On Hart's Way Out

Legal Theory ◽  
1998 ◽  
Vol 4 (4) ◽  
pp. 469-507 ◽  
Author(s):  
Scott J. Shapiro

It is hard to think of a more banal statement one could make about the law than to say that it necessarily claims legal authority to govern conduct. What, after all, is a legal institution if not an entity that purports to have the legal power to create rules, confer rights, and impose obligations? Whether legal institutions necessarily claim the moral authority to exercise their legal powers is another question entirely. Some legal theorists have thought that they do—others have not been so sure. But no one has ever denied (how could they?) that the law holds itself out as having the legal authority to tell us what we may or may not do.

Author(s):  
Tom R. Tyler ◽  
Rick Trinkner

The cognitive developmental model of legal socialization is discussed in chapter 5. This approach emphasizes the development of legal reasoning and focuses on how such thinking shapes legal judgments about the purpose of laws, how legal authority should be used, and whether people should feel obligated to obey legal institutions. Basically, legal reasoning provides a framework to understand the nature of society and the requirements of social order, leading to judgments about the legitimacy of the law. Building on Kohlberg’s work in moral development, the legal reasoning perspective argues that people develop increasingly abstract and sophisticated models of the relationship between society and the law with respect to the position and duties of the law and the responsibilities and obligations of citizens. This provides a basis for understanding when to follow appropriate laws and when to violate laws viewed as unjust or unprincipled.


Author(s):  
Aruna Nair

This chapter examines the law governing the availability of claims to traceable proceeds. It argues that the language used in the case law—which uses the terminology of property rights and of fiduciary relationships—cannot fully explain the law, since such claims are often available in the absence of fiduciary duties and are not available to holders of many types of property right. It argues that such claims instead presuppose a relationship of ‘control of assets’: where the defendant has a legal power to deal with some asset, correlating to a vulnerability to a loss of rights in that asset on the part of the claimant, and coupled with a duty not to exercise the power. It argues that relationships that have this formal structure also share normative characteristics that justify the subordination of defendant autonomy that has been shown to be at the heart of the tracing concept.


Author(s):  
Corrado Roversi

Are legal institutions artifacts? If artifacts are conceived as entities whose existence depends on human beings, then yes, legal institutions are, of course, artifacts. But an artifact theory of law makes a stronger claim, namely, that there is actually an explanatory gain to be had by investigating legal institutions as artifacts, or through the features of ordinary artifacts. This is the proposition explored in this chapter: that while this understanding of legal institutions makes it possible to find common ground between legal positivism and legal realism, it does not capture all of the insights offered by these two traditions. An artifact theory of law can therefore be necessary in explaining the law, but it will not suffice to that end. This chapter also posits that legal artifacts bear a relevant connection to certain conceptions of nature, thus vindicating one of the original insights behind natural law theory.


2021 ◽  
pp. 58-62
Author(s):  
Veronika Shcherbyna ◽  
Ivanna Maryniv

Problem setting. Nowadays the problem of the provisional application of treaties can be described as actual. It is no accident that it has been the subject of the attention of the United Nations International Law Commission with the task of elaborating the most important problems of international law. Furthermore, the above-mentioned subsidiary body of the United Nations General Assembly recognized the need to analyze the provisional application of treaties, the need for the progressive development and codification of international law in respect of the topic dealt with in this article. Аnalysis of research and publications. Aspects of the problem of provisional application of treaties are reflected primarily in the works of in the works of I.I. Lukashuk, O.V. Kyivets, O.V. Pushniak, I.I. Maryniv, T. Leber. Target of research is to describe the legal institution of the provisional introduction of international treaties and to find reasons for its use. Article’s main body. The article is devoted to the question of the temporary use of an international treaty as a fundamental institution of international law. The study discusses the need for provisional application of treaties. Attention was paid to the works of legal academics, who had considered this issue, their works and summaries were reviewed regarding the question under consideration. The author analyzed the formulations of the article 25 of the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. Legal aspects and shortcomings were considered. First of all, it was noted that there is no definition of the temporary application of international treaties in the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties and article 25 of the Convention had been criticized for being difficult to understand and lacking legal precision. In the article, the author noted that in general, the provisional use takes place before the entry into force of the treaty, when countries have not yet completed the necessary internal state procedures for its entry into force and have not internationally expressed consent to be bound. The author also stressed that the application of the treaty before it enters into force or will enter in the moment when it is implemented, the parties will address to their commitments and thus the object of the treaty would disappear. The author highlighted another legal aspect of the international legal institution under consideration is that, in order to implement the institution of provisional application of treaties, A special law and regulations may be enacted in domestic law (constitutional and legislative). What is more, the author mentioned that it is appropriate to devote attention to the work of the father of the national science on the law of international treaties I.I. Lukashuk. Conclusions. The author concluded that the institution of the provisional use of treaties is one of the key institutions in the law of treaties enabling the parties to urgently address cooperation issues. Another conclusion of the author of this article is that countries resort to this legal instrument under consideration for several reasons: urgent resolution of issues to which the relevant treaties apply; the desire of countries to adopt and immediately implement confidence-building measures; preventing time gaps in the operation of a number of international treaties, which have been successively adopted and replace each other on the same subject.


