24. The War in Iraq

Author(s):  
John W. Young ◽  
John Kent

This chapter focuses on the Iraq war of 2003–11 and the troubles in the Middle East. George W. Bush’s advisers, led by Dick Cheney and Don Rumsfeld, had been considering an attack on Iraq well before 9/11. At the same time, many experts within the government pointed to the lack of any evidence for Iraqi-sponsored terrorism directed against the United States. The threats to US national security were outlined to Bush in a briefing just prior to his inauguration; these threats came primarily from al-Qaeda’s terrorism and the proliferation of nuclear arms and other weapons of mass destruction (WMDs). The chapter first considers the US decision to invade Iraq, before discussing the war, taking into account the US’s Operation Iraqi Freedom and the war’s costs to the US and to Iraq. It also examines the Israeli–Palestinian conflict and concludes with an assessment of the ‘Arab Spring’.

Author(s):  
John W. Young ◽  
John Kent

This chapter focuses on the Iraq war of 2003–2011 and the troubles in the Middle East. George W. Bush’s advisers, led by Dick Cheney and Don Rumsfeld, had been considering an attack on Iraq well before 9/11. At the same time, many experts within the government pointed to the lack of any evidence for Iraqi-sponsored terrorism directed against the United States. The threats to US national security were outlined to Bush in a briefing just prior to his inauguration; these threats came primarily from al-Qaeda’s terrorism and the proliferation of nuclear arms and other weapons of mass destruction (WMDs). The chapter first considers the US decision to invade Iraq before discussing the war, taking into account the US’s Operation Iraqi Freedom and the war’s costs to the US and to Iraq. It also examines the Israeli–Palestinian conflict and concludes with an assessment of the ‘Arab Spring’.


2020 ◽  
Vol 26 (3) ◽  
Author(s):  
Linda J. Bilmes

AbstractThe United States has traditionally defined national security in the context of military threats and addressed them through military spending. This article considers whether the United States will rethink this mindset following the disruption of the Covid19 pandemic, during which a non-military actor has inflicted widespread harm. The author argues that the US will not redefine national security explicitly due to the importance of the military in the US economy and the bipartisan trend toward growing the military budget since 2001. However, the pandemic has opened the floodgates with respect to federal spending. This shift will enable the next administration to allocate greater resources to non-military threats such as climate change and emerging diseases, even as it continues to increase defense spending to address traditionally defined military threats such as hypersonics and cyberterrorism.


Jurnal ICMES ◽  
2018 ◽  
Vol 2 (2) ◽  
pp. 179-196
Author(s):  
Firmanda Taufiq

Throughout 2018, relations between Turkey and the United States seemed to deteriorate. The leaders of the two countries issued sharp diplomatic statements and the US even imposed economic sanctions on Turkey. This article aims to analyze how the future of relations between Turkey and the United States. Cooperation between the two has a long historical side after the Cold War. Relations between the two countries are based on various interests, both economic, political, military and security interests. The theory used in this study is the theory of national interest. The US has great interests in the Middle East and Turkey is the front-line ally in achieving those interests. However, there are many US foreign policies that ignore the Turkish concern and create tensions between the two countries. On the contrary, Turkey also has considerable economic interests, but the role of the government elite (in this case, President Erdogan) has a significant influence in the determination of Turkish foreign policy. The findings of this study, although it will go through complex challenges and processes, the US and Turkey will continue to maintain their relations.


2021 ◽  
Vol 6 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Ahmad Shah Azami

