scholarly journals A Comparative Study of Absolute Liability Offense in Iran and the UK

2016 ◽  
Vol 12 (3) ◽  
pp. 135
Author(s):  
Seyed Mohammad Mousavi ◽  
Arash Babaei ◽  
Shamsollah Khatami ◽  
Yousef Jafarzadi
Keyword(s):  
Comparative Study ◽  
Criminal Law ◽  
Common Law ◽  
Objective Measure ◽  
Legal Texts ◽  
The Face ◽  
The Common ◽  
The Law ◽  
The Uk ◽  
First Time

<p>One characteristic of the force of law in the country, the integrity of the rules in all areas of all aspects of creation into account the distinction between crime and the crime and failed or incomplete in acts of crime and crime as the withdrawal. In this respect the rules on penalties culpability in the crime has been proposed that the content of the crime with absolute responsibility of these categories has manifested. Under the Articles 144 and 145 of the Latest version Islamic criminal law (2013), Create unintentional offenses, subject to verification of the fault committed. In crimes ranging from quasi-intentional unintentional deviation as retaliation book rules apply. Legislator to commit a fault, the reason for the error is considered criminal, which has always been considered an objective measure and a ruler (in Article 145), while the common law under subsection (1) "criminal law to crimes" adopted 1981 crime start as the offense is punishable total. This study showed that certain similarities between the laws. In this context, the two internal laws and the common law can be found, in which the underlying offense of absolute liability is not fixed in the courts. Always treat judges and lawyers in the face of legal texts are not consistent because of the lack of transparency and clarity of the rules. In particular, in the common law, when a crime for the first time in cour t, and a warrant has been issued about it in terms of predicting the law and with regard to the interpretation of judges, procedural difference is more tangible.</p>

Child Protection through the Criminal Law

2020 ◽  
pp. 85-114
Author(s):  
Kenneth McK. Norrie
Keyword(s):  
Corporal Punishment ◽  
Criminal Law ◽  
Child Protection ◽  
Adult Population ◽  
Common Law ◽  
Legal Basis ◽  
Sexual Offences ◽  
The Common ◽  
The Law ◽  
A Charge

The earliest criminal law dealing with children differently from the adult population was that concerned with sexual offences. This chapter explores the changing policies of the law, from the late 19th century fear of girls being exposed to immorality and boys being exposed to homosexuality, through the more protective 20th century legislation which nevertheless hung on to old ideas of immorality and criminality, until the Sexual Offences (Scotland) Act 2009 focused almost (but not quite) exclusively on protection from harm and from exploitation. The chapter then turns to the crime of child cruelty or neglect from its earliest manifestation in the common law to its statutory formulation in Prevention of Cruelty to, and Protection of, Children Act 1889, which, re-enacted in 1937, took on a form that, for all intents and purposes, remains to this day. The last part of the chapter explores the legal basis for the power of corporal punishment – the defence previously available to parents, teachers and some others to a charge of assault of a child, known as “reasonable” chastisement. Its gradual abolition from the 1980s to 2019 is described.

Personalized Legal Areas

2021 ◽  
pp. 61-84
Author(s):  
Omri Ben-Shahar ◽  
Ariel Porat
Keyword(s):  
Criminal Law ◽  
Common Law ◽  
Tort Law ◽  
Contract Law ◽  
Standards Of Care ◽  
Criminal Sanctions ◽  
The Common ◽  
The Law

This chapter illustrates personalized law “in action” by examining it in three areas of the law: standards of care under the common law tort doctrine of negligence, mandated consumer protections in contract law, and criminal sanctions. In each area, the chapter examines personalization of commands along several dimensions. In tort law, standards of care could vary according to each injurer’s riskiness and skill, to reduce the costs of accidents. In contract law, mandatory protections could vary according to the value they provide each consumer and differential cost they impose on firms, to allocate protections where, and only where, they are justified. And in criminal law, sanctions would be set based on what it takes to deter criminals, accounting for how perpetrators differ in their motives and likelihood of being apprehended, with the potential to reduce unnecessary harsh penalties.

