1. Introduction

Author(s):  
Adrian Keane ◽  
Paul McKeown

Evidence is information by which facts tend to be proved, and the law of evidence is that body of law and discretion regulating the means by which facts may be proved in both courts of law and tribunals and arbitrations in which the strict rules of evidence apply. This introductory chapter discusses truth and the fact-finding process and explains how getting to the truth in court is hampered by practical constraints, the adversarial system, the rules of evidence themselves, and the fact that litigation is a human endeavour that necessarily provides scope for differences of opinion, error, deceit, and lies. The chapter also contains a brief history of the development of the law to date.

Author(s):  
Adrian Keane ◽  
Paul McKeown

Evidence is information by which facts tend to be proved, and the law of evidence is that body of law and discretion regulating the means by which facts may be proved in both courts of law and tribunals and arbitrations in which the strict rules of evidence apply. This introductory chapter discusses truth and the fact-finding process and explains how getting to the truth in court is hampered by practical constraints, the adversarial system, the rules of evidence themselves, and the fact that litigation is a human endeavour that necessarily provides scope for differences of opinion, error, deceit, and lies. The chapter also contains a brief history of the development of the law to date.


Author(s):  
John B. Nann ◽  
Morris L. Cohen

This introductory chapter provides an overview of legal history research. An attorney might conduct legal history research if the law at question in a legal dispute is very old: the U.S. Constitution and the Bill of Rights are well over two hundred years old. Historical research also comes into play when the question at issue is what the law was at a certain time in the past. Ultimately, law plays an important part in the political and social history of the United States. As such, researchers interested in almost every aspect of American life will have occasion to use legal materials. The chapter then describes the U.S. legal system and legal authority, and offers six points to consider in approaching a historical legal research project.


Author(s):  
Pierre Rosanvallon

This introductory chapter considers the definitions of legitimacy in the context of democratic politics. Expressions such as the “great majority” or “vast majority” established the law of numbers, in contrast to the minority rule characteristic of despotic and aristocratic regimes. At first, it was the difference in the origins of power and the foundation of political obligation that was crucial. Later, the majority principle came to be recognized in a more narrowly procedural sense. The chapter traces this evolution within the history of democratic elections, positing a decentering of democracy as newer forms of political investment emerge, making democratic politics into something more than merely electing representatives.


Author(s):  
Roderick Munday

This introductory chapter discusses the relevance of evidence in the courtroom. It first explores the development of the law of evidence beginning from the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. The chapter then studies the extent to which the law of evidence applies to all of the different stages and matters considered by the courts and to other tribunals. The main purposes and categories of evidence are next considered and exemplified, together with the question of whether any broad general rules can usefully be elaborated. Finally, this chapter turns to its most fundamental principle — relevance, which is contrasted with the admissibility of evidence.


Author(s):  
Michael J. Pfeifer

This introductory chapter discusses the gaps in current American lynching historiography, noting that, while several recent studies of lynching have enhanced our understanding of the history of the rhetoric surrounding the term lynching, they have only peripherally addressed the very real practices of collective violence that the word actually connoted in particular times and places. In addition, the chapter provides a brief overview of American lynching, which arose in the early to mid-nineteenth century as a response to alterations in law and social values (the shift from a penology of retribution and deterrence to one centered on reform of the criminal, the rise of the adversarial system and aggressive defense lawyering, the shift from private to public criminal prosecution, and the professionalization of criminal justice) that occurred throughout the Anglo-American world.


2018 ◽  
pp. 176-226
Author(s):  
Roderick Munday

This chapter discusses the basic functions of judge and jury. It begins with the general rule of separation of functions of judge and jury, before turning to some of the more direct methods of judicial control. The chapter also considers the extent to which the average jury understands the directions that the law requires the judge to give, and whether jurors are as imperceptive, ignorant, or prejudiced as some of the rules of evidence suppose. Secret monitoring of jury deliberations is one way of resolving these issues, but such monitoring would amount to contempt of court. Moreover, any discussion with a third party before verdict is liable to result in a conviction being quashed. Recourse must, at present, be had to simulations and generally less reliable methods of obtaining the information needed to provide a basis for understanding and improving the law of evidence.


2005 ◽  
Vol 9 (2) ◽  
pp. 73-109 ◽  
Author(s):  
Robert J. Currie

This article surveys the manner in which the courts of Canada have treated the concept of ‘culture’ as a justiciable matter in litigation. It starts from the premise that a constitutionally ‘multicultural’ society has manifest impetus to factor cultural realities into court-based decision-making, and acknowledges that judicial use of ‘contextualism’ appears to have provided the framework for reception of cultural evidence. Using the rules of evidence as a lens, the article: surveys how courts have found culture to be relevant, material and admissible in various kinds of legal disputes; analyses the trends; and offers some preliminary thoughts as to how the law of evidence should continue to adapt in order to accommodate culture in a principled manner.


1997 ◽  
Vol 31 (1-3) ◽  
pp. 645-689 ◽  
Author(s):  
John D. Jackson ◽  
Sean Doran

It is a curious quirk of legal scholarship that so much attention has been devoted to the rules and procedures that operate injury trials and so little to the way in which these rules and procedures operate in the vast majority of trials which are conducted without a jury. This “jury-centredness” as it has been called was noted almost thirty years ago by the American scholar Kenneth Culp Davis when he urged scholars and the legal profession to escape from the deep-seated habit of allowing all thinking about evidence law to be dominated by the needs of the 3% of trials that involve juries and to think instead about the needs of the remaining 97% of trials that are tried without a jury. It is certainly true that the withdrawal of the jury from many categories of cases throughout this century in many jurisdictions has not been accompanied by any instant changes in the law of evidence. Certain commentators have noted that in spite of Thayer's claim that the rules are the “child of the jury”, the rules of evidence have proved remarkably resilient in outlasting the demise of the jury. The parent may have ceased to exist in many legal proceedings but the child has lived on.


Author(s):  
Klimchuck Samet

This introductory chapter provides an overview of this book’s study of the history of equity. In his celebrated Lectures on Equity, FW Maitland famously declared that all that could be said in answer to what is distinctive of the law of equity is that it comprises ‘that body of rules administered by our English courts of justice which, were it not for the operation of the Judicature Acts, would be administered only by those courts which would be known as Courts of Equity’. If Maitland was right, then there is no reason to think the law of equity names something about which there could be philosophical foundations. The contributors to this volume share, for the most part, and in various degrees, the view that Maitland was wrong. Since at least the time of Aristotle, equity has captured the interest of philosophers, and that fascination continues today. As equity’s place in the legal system continues to evolve, equity’s correction of the law, equity’s distinctiveness, and equity’s moral dimensions will continue to remain central questions. Philosophical analysis of these aspects of equity in general and equity in common law legal systems promises to help in understanding and better shaping these developments.


Author(s):  
Butler William E

This introductory chapter briefly reflects on the history of the law of making treaties in Russia. Treaties constitute the earliest surviving documents by at least a century and perhaps more in not only the legal history, but the general history, of the Russian people. The chapter discusses multiple issues which were embedded in the treaties of the ninth and tenth centuries, such as the form and legal nature of the document, ratification procedures, and so on. It considers how these issues interact with the existence of an international legal system as well as a domestic one. The chapter also looks at Russia's especially post-Soviet Russia's-responses to these issues and expounds on the importance of addressing them.


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