scholarly journals Trade Wars: What do they mean? Why are they happening now? What are the costs?

Author(s):  
Aaditya Mattoo ◽  
Robert W Staiger

Abstract How should economists interpret current trade wars and the recent U.S. trade actions that have initiated them? In this paper we offer an interpretation of current U.S. trade actions that is at once more charitable and less forgiving than that typically offered by economic commentators. More charitable, because we argue that it is possible to see a logic to these actions: the United States is initiating a change from “rules-based” to “power-based” tariff bargaining and is selecting countries with which it runs bilateral trade deficits as the most suitable targets of its bargaining tariffs. Less forgiving, because the main costs of these trade tactics cannot be avoided even if they happen to “work” and deliver lower tariffs. Rather, we show that the main costs will arise from the use of the tactics themselves, and from the damage done by those tactics to the rules-based multilateral trading system and the longer-term interests of the United States and the rest of the world.

2001 ◽  
Vol 55 (4) ◽  
pp. 949-969 ◽  
Author(s):  
Thomas H. Oatley

Europe's postwar shift to multilateral trade and payments arrangements was complicated by three factors. Distributional problems and uncertainty about the state of the world made European governments reluctant to adopt multilateral arrangements without financial support from the United States. An enforcement problem made U.S. policymakers reluctant to finance a European multilateral trading system. The severity of these problems was reduced by institutional designs that combined flexibility, centralization, and particular decision rules. Centralization and flexibility reduced uncertainty and softened distributive conflict. Centralization and particular decision rules solved the enforcement problem that U.S. policymakers faced.


2019 ◽  
Vol 20 (6) ◽  
pp. 792-819
Author(s):  
Yuka Fukunaga

Abstract The United States criticizes the Appellate Body for ‘making law’ by interpreting and applying the World Trade Organization (WTO) agreements in disregard of the intention of WTO members. The criticism of the United States is not without legitimate basis in that Members have few tools with which they may weigh in on the interpretation of the WTO agreements, even if the Appellate Body makes an erroneous interpretation. As much as the Appellate Body’s contribution to the security and predictability of the multilateral trading system warrants praise, the dysfunction of legislative and political mechanisms to counterbalance the growing de facto ‘authority’ of the Appellate Body should be a cause for concern. Against this background, this article proposes a new mechanism that would allow Members to disagree with interpretations by the Appellate Body and pronounce their own interpretations of the WTO agreements. The mechanism would be built upon ‘interpretative declarations.’


Author(s):  
Asif Khan ◽  
Ximei Wu

The World Trade Organization's (WTO’s) dispute settlement mechanism, known as the "pearl in the crown," is stalled due to United States (U.S.) obstruction, which prevents appellate body members from being ordained. This situation continues, and the WTO’s dispute settlement function is paralyzed since 2019. The WTO has faced a crisis in recent years, and the trade legislation has stagnated. The dispute settlement body was also blocked due to U.S. interference, which led to the failure of the appellate body’s members to be selected. The data has been gathered for this descriptive study using secondary research method, including different newspaper articles and the internet, which were outlined and noted. This paper presents and evaluates several existing proposals on how to get out of the impasse. This paper points out whether the existing WTO members can choose to join or not participate in establishing a new appellate body. On this basis, it makes its own relatively unique proposal, namely, to establish a substantial dispute settlement mechanism outside the WTO, parallel to the existing dispute settlement mechanism, and it demonstrates the legal feasibility of the proposal. Immediately, the states should begin negotiations on the significant agreements required for this new appellate body. It will effectively solve the deadlock in the dispute settlement mechanism caused by the United States, blocking the appointment of members of the appellate body.


1990 ◽  
Vol 84 (2) ◽  
pp. 394-443 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jean Raby

This is a good deal, a good deal for Canada and a deal that is good for all Canadians. It is also a fair deal, which means that it brings benefits and progress to our partner, the United States of America. When both countries prosper, our democracies are strengthened and leadership has been provided to our trading partners around the world. I think this initiative represents enlightened leadership to the trading partners about what can be accomplished when we determine that we are going to strike down protectionism, move toward liberalized trade, and generate new prosperity for all our people.On January 2, 1988, President Ronald Reagan of the United States and Prime Minister Brian Mulroney of Canada signed the landmark comprehensive Free Trade Agreement (FTA) between the two countries that already enjoyed the largest bilateral trade relationship in the world. The FTA was subsequently ratified by the legislatures of both countries, if only after a bitterly fought election on the subject in Canada. On January 1, 1989, the FTA formally came into effect.