2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Alexander Ilsner

The legal status of victims of violent criminality has been in the spotlight during recent decades. The institutionalization of psychosocial assistance in criminal proceedings represents the temporary peak of this development. In this study, the author focuses on the legal innovation, analyzes it fundamentally (especially regarding the recently formulated § 406g StPO), and submits specific reform proposals correspondingly. This research includes four systematically structured chapters, which impart the essential features of the legal institution, elucidate the legal framework, and finally appoint considerations regarding its transfer into the law of civil procedure.


Author(s):  
Jonathan Jackson ◽  
Ben Bradford ◽  
Mike Hough ◽  
Andy Myhill ◽  
Paul King Quinton ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  

2017 ◽  
Vol 4 (3) ◽  
pp. 296
Author(s):  
Aryani Witasari

Article 2 of Law Number 30 Year 1999 concerning Arbitration and Alternative Dispute Settlement indicates that dispute settlement or disagreement among parties in a certain legal relationship shall be the authority of the arbitration institution, if it has been agreed in an arbitration agreement. This research tried to criticize the concept of absolute nature of the arbitral decision in the settlement of business dispute in the perspective of the theory of justice. Method of data retrieval used in this research was by collecting literature study by studying data and analyzing the entire contents of library by linking to existing problems. The final and legally binding arbitral decision, if associated with Aristotle's corrective theory of justice, does not at all reflect the basic value of justice. This is indicated by not giving an opportunity for another party whose position is higher to correct the decision, whereas in the judicial system, the court as an ordinary court having legal status (legal statue) and legal authority (legal authority/legal power). Verdict the panel of judges can still be corrected through the usual remedies (appeals) and extraordinary reviews.


Author(s):  
Alexander Kaye

The attempts of religious Zionists to establish halakha as the law of Israel failed. This chapter examines the response of religious Zionist leaders to this failure, and their bitter resentment of Israel’s secular legal institutions that, in their view, had usurped halakhic rule. It shows that, resigned to these circumstances, religious Zionists adopted a double strategy. Among themselves, they persevered in their commitment to the idea of the halakhic state. When speaking to others, however, they embraced a more pragmatic position. In Knesset speeches, for example, they argued for a pluralistic position in which the rabbinical courts would have equal authority to the state’s secular courts. The chapter also shows how the legal rhetoric of religious Zionists, particularly of Zerah Warhaftig, shored up the identity of the community during the time of setback.


Author(s):  
Yaron Harel

This epilogue studies how the Young Turk Revolution further weakened both Jewish autonomy within the Ottoman Empire and, along with growing secularization, the official recognition and legal authority hitherto accorded to the law of the Torah and to the religious leadership. In the controversies that broke out after the Young Turk Revolution, the call to remove the chief rabbis in a number of Jewish communities drew on revolutionary, reformist, and Enlightenment arguments, including the idea of free expression. Struggles over power in the community began to assume the character of a confrontation between those who were defined as enlightened liberals and their opponents, who were seen as benighted conservatives. Ultimately, the ‘secularization of the rabbinate’ — that is, the involvement of the ḥakham bashi in political matters and his role as a government official fulfilling explicitly administrative functions — led to a ‘cheapening of the rabbinate’. Modernization, and especially the expansion of education, disseminated ideas of secularism and individualism, and facilitated the emergence of new kinds of leader. During the first decade of the twentieth century, patterns of leadership that had been accepted in the Ottoman Empire for generations, including the placing of a religious figure at the head of the community, were increasingly perceived as outdated.


Author(s):  
Adam Reilly

Abstract Private lawyers owe a particular debt of gratitude to Hohfeld, given their widespread use of his scheme. An example is equitable rescission, where the entitlement to rescind a voidable transfer is now widely understood to be a Hohfeldian legal power. Yet, though scholars have been quick to use Hohfeld’s concept of legal power, they have given little sustained thought to what he meant by ‘volitional control’ and how we might identify it within the law. The result is that certain areas of law have been mislabelled as ‘power conferring’, most notably equitable rescission. This article seeks to unpack Hohfeld’s concept of ‘volitional control’ as terminological shorthand for the coincidence of two distinct elements: (i) the power holder’s normative intention to effect the relevant legal change; and (ii) her decision to effect that change as exhibited in power-exercising conduct. By these lights, the rescinding claimant does not have a legal power to rescind.


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