’ were the focus of the proceedings. This led both Trial and Appeal Chambers to deal with issues related to the law of targeting such as classification of military objectives, proportionality, and the intent behind an attack. This article argues that the judges failed to take full advantage of the opportunity to discuss these issues. They failed consistently to articulate the legal reasoning behind their findings; they failed to explain the branch of law on which any of their substantive determinations were based; and, perhaps most importantly, they did not explain the relationship between IHL and criminal law and how IHL is to be applied in a courtroom.

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