As part of its “War on Terror”, the United States (US) provided immense sums of money and advanced equipment to Afghan warlords in order to defeat and dismantle the Taliban and al-Qaeda in Afghanistan. Nearly two decades after the 2001 US-led intervention in Afghanistan that toppled the Taliban regime, the US continues supporting the warlords in various ways. As the intervention was also aimed at establishing a functioning state and reconstruction of the war-torn country, the US needed the support of local warlords to achieve its goals. However, over time, warlords and warlordism became a major challenge to the postTaliban state-building project and in many ways undermined the overall security and the state monopoly on violence. These warlords, who had been mostly expelled and defeated by the Taliban regime, returned under the aegis of the B52 bombers, recaptured parts of the country and reestablished their fiefdoms with US support and resources. They not only resist giving up the power and prestige they have accumulated over the past few years, but also hamper the effort to improve governance and enact necessary reforms in the country. In addition, many of them run their private militias and have been accused of serious human rights abuses as well as drug trafficking, arms smuggling, illegal mining and extortion in the areas under their control or influence. In many ways, they challenge the government authority and have become a major hurdle to the country’s emerging from lawlessness and anarchy. This paper explores the emergence and reemergence of warlords in Afghanistan as well as the evolution of chaos and anarchy in the country, especially after the US-led intervention of late 2001. It also analyzes the impact of the post-9/11 US support to Afghan warlords and its negative consequences for the overall stability and the US-led state-building process in Afghanistan.


2018 ◽  
Vol 25 ◽  
pp. 11-21
Author(s):  
Matthew Dotzler

The conflict between Turkey and the Kurds is once again reaching a boiling point. Following the defeat of ISIL in northern Iraq and Syria, Turkey is now concerned that the returning Kurdish militias pose a threat to its national security. The United States, as an ally to both parties, finds itself in a unique position to push for diplomatic solutions and to mediate the conflict before it grows out of control once again. This paper will examine the history of the Turkish-Kurdish conflict, the actors involved, and how US foreign policy can be used to try and deter yet another war in the region.


Author(s):  
Beverley Hooper

From the early 1970s, the US-China relationship was central to diplomatic reporting, with National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger’s visit to Peking in October 1971, President Nixon’s historic visit in February 1972, and the establishment the following year of small liaison offices in Peking and Washington. Following each of Kissinger’s further visits in 1973 and 1974, senior diplomats virtually queued up at the liaison office to find out what progress, if any, had been made towards the normalization of US-China relations. Peking’s diplomats, like some of their colleagues elsewhere in the world, did not always see eye-to-eye with their foreign ministries. There was little chance of their becoming overly attached to Communist China, as the Japanologists and Arabists were sometimes accused of doing for Japan and Arab countries. At the same time, living and breathing the PRC led some diplomats to regard Chinese Communism as being rather more nuanced—and the government somewhat less belligerent—than the Cold War images portrayed in the West, particularly the United States.


Author(s):  
Christian Leuprecht

This chapter reviews the member organizations of the United States Intelligence Community, the strategic environment that has informed intelligence and accountability in the United States, including scandals as a key driver of innovation, and the current and future threat environment as seen by the United States. The chapter examines the US intelligence accountability architecture: the House of Representative Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court, the Inspectors General, the Government Accountability Office, the Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Office, and the President’s Intelligence Advisory Board. The sheer number and complexity of accountability bodies in the US gives rise to inefficiencies, ineffectiveness, and duplication. The accountability system is replete with gaps and vulnerabilities: partisanship, collective-action problems, resource allocation, and inconsistent quality of review in congressional accountability; GAO’s limited authority to review the USIC and sensitive operations; the adequacy of the FISA court in adequately protecting the rights of Americans; and Presidential discretion in appointing and removing IGs. These issues have implications not just for the United States, but for allies, partners as well as regional and global stability.


2004 ◽  
Vol 5 (2) ◽  
pp. 287-310 ◽  
Author(s):  
CURTIS H. MARTIN

The loss of life that resulted from the sinking of the fisheries training vessel Ehime Maru by the nuclear submarine USS Greeneville off Hawaii in February 2001 exemplifies the risks to United States–Japan alliance relations posed by US global military deployments. Following a pattern of incidents involving the US military in Japan itself, the collision violated Japanese expectations of benevolence from its stronger partner and put considerable pressure on the government to seek public apology and reassurance. This article examines the interplay of culture, national security interests and domestic politics in framing both perceptions and diplomacy during the crisis. While differences at both the cultural and security levels complicated diplomacy, asymmetry in the respective domestic political stakes, combined with overriding and largely congruent security interests, helped the United States to provide Japan with the requisite reassurance. After a decade of alliance drift, both Japan and the United States were determined to forestall defection by their alliance partner.


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