19. Coercive Diplomacy: Countering War-Threatening Crises and Armed Conflicts

Author(s):  
Peter Viggo Jakobsen

This chapter examines how coercive diplomacy has emerged as a strategy for states in dealing with the opponent without resorting to full-scale war. Coercive diplomacy involves the use of military threats and/or limited force (sticks) coupled with inducements and assurances (carrots) in order to influence the opponent to do something it would prefer not to. This chapter first explains what coercive diplomacy is and considers its requirements for success. It then shows how states have employed coercive diplomacy to manage crises and conflicts during the three strategic eras that followed the end of the Cold War. It also discusses the importance of the strategic context in shaping the use of coercive diplomacy by presenting two case studies, one relating to Iran’s nuclear ambitions, and the other relating to Russia’s military involvement in Ukraine.

Author(s):  
Peter Viggo Jakobsen

This chapter examines how coercive diplomacy has emerged as a strategy for states in dealing with the opponent without resorting to full-scale war. Coercive diplomacy involves the use of military threats and/or limited force (sticks) coupled with inducements and assurances (carrots) in order to influence the opponent to do something it would prefer not to. This chapter first explains what coercive diplomacy is and considers its requirements for success. It then shows how states have employed coercive diplomacy to manage crises and conflicts during the three strategic eras that followed the end of the Cold War. It also discusses the importance of the strategic context in shaping the use of coercive diplomacy by presenting two case studies, one relating to the United States’s conflict with Libya due to the latter’s weapons of mass destruction, and the other relating to Russia’s military involvement in Ukraine.


Author(s):  
Thomas J. Christensen

In brute-force struggles for survival, such as the two world wars, disorganization and divisions within an enemy alliance are to one's own advantage. However, most international security politics involve coercive diplomacy and negotiations short of all-out war. This book demonstrates that when states are engaged in coercive diplomacy—combining threats and assurances to influence the behavior of real or potential adversaries—divisions, rivalries, and lack of coordination within the opposing camp often make it more difficult to prevent the onset of regional conflicts, to prevent existing conflicts from escalating, and to negotiate the end to those conflicts promptly. Focusing on relations between the Communist and anti-Communist alliances in Asia during the Cold War, the book explores how internal divisions and lack of cohesion in the two alliances complicated and undercut coercive diplomacy by sending confusing signals about strength, resolve, and intent. In the case of the Communist camp, internal mistrust and rivalries catalyzed the movement's aggressiveness in ways that we would not have expected from a more cohesive movement under Moscow's clear control. Reviewing newly available archival material, the book examines the instability in relations across the Asian Cold War divide, and sheds new light on the Korean and Vietnam wars. While recognizing clear differences between the Cold War and post-Cold War environments, the book investigates how efforts to adjust burden-sharing roles among the United States and its Asian security partners have complicated U.S. security relations with the People's Republic of China since the collapse of the Soviet Union.


Author(s):  
Dirk Berg-Schlosser

Area studies have undergone significant changes over the last two decades. They have been transformed from mostly descriptive accounts in the international context of the Cold War to theory-oriented and methodological analytical approaches. More recent comparative methods such as “Qualitative Comparative Analysis” (QCA) and related approaches, which are particularly suitable for medium N studies, have significantly contributed to this development. This essay discusses the epistemological background of this approach as well as recent developments. It provides two examples of current “cross area studies,” one concerned with successful democratic transformations across four regions (Africa, Eastern Europe, Latin America, and East Asia), the other with political participation in marginalized settlements in four countries (Brazil, Chile, Ivory Coast, Kenya) in a multilevel analysis. The conclusion points to the theoretical promises of this approach and its practical-political relevance.


Author(s):  
Jenny Andersson

Alvin Toffler’s writings encapsulated many of the tensions of futurism: the way that futurology and futures studies oscillated between forms of utopianism and technocracy with global ambitions, and between new forms of activism, on the one hand, and emerging forms of consultancy and paid advice on the other. Paradoxically, in their desire to create new images of the future capable of providing exits from the status quo of the Cold War world, futurists reinvented the technologies of prediction that they had initially rejected, and put them at the basis of a new activity of futures advice. Consultancy was central to the field of futures studies from its inception. For futurists, consultancy was a form of militancy—a potentially world altering expertise that could bypass politics and also escaped the boring halls of academia.


