International Law and the Responsibility to Protect

Author(s):  
B. Welling Hall ◽  
Nadira Khudayberdieva

The notion of responsibility to protect (R2P) emerged as a legal challenge to what F. R. Teson called “the moral and legal enclosure of states.” The development of the R2P doctrine coincided with the surge in popularity of the democratic peace thesis, according to which the creation of a security community rests not on the existence of a common enemy, but on the “positive shared foundation of democracy and cooperation.” The R2P doctrine was developed by international lawyers in response to the failure of the international community to prevent or react effectively enough to the commission of genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity, and ethnic cleansing in Rwanda, Bosnia, Haiti, and elsewhere during the last decade of the 20th century and the first of the 21st century. Some scholars of international law argue that R2P reconceptualizes sovereignty as a legal construct and expands the international toolkit for the peaceful prevention of deadly conflict. The International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) report, The Responsibility to Protect, lays emphasis on military intervention as a key component of R2P. Others, however, claim that R2P simply provides new, legal justifications for the use of force. International law scholarship on R2P is overwhelmingly dedicated to the question of when and how R2P might be invoked to support military intervention (jus ad bellum) and the relationship between R2P and international criminal tribunals (jus post bellum). One area that deserves attention from scholars is a “law instead of war,” or jus non bello.

2006 ◽  
Vol 20 (2) ◽  
pp. 143-169 ◽  
Author(s):  
Alex J. Bellamy

At the 2005 World Summit, the world‘s leaders committed themselves to the “responsibility to protect”, recognizing both that all states have a responsibility to protect their citizens from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity and that the UN should help states to discharge this responsibility using either peaceful means or enforcement action. This declaration ostensibly marks an important milestone in the relationship between sovereignty and human rights but its critics argue that it will make little difference in practice to the world’s most threatened people. The purpose of this article is to ask how consensus was reached on the responsibility to protect, given continuing hostility to humanitarian intervention expressed by many (if not most) of the world‘s states and whether the consensus will contribute to avoiding future Kosovos (cases where the Security Council is deadlocked in the face of a humanitarian crises) and future Rwandas (cases where states lack the political will to intervene). It suggests that four key factors contributed to the consensus: pressure from proponents of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, its adoption by Kofi Annan and the UN’s High Level Panel, an emerging consensus in the African Union, and the American position. Whilst these four factors contributed to consensus, each altered the meaning of the responsibility to protect in important ways, creating a doctrine that many states can sign up to but that does little to prevent future Kosovos and Rwandas and may actually inhibit attempts to build a consensus around intervention in future cases.


2019 ◽  
Vol 11 (4) ◽  
pp. 435-450
Author(s):  
Simon Adams

The failure of the international community to adequately respond to patterns of discrimination against the ethnic Rohingya minority in Myanmar (Burma) eventually led to a genocide. The so-called “clearance operations” launched by Myanmar’s military in August 2017 tested the resilience of the international community’s commitment to defending human rights and upholding its Responsibility to Protect (R2P) populations from genocide, ethnic cleansing, crimes against humanity and war crimes. Two years later the UN Security Council has still not adopted a single resolution to name the crime committed against the Rohingya, or to hold the perpetrators accountable. Nevertheless, Rohingya survivors and international civil society have continued to campaign for justice under international law, and to advocate for targeted sanctions to be imposed on those responsible for atrocities. Faced with an inert Security Council, some UN member states have adopted inventive diplomatic measures to uphold their responsibility to protect.


Author(s):  
Taylor Seybolt

This chapter argues that the use of force can prevent or end the atrocities of genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity, and ethnic cleansing. The historical record, however, shows both successes and failures, and points to certain factors—especially a coherent strategy—that improve the prospect of protecting civilians who are in imminent danger. There is broad diplomatic support among governments for military intervention in the context of the responsibility to protect (R2P) but that support has not resulted in a groundswell of interventions. In light of the risk and difficulty of military intervention, selective use of force is preferable to engaging in military intervention early and often. Caution ought to remain a guiding principle, balanced against the knowledge that R2P without the use of force is meaningless in the situations where it is needed the most.


2013 ◽  
Vol 5 (1) ◽  
pp. 109-125 ◽  
Author(s):  
Alex J. Bellamy

This article reflects upon the UN General Assembly’s 2012 informal interactive dialogue on the Responsibility to Protect (RtoP), which was on the theme of ‘timely and decisive response’. It shows that although Member States recognize that ‘timely and decisive’ responses to genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity could sometimes prove controversial, none disputed the occasional necessity of robust enforcement measures when properly authorized by the Security Council and used as a last resort. Against this backdrop, the paper identifies and engages with three of the key challenges that emerged in the dialogue: the relationship between the the three pillars of RtoP, the problem of consistency in the application of the principle, and the challenge of making prevention a ‘living reality’. The paper identifies ways of navigating these challenges and proposes a pathway for the further consolidation of RtoP in international practice.


2020 ◽  
Vol 4 (1) ◽  
pp. 109-140
Author(s):  
Allan Mukuki

States are collapsing and genocidal acts are being committed or may happen any moment. In these instances, states look to the United Nations (UN) to act in order to prevent genocide from happening. This article seeks to determine if there exists an obligation under international law for the UN to prevent genocide, and in that event, can the UN be held responsible under international law for failure to comply with this obligation? This article further analyses these questions by looking at the aspect of Responsibility to Protect (R2P) which elicits an obligation to prevent genocide first to states and then to the UN. At the very minimum, every state must protect its population from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity. In the case of states failing to undertake this obligation, the UN is bound to step in and undertake this obligation. Hence, this is a responsibility that is an obligation to states first and then to the UN. In summation, this article establishes that the obligation to prevent genocide is a customary international law obligation. Further, the UN is bound by this obligation. However, it is shown that the procedures that are available to address its failure to uphold this obligation are inconsequential since the UN has absolute immunity and any decision, even if holding the UN responsible, cannot be enforced as against it. Neverthless, this article provides some recommendation(s) as to how the UN can play a role in ensuring accountability for failures within its ambit.


