European Court of Justice (ECJ)

Author(s):  
Sabine Saurugger ◽  
Fabien Terpan

Considered an unusually powerful actor that has furthered European integration, the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) has attracted considerable interest from both scholars and the public. Legal scholars and political scientists, as well as historians, have studied the Court in the context of it being one of the main actors in the integration process. Those that saw European integration as “integration through law” originally considered the Court to be the core element driving this process. The Court’s case law has influenced market integration, the balance of power among the EU’s institutions, and the “constitutional” boundaries between supranational and national competences. The pathbreaking rulings Costa vs. Enel and van Gend en Loos introduced new legal principles of direct effect and primacy in the 1960s; the 2007 Laval and Viking rulings triggered criticism of the Court’s decision, which was said to put the rights of companies above those of workers; whereas the Mangold ruling in 2005 on age discrimination was widely welcomed in spite of some negative reactions in Germany. Hence, while “integration through law” remains a powerful narrative in the academic field of European studies, the Court’s decisions and its role in the EU system have not remained unchallenged. This view of the Court as being less central to European integration is based on two developments in this field of study. On the one hand, research findings based on various analytical approaches—from rational choice to post-positivist—suggest that “integration through law” since the beginning of European integration has been a far less straightforward process than we have otherwise been led to believe. Scholars assert that the Court has been constrained by political, administrative, and constitutional counteractions since its establishment in 1952. On the other hand, scholars have identified a number of developments in the integration process from the early 1990s and the Maastricht Treaty, such as the increase in new modes of governance and intergovernmental decision-making, that explain why the Court’s role has come into question. Understanding these debates is crucial to grasping the broader institutional as well as political and legal developments of European integration.

2019 ◽  
Vol 38 ◽  
pp. 153-219
Author(s):  
Amedeo Arena

Abstract ‘Purely internal situations’ are sets of facts entirely confined within a single Member State. According to the ‘purely internal rule’, introduced by the European Court of Justice (ECJ) in 1979, purely internal situations lie outside the scope of the internal market fundamental freedoms and of other EU provisions having a cross-border scope. On the fortieth anniversary of the jurisprudential genesis of the purely internal rule, this article seeks to examine its origins, rationale, and evolution, by analyzing the most relevant patterns in the over 250 preliminary rulings handed down in disputes involving purely internal situations. This survey will enable an assessment of the systemic significance of the purely internal rule and of the consequences that abolishing that rule would have for the European integration process.


Author(s):  
Mock Sebastian

This chapter presents an overview of the Market Abuse Regulation (MAR). The MAR is based on the competence of the Union in Article 114 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU). The regulation of market abuse has a long history in the Union and dates back to the 1960s. As is the case for many European regulations such as this one, the Market Abuse Regulation is directly applicable and must be interpreted by the General Court of the European Court of Justice as the court of last instance. In this regard, autonomous interpretation is the core principle for the interpretation of the Market Abuse Regulation.


2002 ◽  
Vol 3 (3) ◽  
Author(s):  
Stephan Bitter

The accession of up to twelve East-European States to the European Union in the next decade is likely to change the possibilities for substantive consensus within the Union for the worse. Yet, the consensus on the means to pursue the objectives of the Union has thus far made European integration successful. Insofar as the feasibility of substantial consent between the Member States diminishes, the need to have rules and principles regulating the conflict between the relevant actors increases. These rules and principles must facilitate the creation of solutions to the new challenges that face the Union. Thus, it is essential for the Union's future that the law of the European Union offers both such rules and principles. One of the most outstanding principles which could perform this important task is the principle of loyalty as developed by the European Court of Justice (ECJ) based on Article 10 EC Treaty.


2000 ◽  
Vol 35 (1) ◽  
pp. 3-26 ◽  
Author(s):  
Daniel Wincott

OVER THE LAST DECADE AND A HALF THE PART PLAYED BY THE European Court of Justice (ECJ) in the construction and operation of the European Union has become controversial. Relatively unnoticed beyond specialist legal circles in the 1960s, 1970s and early 1980s, the role of the Court featured prominently in the debates occasioned by the Treaty of Maastricht. In this article I consider the use of heroic and villainous imagery to describe the Court. After arguing that such imagery now conceals more than it reveals, I suggest that if its role is to be understood properly, the Court needs to be placed in strategic context. For convenience, the discussion of strategic context, which makes up the largest part of this article, is divided into five sections. In turn these sections consider member state executives, other European Union institutions, ‘European’ law(s), European Community law and actors in civil society (particularly litigants).