2018 ◽  
Vol 74 (4) ◽  
pp. 402-419
Author(s):  
Krishnakumar S.

With Donald Trump as President of United States, multilateralism in the world economy is facing an unprecedented challenge. The international economic institutions that have evolved since the fifties are increasingly under the risk of being undermined. With the growing assertion of the emerging and developing economies in the international fora, United States is increasingly sceptical of its ability to maneuvre such institutions to suit its own purpose. This is particularly true with respect to WTO, based on “one country one vote” system. The tariff rate hikes initiated by the leader country in the recent past pose a serious challenge to the multilateral trading system. The paper tries to undertake a critical overview of the US pre-occupation of targeting economies on the basis of the bilateral merchandise trade surpluses of countries, through the trade legislations like Omnibus Act and Trade Facilitation Act. These legislations not only ignore the growing share of the United States in the growing invisibles trade in the world economy, but also read too much into the bilateral trade surpluses of economies with United States and the intervention done by them in the foreign exchange market.


Author(s):  
A.V. Brizitskaya

The article analyzes the trade relations between Russia and China in the modern period characterized by changes in the situation on the world stage and in the domestic political life of countries. The dynamics and commodity structure of bilateral trade of Russia and China have been studied, the Index of trade com-plementarity has been calculated, which showed that Chinese exports are more complementary to the structure of Russian imports than vice versa. Emphasis is placed on traditional trade in goods, excluding services and cross-border e-Commerce. The paper identifies two main directions which the development of Russian exports to China can take in the conditions of the "trade war" of China and the United States. The short-sighted policy of increasing only fuel and energy exports is justified. The reasons hindering the development of non-resource exports of Russia, primarily agricultural products and food, to China have been identified.


2019 ◽  
Vol 5 (1) ◽  
pp. 1
Author(s):  
Yagoub Elryah ◽  

Trade policy among the G20 has emerged as one of the challenges the group faces during the last decade after the 2008 global financial crisis. This paper aims at analyzing the current trade disputes between China and the United States and the efforts the G20 has taken to settle these disputes. The fundamental questions this study attempts to answer are as follows: (1) what the US–China trade dispute means for the world trading system? (2) what the G20 can do to prevent destructive trade wars? We confront this view by critically examining a large body of evidence on the effects of trade policy on economically important outcomes. We begin with a discussion of the role of G20 in stabilizing world economy. We show the G20’s recent economic and trade development challenges and measurements of trade policy and identification of its causal effects. We present the trade balance between the United States and China. We also illustrate the efforts made by the G20 in promoting the development of China–US trade cooperation. Data were collected from different sources. Data are collected from the World Bank, the World Trade Organization (WTO) publications, and the G20 summits’ reports. The results show that the United States has a trade deficit with China, and the global growth would be notably curtailed as investment and consumer spending fall back. The G20 should focus on supporting the WTO, being upfront about the mixed effects of trade and investment, and improving G20 measures to tackle protectionism.


Author(s):  
Özlem Toplu Yılmaz

This chapter analyzes the trade war between the United States of America and China. The United States of America and China are the two biggest trade leaders in the world. The United States supported China for its integration to world trade. The United States accused China of pursuing unfair trade policies. The United States increased tariffs against Chinese imports and China undertook retaliation measures against the United States' tariff increases. The two countries entered a period of a trade war and they started to implement protectionist policies on each other. These protectionist policies between the United States and China are seen as trade wars and could affect the world trade liberalization adversely. As they are trade partners too, it is better for both countries to end this war and to reach an agreement, because trade liberalization efforts could fail.


AJIL Unbound ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 113 ◽  
pp. 40-44
Author(s):  
Kathleen Claussen

Since the first half of the twentieth century, the U.S. Congress has increasingly delegated its authority over tariffs to the U.S. president. Some of these statutes permit private actors to petition for tariff relief. Some also permit the president to initiate an investigation and subsequently to take trade-related or other action when certain criteria are met. Since the 1990s, however, a robust multilateral trading system has required the United States and others to resolve disputes over trade measures in Geneva, rather than through unilateral policy steps under these tariff authorities. In a stark departure from this movement away from unilateral action, the Trump Administration has returned to relying heavily on domestic statutes to impose tariffs on goods imported from U.S. trading partners and on those from one country in particular: China.


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