Author(s):  
Mettraux Guénaël

This chapter discusses crimes against humanity under international law. Crimes against humanity were first introduced at Nuremberg as a means of criminalizing three sorts of criminality that so far had evaded the sanction of international law: atrocities committed outside the context of an armed conflict or independent of it; crimes committed against fellow nationals or nationals of allied nations; and institutionalized discriminatory violence that resulted in individuals being targeted and mistreated by a state because of their identity. Crimes against humanity seek to protect core attributes of all human beings: their dignity; their humanity; and their fundamental human rights. The notion of crimes against humanity reflects the fact that the protection of those interests and the punishment of serious violations of these interests is a matter of universal concern. It also makes it clear that the protection arising from international law does not depend on the nationality of the victim or his membership in a group, nor on his or relationship to the perpetrator. Instead, it is the sheer humanity of the victim that warrants and justifies the criminalization of such acts. And whilst the notion of genocide and crimes against humanity overlap in part in their efforts to protect these core values, unlike genocide, crimes against humanity seek to protect individuals as such, rather than groups of individuals. The chapter then looks at the relationship between crimes against humanity and other international crimes as well as the process of defining crimes against humanity.


2012 ◽  
Vol 4 (2) ◽  
pp. 241-272 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sahana Dharmapuri

Although the principle of the Responsibility to Protect has a number of supporters, there is still little agreement on institutional procedures to execute Responsibility to Protect (RtoP) systematically. This is due to a lack of consensus on how exactly to operationalize specific RtoP practices with regard to genocide, crimes against humanity, ethnic cleansing, and war crimes. The acceptance of this line of thinking is peculiar in its ignorance of the implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 1325 (UN 1325) on Women, Peace and Security, by militaries, both national and multinational, over the last five to ten years. Misunderstanding, underutilization, and neglect of the UN 1325 mandate within the RtoP community has caused many important developments in the field to be overlooked. This article attempts to begin filling that gap. It presents an overview of what UN 1325 is about and compares UN 1325 to the Responsibility to Protect agenda. It also examines how implementing UN 1325 in UN and NATO peace and security operations is pushing the RtoP agenda forward in practical, not theoretical, terms in three key areas of military peace and security operations – the transformation of doctrine, command structure, and capabilities.


2014 ◽  
Vol 6 (4) ◽  
pp. 483-507 ◽  
Author(s):  
Deborah Mayersen

Within the responsibility to protect (R2P) principle, there is an assumption that is rarely questioned. Beneath the statement that states and the international community are charged with the responsibility to protect populations from genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity and ethnic cleansing, lies the implication that vulnerable populations cannot protect themselves. In periods of crisis, when the international community might consider mobilising a response under pillar three, this is often the case. Yet outside of such crises, when pillar one – the enduring responsibility of the state to protect its own populations – and pillar two – assistance from the international community to meet this responsibility – might be invoked in a preventive capacity, vulnerable populations may not be wholly reliant upon protection from external actors. In these circumstances, persecuted groups may actively seek to protect themselves, and may be successfully able to do so. In this paper, I challenge the current understanding of prevention within R2P as an externally imposed process, by considering how persecuted groups have themselves acted in ways that mitigate their vulnerability to mass atrocities. The paper considers a number of historical case studies in which targeted groups were able to leverage their own agency, often with assistance from others, to reduce this vulnerability. These include cases that culminated in genocide, namely the experiences of German and Austrian Jews under Nazi rule, and negative cases studies in which a demonstrable risk of mass atrocities was not realised, such as the experiences of Yemenite Jews in the first half of the twentieth century and those of the Bahá’í community in Iran since the 1979 Iranian revolution. These cases suggest that assisting persecuted populations to empower themselves can be an effective way to promote resilience to mass atrocities. In the final section of the paper, I explore why this approach is often overlooked, despite its capacity for some success. I consider the potential benefits and costs of a greater focus on utilising the agency of vulnerable groups in endeavours to prevent mass atrocities.


2020 ◽  
pp. 190-214
Author(s):  
Svetlana Bokeriya ◽  
Dmitriy Sidorov

The three-stage transformation in the framework of «humanitarian intervention – personal security – responsibility to protect (R2 P)» reflects the international community's search for the most effective forms of protecting the population from crimes against humanity, genocide, and ethnic cleansing. The concept of humanitarian intervention turned out to be untenable, and in 2005 the «responsibility to protect» was formalized. Responsibility to protect concept was intended to become an effective tool in the field of ensuring peace and security. The article deals with the approaches of the BRICS countries, which took an active part in the development of the R2 P, to its interpretation at the present stage. The contradictory semantic content and legal non-formality of the concept make it difficult to implement it in practice and divide R2 P researchers into two main groups. The key goal of the article is to study the evolution of the positions of the BRICS countries on R2 P.


2020 ◽  
pp. 114-129
Author(s):  
Cymie R. Payne

This chapter argues that reparations should be seen as instrumental for peacebuilding. In contemporary practices, they are no longer solely mediated through the state or confined to claims by individuals against states. Experiences of UN claims mechanisms and international criminal tribunals show that duties may also arise in the relationship between individuals. The chapter examines reparation practices, especially from the ICC, critically engaging with the source of compensation funds, as well as with the ultimate goal of reparations: building a just and sustainable peace. With this assessment, including lessons learned from the UN Compensation Commission, the chapter aims to reframe reparations as a critical element for peacebuilding.


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