2020 ◽  
Vol 145 (2) ◽  
pp. 495-505
Author(s):  
EIRINI DIAMANTOULI

Ideologically motivated attempts to elucidate Shostakovich’s political views and to determine whether and how they may be coded into his compositions have come to characterize the Western reception of the composer’s works since his death in 1975. Fuelled by the political oppositions of the cold war, Shostakovich’s posthumous reputation in the West has been largely shaped by two conflicting perspectives. These have positioned him on the one hand as a secret dissident, bent and broken under the unbearable strain of totalitarianism, made heroic through his veiled musical resistance to Communism; and on the other hand as a composer compromised by his capitulation to the regime – represented in an anachronistic musical style. Both perspectives surrender Shostakovich and his music to a crude oversimplification driven by vested political interests. Western listeners thus conditioned are primed to hear either the coded dissidence of a tragic victim of Communist brutality or the sinister submission of a ‘loyal son of the Communist Party’.1 For those prepared to accept Shostakovich as a ‘tragic victim’, the publication of his purported memoirs in 1979, ‘as related to and edited by’ the author Solomon Volkov, presents a tantalizing conclusion: bitterly yet discreetly scornful of the Stalinist regime, Shostakovich was indeed a secret dissident and this dissidence was made tangible in his music.


2012 ◽  
Vol 14 (1) ◽  
pp. 93-95
Author(s):  
Christian Nuenlist ◽  
Anna Locher ◽  
Garret Martin

Four distinguished analysts of French foreign policy under Charles de Gaulle provide in-depth assessments of the new book edited by Christian Nuenlist, Anna Locher, and Garret Martin, Globalizing de Gaulle: International Perspectives on French Foreign Policies, 1958–1969, published by Lexington Books. The commentators praise the book's wide scope and many of its essays and broad themes, but they raise questions about Garret Martin's contention (shared by a few, though not all, of the other contributors to the volume) that de Gaulle had a coherent if ultimately unsuccessful strategy to overcome the Cold War and move toward the unification of Germany and Europe. In article-length commentaries, both Andrew Moravcsik and Marc Trachtenberg take issue with Martin's view, arguing that de Gaulle's foreign policy involved more bluff and bluster than any genuine attempt to bring about the reunification of Germany or to end the Cold War. Moravcsik also provides a spirited defense of the “revisionist” conception of de Gaulle's policy toward Europe, which sees the general as having been guided mostly by his domestic economic and political interests—a conception that Trachtenberg has also come to accept. The forum ends with a reply by Nuenlist, Locher, and Martin to the four commentaries.


1996 ◽  
Vol 36 (314) ◽  
pp. 512-531 ◽  
Author(s):  
David P. Forsythe

In today's armed conflicts and complex emergencies more civilians suffer than combatants. After the Cold War one could identify a zone of turmoil in which civilian suffering was acute. But one could also identify a zone of stability from which operated a complicated system of humanitarian assistance designed to respond to civilian suffering. Media coverage emphasized the suffering, but never before in world history had such a kaleidoscope of humanitarian actors tried to provide emergency relief during armed conflicts and complex emergencies. Inevitably calls were heard for better organization and coordination, and in 1991–92 the United Nations created a Department of Humanitarian Affairs (DHA).


2021 ◽  
Vol 30 (4) ◽  
pp. 23-44
Author(s):  
Adam Potočňák

The article holistically analyses current strategies for the use and development of nuclear forces of the USA and Russia and analytically reflects their mutual doctrinal interactions. It deals with the conditions under which the U.S. and Russia may opt for using their nuclear weapons and reflects also related issues of modernization and development of their actual nuclear forces. The author argues that both superpowers did not manage to abandon the Cold War logic or avoid erroneous, distorted or exaggerated assumptions about the intentions of the other side. The text concludes with a summary of possible changes and adaptations of the American nuclear strategy under the Biden administration as part of the assumed strategy update expected for 2022.


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