2020 ◽  
pp. 135-159
Author(s):  
Arjen Boin ◽  
Susanne K. Schmidt

AbstractThe European Court of Justice (ECJ) was founded in 1952. At that time, few observers would have predicted a future of a powerful institution, shaping Europe’s faith through its rulings. But that is exactly what happened. After a slow start, the ECJ gradually evolved into one of the most important institutions of the European Union. This chapter describes how this little court shrouded in secrecy managed to climb the institutional ladder. It analyses the role of institutional leadership, the relation between the ECJ and its authorizing environment, the near-existential crisis it faced in the 1970s, and the potential vulnerabilities that have grown over the years.


2019 ◽  
Vol 12 (2-2019) ◽  
pp. 419-433
Author(s):  
Stefanie Vedder

National high courts in the European Union (EU) are constantly challenged: the European Court of Justice (ECJ) claims the authority to declare national standing interpretations invalid should it find them incompatible with its views on EU law. This principle noticeably impairs the formerly undisputed sovereignty of national high courts. In addition, preliminary references empower lower courts to question interpretations established by their national ‘superiors’. Assuming that courts want to protect their own interests, the article presumes that national high courts develop strategies to elude the breach of their standing interpretations. Building on principal-agent theory, the article proposes that national high courts can use the level of (im-) precision in the wording of the ECJ’s judgements to continue applying their own interpretations. The article develops theoretical strategies for national high courts in their struggle for authority.


2015 ◽  
Vol 16 (5) ◽  
pp. 1073-1098 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mattias Derlén ◽  
Johan Lindholm

AbstractThe case law of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) is one of the most important sources of European Union law. However, case law's role in EU law is not uniform. By empirically studying how the Court uses its own case law as a source of law, we explore the correlation between, on the one hand, the characteristics of a CJEU case—type of action, actors involved, and area of law—and, on the other hand, the judgment's “embeddedness” in previous case law and value as a precedent in subsequent cases. Using this approach, we test, confirm, and debunk existing scholarship concerning the role of CJEU case law as a source of EU law. We offer the following conclusions: that CJEU case law cannot be treated as a single entity; that only a limited number of factors reliably affect a judgment's persuasive or precedential power; that the Court's use of its own case law as a source of law is particularly limited in successful infringement proceedings; that case law is particularly important in preliminary references—especially those concerning fundamental freedoms and competition law; and that initiating Member State and the number of observations affects the behavior of the Court.


2020 ◽  
pp. 203228442097974
Author(s):  
Sibel Top ◽  
Paul De Hert

This article examines the changing balance established by the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) between human rights filters to extradition and the obligation to cooperate and how this shift of rationale brought the Court closer to the position of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) in that respect. The article argues that the ECtHR initially adopted a position whereby it prioritised human rights concerns over extraditions, but that it later nuanced that approach by establishing, in some cases, an obligation to cooperate to ensure proper respect of human rights. This refinement of its position brought the ECtHR closer to the approach adopted by the CJEU that traditionally put the obligation to cooperate above human rights concerns. In recent years, however, the CJEU also backtracked to some extent from its uncompromising attitude on the obligation to cooperate, which enabled a convergence of the rationales of the two Courts. Although this alignment of the Courts was necessary to mitigate the conflicting obligations of European Union Member States towards both Courts, this article warns against the danger of making too many human rights concessions to cooperation in criminal matters.


2004 ◽  
Vol 6 ◽  
pp. 1-34
Author(s):  
Anthony Arnull

The purpose of this article is to consider the effect of the draft Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe on the European Court of Justice (ECJ). At the time of writing, the future of the draft Constitution is somewhat uncertain. Having been finalised by the Convention on the Future of Europe in the summer of 2003 and submitted to the then President of the European Council, it formed the basis for discussion at an intergovernmental conference (IGC) which opened in October 2003. Hopes that the text might be finalised by the end of the year were dashed when a meeting of the IGC in Brussels in December 2003 ended prematurely amid disagreement over the weighting of votes in the Council. However, it seems likely that a treaty equipping the European Union with a Constitution based on the Convention’s draft will in due course be adopted and that the provisions of the draft dealing with the ECJ will not be changed significantly. Even if either assumption proves misplaced, those provisions will remain of interest as reflecting one view of the position the ECJ might occupy in a constitutional order of the Union.


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