Conflicts between Caribbean Basin Dictators and Democracies, 1944–1959

Author(s):  
Aaron Coy Moulton

Between 1944 and 1959, conflicts with anti-dictatorial exiles and democratic leaders against dictatorial regimes and dissident exiles shaped inter-American relations in the Caribbean Basin. At the end of World War II, anti-dictatorial exiles networked with students, laborers, journalists, and politicians in denouncing the Dominican Republic’s Rafael Trujillo, Nicaragua’s Anastasio Somoza, and Honduras’s Tiburcio Carías. Opponents of and dissident exiles from the 1944 Guatemalan Revolution and Venezuela’s Trienio Adeco (Adeco Triennium) under Rómulo Betancourt likewise turned to dictatorial regimes for aid. By 1947, a loose coalition of anti-dictatorial exiles with the help of Cuba, Guatemala, and Venezuela’s democratic leaders formed what would become known as the Caribbean Legion and organized the abortive Cayo Confites expedition against Trujillo. Seeking regional stability, U.S. officials intervened against this expedition and Caribbean Basin dictators and dissident exiles’ attempts to air-bomb Guatemala City and Caracas. Caribbean Basin leaders and exiles focused upon these inter-American conflicts, rather than the international Cold War. José Figueres’s rise to power in Costa Rica provided a pivotal ally to democratic leaders and anti-dictatorial exiles, and Caribbean Basin dictators began working with the Venezuelan military regime after the 1948 military coup. In 1949, Trujillo’s regime coordinated a counter-intelligence operation that destroyed the Caribbean Legion’s expedition at Luperón and brought greater attention to the region. By the early 1950s, dictatorial regimes operated as a counter-revolutionary network sharing intelligence, aiding dissident exiles, supporting Fulgencio Batista’s 1952 coup in Cuba, and lobbying U.S. officials against Jacobo Arbenz in Guatemala and Figueres in Costa Rica. The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) utilized these dictators and exiles during Operations PBFORTUNE and PBSUCCESS to overthrow the Guatemalan government in 1954, but U.S. officials intervened when the counter-revolutionary network invaded Costa Rica in 1955. From 1955 onward, anti-dictatorial exiles from Cuba, the Dominican Republic, Guatemala, Nicaragua, and Venezuela continued organizing expeditions against Caribbean Basin dictatorships, and multiple groups conspired against Batista’s regime. Among Cuban exiles, Fidel Castro rose to prominence and received important resources and alliances through anti-dictatorial exiles. Dictators shared intelligence and gave aid to Batista, yet Caribbean Legion veterans, Cuban exiles, Betancourt, Figueres, and others helped Castro undermine Batista. In 1959, Castro supported anti-dictatorial expeditions, most notably those against Trujillo and Luis Somoza. However, Castro disagreed with many former exiles and Betancourt and Figueres’s policies, so the resulting tension separated Castro from democratic leaders and divided the region among dictatorial regimes, democratic governments, and Castro.

2003 ◽  
Vol 12 (3-4) ◽  
pp. 207-224 ◽  
Author(s):  
Christopher Gerteis

AbstractDuring the 1950s, the American Federation of Labor (AFL) led a global covert attempt to suppress left-led labor movements in Western Europe, the Mediterranean, West Africa, Central and South America, and East Asia. American union leaders argued that to survive the Cold War, they had to demonstrate to the United States government that organized labor was not part-and-parcel with Soviet communism. The AFL’s global mission was placed in care of Jay Lovestone, a founding member of the American Communist Party in 1921 and survivor of decades of splits and internecine battles over allegiance to one faction or another in Soviet politics before turning anti-Communist and developing a secret relation with the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) after World War II. Lovestone’s idea was that the AFL could prove its loyalty by helping to root out Communists from what he perceived to be a global labor movement dominated by the Soviet Union. He was the CIA’s favorite Communist turned anti-Communist.


Author(s):  
Ilko Drenkov

Dr. Radan Sarafov (1908-1968) lived actively but his life is still relatively unknown to the Bulgarian academic and public audience. He was a strong character with an ulti-mate and conscious commitment to democratic Bulgaria. Dr. Sarafov was chosen by IMRO (Inner Macedonian Revolutionary Organization) to represent the idea of coop-eration with Anglo-American politics prior to the Second World War. Dr. Sarafov studied medicine in France, specialized in the Sorbonne, and was recruited by Colonel Ross for the Secret Intelligence Service (SIS), remaining undisclosed after the with-drawal of the British legation in 1941. After World War II, he continued to work for foreign intelligence and expanded the spectrum of cooperation with both France and the United States. After WWII, Sarafov could not conform to the reign of the communist regime in Bulgaria. He made a connection with the Anglo-American intelligence ser-vices and was cooperating with the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) for more than a decade. Sarafov was caught in 1968 and convicted by the Committee for State Securi-ty (CSS) in Bulgaria. The detailed review of the past events and processes through personal drama and commitment reveals the disastrous core of the communist regime. The acknowledgment of the people who sacrificed their lives in the name of democrat-ic values is always beneficial for understanding the division and contradictions from the time of the Cold War.