A new chapter in the law of sexual harassment in Malaysia: The emergence of the torts of harassment and sexual harassment

2019 ◽  
Vol 48 (4) ◽  
pp. 191-207
Author(s):  
Abdul Majid ◽  
Sri Yogamalar ◽  
Audrey Kim Lan Siah ◽  
Jane L Y Terpstra-Tong ◽  
Luc Borrowman
Keyword(s):  
Sexual Harassment ◽  
Common Law ◽  
Federal Court ◽  
The World ◽  
The Common ◽  
Per Se ◽  
The Law ◽  
First Time

In a landmark case in 2016, Malaysia’s apex court, the Federal Court, explicitly recognised for the first time, the common law tort of sexual harassment. Actually, the Federal Court did more than that; its recognition of the common law tort of sexual harassment is built on its recognising the common law tort of harassment. The recognition of the tort of harassment has escaped notice because attention has been concentrated on the tort of sexual harassment. This article analyses the Federal Court’s exposition of the tort of sexual harassment to reveal that the exegesis itself acknowledges the existence of the tort of harassment per se. The tort of harassment that the Federal Court sent out into the world is largely a creature of its English common law ancestry.

11. Judge-made law

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Neil Parpworth
Keyword(s):  
Human Rights ◽  
Common Law ◽  
Human Rights Act ◽  
Human Rights Act 1998 ◽  
The Common ◽  
The Law ◽  
The Uk

This chapter considers a further source of the UK constitution: the law made by the judicial branch of government as a result of the cases heard by the courts. Today it is widely accepted that judge-made law is a reality. It takes two main forms: the development of the common law; or the interpretation of statutes. The two main approaches of the courts to interpretation of Acts of Parliament—the literal approach and the purposive approach—are discussed. The interpretative obligation imposed on the courts by s 3 of the Human Rights Act 1998 is also reviewed.

18. Freedom of expression

2020 ◽  
pp. 451-481
Author(s):  
Neil Parpworth
Keyword(s):  
Freedom Of Expression ◽  
Common Law ◽  
Search And Seizure ◽  
Democratic State ◽  
The Media ◽  
The Common ◽  
The Law ◽  
Court Proceedings ◽  
The Uk

This chapter focuses on some of the laws relating to freedom of expression in the UK. Freedom of expression is widely considered to be a necessary feature in any democratic state. The chapter considers the extent to which restrictions are placed on the freedom of expression in the UK in two particular contexts. It considers laws for the control of obscenity and indecency, the publication of obscene matter, the test of obscenity, defences, powers of search and seizure, and the possession of pornographic images. The discussion also considers that part of the law of contempt of court which relates to restricting the ability of the media to report court proceedings. This chapter is confined to the law relating to obscenity and indecency and contempt of court on the basis that they share the important characteristic of being regulated by both statute and the common law.

11. Judge-made law

2020 ◽  
pp. 243-250
Author(s):  
Neil Parpworth
Keyword(s):  
Human Rights ◽  
Common Law ◽  
Human Rights Act ◽  
Human Rights Act 1998 ◽  
The Common ◽  
The Law ◽  
The Uk

This chapter considers a further source of the UK constitution: the law that is made by the judicial branch of government as a result of the cases heard by the courts. Today it is widely accepted that judge-made law is a reality. It takes two main forms: the development of the common law; or the interpretation of statutes. The two main approaches of the courts to interpretation of Acts of Parliament—the literal approach and the purposive approach—are discussed. In addition, the interpretative obligation imposed on the courts by s 3 of the Human Rights Act 1998 is also reviewed.

