26. Trade marks—infringement and revocation

Author(s):  
Paul Torremans

This chapter discusses the law on trade mark infringement and revocation. Section 10 of the Trade Marks Act 1994 establishes the basic criteria for an infringement action. If a mark is already on the Trade Marks Register, it is an infringement to use the same mark for the same goods or services. The grant of a trade mark lasts initially for 10 years from the date of its registration, and this may be renewed for a seemingly indefinite number of further periods of 10 years thereafter on payment of the appropriate fee. There are four grounds listed in s. 46(1) of the 1994 Act for revocation: (i) five years’ lack of genuine use of the mark in the UK without cause; (ii) a suspension for the same period (after initial use); (iii) the mark has become the common name for the product in question in the trade; and (iv) if the mark has been used in a misleading manner, especially as to the nature, quality, or origin of the goods or services in question.

Author(s):  
Paul Torremans

This chapter discusses the ways in which the common law, in the form of the law of tort, creates rights of action. It focuses on the torts of passing off and malicious falsehood, although attention is also paid to the ways in which defamation can assist. These rights are supplementary, and complementary, to the statutory formal rights. In particular, trade mark law and passing off closely overlap, although s. 2(2) of the Trade Marks Act 1994 preserves passing off as a separate cause of action.


Author(s):  
Paul Torremans
Keyword(s):  
The Law ◽  

This chapter discusses the historical roots of trade marks, the need for reform, and the rationale of a system of trade marks. Over the last decades, trade mark law has been harmonized in Europe; in the UK, the Trade Marks Act 1994 saw a sea change in the law of trade marks.


2019 ◽  
pp. 290-319
Author(s):  
Stavroula Karapapa ◽  
Luke McDonagh

This chapter focuses on trade mark infringement, setting out the rights of a trade mark owner to prevent others from making use of any sign which is the same as or similar to the registered mark in the course of trade. A claimant who brings a trade mark infringement action will have to show two things: that an act of infringement has been committed, and that such conduct falls within the scope of protection afforded to the registered mark. Once these two points have been established, the court will normally find in favour of the claimant unless one or more of the counter-arguments raised by the defendant succeeds. A defendant who is sued for trade mark infringement, besides denying that infringement has been made out or raising one of the statutory defences, will usually try to counterclaim that the mark should be revoked or declared invalid.


Legal Studies ◽  
2001 ◽  
Vol 21 (2) ◽  
pp. 226-250
Author(s):  
Andrew McGee ◽  
Sarah Gale ◽  
Gary Scanlan

The article considers the present state of the law of character merchandising. It questions whether the law relating to character merchandising should be further developed and extended so as to give an individual a comprehensive right to prevent the unauthorised use of aspects of his personality by third parties in connection with the promotion or sale of goods or services. In this context the article rejects the creation of new comprehensive remedies such as a tort of appropriation of personality as being undesirable and impractical. The article maintains that unauthorised acts of personality appropriation or use are already subject to adequate legal control through the law of trade marks and passing off. In this regard the article further suggests that tortious remedies such as defamation, malicious falsehood, and, in restricted circumstances copyright, provide effective sanctions against the unauthorised use of an individual's persona in commercial enterprises in particular and special circumstances. These remedies supplement and complement the principal remedies provided by trade mark protection and passing off.


Author(s):  
Hana Kelblová

The article deals with the verification of the starting hypothesis of complementariness of the law of consumer protection and the law of intellectual property. In order to achieve that goal the author analyzes individual the Czech Trade Marks Act from the standpoint of protection of rights and interests of consumers.The article follows the categorical requirement of a public law rule, the Consumer Protection Act, which prohibits deceiving consumers and establishes that deceiving may also consist in offering products and services unjustified designated by misleading trade mark.The consumer is deceived most frequently when trade marks are used for designation of products and their promotion. The Trade Marks Act may be analyzed in relation to consumer protection first from the standpoint of consumer protection against trade marks misleading someone about the origin and quality of products and services designated by them. Then it is possible to examine the question whether requirements of a designation for being registered as a trade mark are at the same time those attributes of the trade mark which meet the declared intention of the lawmaker, i.e. that the trade mark should be a source of information for the consumer about the origin and quality of the product de­sig­na­ted by it.Especially, the article deals with an interpretation of the conception „Likelihood of Confusion“ as the fundamental conception while judging the conflict with elderly trademarks applying for the re­gi­stra­tion into the list of The Patent Office.A perception of an average consumer is a fundamental factor for a judgement of „Likelihood of Confusion“ as results from the decision practice of The Czech Patent Office, Czech courts and The European Court of Justice. This is proof of the conclusion that rules of the Trademark Law are rules of the Consumer protection Law.