2020 ◽  
Vol 46 ◽  
Author(s):  
Alexia Ugalde Quesada

Este artículo estudia la invasión del 10 de diciembre de 1948 a Costa Rica en sus dimensiones de conflicto nacional, es decir, como consecuencia de la guerra civil del mismo año y de conflicto transnacional que involucra a otros países de la región así como la intervención de la Organización de Estados Americanos. Para ello se consultaron fuentes históricas del Archivo Nacional de Costa Rica, documentos de la Central Intelligence Agency y de los Archivos Nacionales de los Estados Unidos, así como prensa. Se plantea que durante la posguerra costarricense la violencia política permaneció debido a que los vencedores crearon instituciones y legislación para perseguir a sus enemigos, lo que a su vez causó una inminente invasión.   Palabras claves: Costa Rica, Nicaragua, Legión Caribe, comunistas, Cruz Roja, Organización de Estados Americanos, TIAR.


Zootaxa ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 4763 (1) ◽  
pp. 50-60
Author(s):  
EDWIN A. BARRANTES ◽  
MARCO A. ZUMBADO ECHAVARRIA ◽  
CHARLES R. BARTLETT ◽  
ERICKA E. HELMICK ◽  
PAIGE CUMMINS ◽  
...  

An ongoing survey for planthoppers associated with palms in the Caribbean basin is being conducted with current efforts on the Caribbean lowlands of Costa Rica. In an expedition in June of 2019, a derbid was found on coconut palms in Alajuela province and was determined to be a new species belonging to the genus Anotia. The novel taxon is described and named Anotia firebugia Bahder & Bartlett sp. n. Additionally, molecular barcode data (COI) is provided for the newly described taxon. 


2019 ◽  
pp. 64-84
Author(s):  
David P. Hadley

This chapter examines the public presence of the Central Intelligence Agency after its high-profile successes in Iran and Guatemala, related in the previous chapter. An effort to oust Sukarno in Indonesia failed, and the CIA was troubled by the general political environment of the 1950s, driven by fears that the Soviet Union was technologically ahead of the United States. Though able to weather the crisis that ensued when a U-2 surveillance plane was shot down over the Soviet Union in 1960, the CIA’s public and humiliating failure to oust Fidel Castro in the April 1961 Bay of Pigs invasion undermined the CIA’s reputation for effectiveness. Though not a reason for the failure of the invasion, the press’s coverage of the anti-Castro operation demonstrated that press attitudes toward the agency had begun to shift as a younger generation of reporters and managers more willing to question the CIA emerged on the scene.


2020 ◽  
Vol 32 (3) ◽  
pp. 241-272
Author(s):  
MARK ELLIS

AbstractThe work of southern sociologist Thomas Jackson Woofter Jr. (1893–1972) is frequently cited by American historians, but his contribution to government policy on agriculture in the New Deal, Social Security in the 1940s, and demography in the Cold War remains underappreciated. He left the University of North Carolina to direct government research on rural relief in the 1930s, Social Security enhancement during and after World War II, and foreign population and manpower projections during the Cold War. Contributing to the delivery of essential programs in key agencies, he participated in internal and external debates over policy and social attitudes between 1930 and 1960. Woofter worked for the Federal Emergency Relief Administration, the Works Progress Administration, the Farm Security Agency, the Federal Security Agency, and the Central Intelligence Agency, improving data-gathering and assisting transitions in federal policymaking. This article assesses his role in those agencies, using official records, other primary materials, and secondary sources.


1968 ◽  
Vol 34 ◽  
pp. 66-81 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kenneth E. Shewmaker

Much nonsense has been written about the “agrarian reformer” myth. A retired American diplomat maintains that the agrarian reformer slogan was a clever artifice devised by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) to mask its intentions and affiliations. Allen Dulles, former director of the Central Intelligence Agency, has gone a step further. He contends that One of the most successful long-range political deceptions of the Communists convinced gullible people in the West before and during World War II that the Chinese people's movement was not Communistic, but a social and “agrarian” reform movement. This fiction was planted through Communist-influenced journalists in the Far East and penetrated organisations in the West.


2019 ◽  
pp. 13-41
Author(s):  
David P. Hadley

This chapter examines the dissolution of the World War II–era U.S. intelligence agency, the Office of Strategic Services. Facing competition from the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the military intelligence services, and without a strong political patron, the OSS was not maintained after the war as many of its members wished. Beyond desiring that the OSS continue to function, many of its members articulated a clear ideology of intelligence, calling for a centralized, activist agency that could both gather secret intelligence and conduct covert warfare. This model was at odds with the collection and coordination focus of the early Central Intelligence Agency. While initially unsuccessful, the OSS vision ultimately triumphed in part because of the cultivation of key members of the press. The press was especially important owing to its criticism of the CIA for failures of prediction while remaining silent on covert operations; thus, failed operations did not impede advocates for covert action, while advocates for an agency focused on collection and analysis labored under unrealistic expectations.


2007 ◽  
Vol 61 (1) ◽  
pp. 17-28 ◽  
Author(s):  
Thomas W. Lippman

Shortly after the end of World War II, President Harry S. Truman was struggling with the question of what should become of Palestine, where Britain was soon to abandon its League of Nations Mandate. The newly created Central Intelligence Agency weighed in with a study of what would happen if Palestine were partitioned into Jewish and Arab zones — and came to some erroneous predictions along with some valuably prescient ones.


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