Intention vs. Negligence

2019 ◽  
pp. 175-184
Author(s):  
George P. Fletcher
Keyword(s):  
Mental State ◽  
Common Law ◽  
Mens Rea ◽  
Criminal Cases ◽  
Reasonable Person ◽  
The Face ◽  
The Common ◽  
The Law

This chapter explores the role of mental state in criminal cases, considering the concept of negligence. Lawyers trained in the common law tradition are familiar with the concept of mens rea and the maxim actus non facit reus nisi mens sit rea. Literally this means that there is no criminal (or guilty) act without a criminal (or guilty) mind. The problem is that there are both descriptive and normative interpretations of mens rea and of the maxim. The normative or moral interpretation of mens rea holds that the term equivalent to a guilty mind, for example, a basis for blaming the actor for their conduct, is something not possible in the face of the defenses considered in the last chapter. Meanwhile, negligence is based, as in the classic definition from the law of torts, on the conduct of “a reasonable person under the circumstances.” The important point is that negligence is based on the fault of not knowing.

Duress and the Criminal Law: Another About Turn by the House of Lords

1988 ◽  
Vol 47 (1) ◽  
pp. 61-76 ◽  
Author(s):  
H. P. Milgate
Keyword(s):  
Northern Ireland ◽  
Criminal Law ◽  
Common Law ◽  
General Rule ◽  
The Past ◽  
House Of Lords ◽  
The Common ◽  
The Law ◽  
The Relationship ◽  
Second Degree

In the field of criminal law we should be used to the House of Lords changing its mind. In the course of the past three years the House has fundamentally altered its view on the meaning of intention, on the relationship between statutory and common law conspiracy and on the law of impossible attempts. Now we have another about turn. In R. v. Howe and Bannister the House of Lords has unanimously decided that duress can never be a defence to murder. Yet elsewhere in the criminal law (with the exception of some forms of treason) duress operates as a complete defence, leading to acquittal if raised successfully. In making murder an exception to this general rule the House, using its power under the Practice Statement of 1966, has departed from its previous decision in D.P.P. for Northern Ireland v. Lynch which allowed the defence of duress to be raised by principals in the second degree to murder. The Lynch decision, which had stood as part of the common law for some twelve years, is now consigned to the legal scrapheap.

6. The royal prerogative and constitutional conventions

Public Law ◽  
2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
John Stanton ◽  
Craig Prescott
Keyword(s):  
Rule Of Law ◽  
Common Law ◽  
The Rule Of Law ◽  
Head Of State ◽  
Constitutional Conventions ◽  
The Common ◽  
The Law ◽  
The Government ◽  
The Uk

This chapter explores the historical, legal, and political nature of the Crown and the royal prerogative. The rule of law requires that the government act according to the law, which means that the powers of the government must be derived from the law. However, within the UK Constitution, some powers of the government are part of the royal prerogative, as recognised by the common law. The concepts of the Crown and the royal prerogative mean that although the Queen is Head of State, it is generally the ministers who form the government that exercise the prerogative powers of the Crown. For this reason, many prerogative powers are often referred to as the ‘ministerial prerogatives’, and the few prerogative powers still exercised personally by the monarch, are referred to as the ‘personal prerogatives’.

6. The royal prerogative and constitutional conventions

Public Law ◽  
2020 ◽  
pp. 203-258
Author(s):  
John Stanton ◽  
Craig Prescott
Keyword(s):  
Rule Of Law ◽  
Common Law ◽  
The Rule Of Law ◽  
Head Of State ◽  
Constitutional Conventions ◽  
The Common ◽  
The Law ◽  
The Government ◽  
The Uk

This chapter explores the historical, legal, and political nature of the Crown and the royal prerogative. The rule of law requires that the government act according to the law, which means that the powers of the government must be derived from the law. However, within the UK Constitution, some powers of the government stem from the royal prerogative, as recognized by the common law. The concepts of the Crown and the royal prerogative mean that although the Queen is Head of State, it is generally the ministers who form the government that exercise the prerogative powers of the Crown. For this reason, many prerogative powers are often referred to as the ‘ministerial prerogatives’, and the few prerogative powers still exercised personally by the monarch, are referred to as the ‘personal prerogatives’.

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