2018 ◽  
Vol 9 (2) ◽  
pp. 170-191
Author(s):  
Bjarte Askeland

Abstract The article presents an overview of Norwegian law with regard to damages caused by means of mass transportation by buses, railways and airplanes. The author explains why and how in Norway, as elsewhere in Scandinavia, there is strict liability for damages caused by means of mass transportation. Also the assessment of damages in the mentioned categories is discussed. For personal injuries there are no caps for trains or buses, partly because a greater part of the loss of income is covered by social security benefits, something which is typical of the ‘Nordic model’. Along the same lines, the rules on contributory negligence favour the victim somewhat more than in other parts of Europe, with regard to accidents caused by both buses and trains. Hence the law is all in all rather friendly to the victim. As for damage caused by air traffic, there are tensions between the ‘victim-friendly’ attitude and the relevant EU regulations which make the Montreal Convention applicable to Scandinavian law. These tensions are discussed towards the end of the article. Thus the article highlights and illustrates how the Scandinavian legal culture with the ‘Nordic Model’ as its special hallmark endorses solutions that somewhat contradict the common solutions in continental Europe and in the UK.


Author(s):  
Neil Parpworth

This chapter considers a further source of the UK constitution: the law made by the judicial branch of government as a result of the cases heard by the courts. Today it is widely accepted that judge-made law is a reality. It takes two main forms: the development of the common law; or the interpretation of statutes. The two main approaches of the courts to interpretation of Acts of Parliament—the literal approach and the purposive approach—are discussed. The interpretative obligation imposed on the courts by s 3 of the Human Rights Act 1998 is also reviewed.


2016 ◽  
Vol 12 (3) ◽  
pp. 135
Author(s):  
Seyed Mohammad Mousavi ◽  
Arash Babaei ◽  
Shamsollah Khatami ◽  
Yousef Jafarzadi

<p>One characteristic of the force of law in the country, the integrity of the rules in all areas of all aspects of creation into account the distinction between crime and the crime and failed or incomplete in acts of crime and crime as the withdrawal. In this respect the rules on penalties culpability in the crime has been proposed that the content of the crime with absolute responsibility of these categories has manifested. Under the Articles 144 and 145 of the Latest version Islamic criminal law (2013), Create unintentional offenses, subject to verification of the fault committed. In crimes ranging from quasi-intentional unintentional deviation as retaliation book rules apply. Legislator to commit a fault, the reason for the error is considered criminal, which has always been considered an objective measure and a ruler (in Article 145), while the common law under subsection (1) "criminal law to crimes" adopted 1981 crime start as the offense is punishable total. This study showed that certain similarities between the laws. In this context, the two internal laws and the common law can be found, in which the underlying offense of absolute liability is not fixed in the courts. Always treat judges and lawyers in the face of legal texts are not consistent because of the lack of transparency and clarity of the rules. In particular, in the common law, when a crime for the first time in cour t, and a warrant has been issued about it in terms of predicting the law and with regard to the interpretation of judges, procedural difference is more tangible.</p>


Author(s):  
Annette Kur ◽  
Martin Senftleben

As with other intellectual property rights, the exclusive rights of the trade mark proprietor are limited in several respects. At the international level, Article 17 TRIPS offers room for the adoption of ‘limited exceptions’ in domestic legislation (see paragraphs 2.68–2.72). On this basis, Article 14 of the Trade Mark Directive (TMD) and Article 12 of the European Trade Mark Regulation (EUTMR) provide a tool for reconciling the interests of the trade mark owner with competing interests of other traders and the public at large. As explained by the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU), these provisions, by limiting the effects of the exclusive rights of the trade mark owner, seek ‘to reconcile the fundamental interests of trade mark protection with those of free movement of goods and freedom to provide services in the common market in such a way that trade mark rights are able to fulfil their essential role in the system of undistorted competition which the Treaty seeks to establish and maintain’.


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