scholarly journals Emerging illiberal norms: Russia and China as promoters of internet content control

2021 ◽  
Vol 97 (6) ◽  
pp. 1925-1944
Author(s):  
Daniëlle Flonk
Keyword(s):  
International Organizations ◽  
Coalition Building ◽  
Internet Governance ◽  
Target Groups ◽  
Norm Theory ◽  
Sequencing Strategy ◽  
Naming And Shaming

Abstract This article contributes to the understanding of authoritarian states as norm entrepreneurs of content control norms. These emerging norms challenge the norm literature, which disregards illiberal norms and illiberal actors as norm entrepreneurs. This article focuses on two distinct but coexisting strategies that Russia and China apply for promoting and developing internet governance norms. It shows that these countries use a combination of socialization and persuasion strategies. They employ a sequencing strategy of regional coalition-building in order to create support, after which they expand a norm's range via international organizations. These norm entrepreneurs adapt their strategies to different target groups based on the degree of internalization of the norm. The article shows that a reassessment of norm theory in a broader context allows for extension to illiberal norms and illiberal actors, but also shows the limits since the applicability of strategies such as naming and shaming should be questioned.

Power, Diplomacy, and Diplomatic Networks

2019 ◽  
pp. 151-168
Author(s):  
Marina E. Henke
Keyword(s):  
Institutional Theory ◽  
International Organizations ◽  
International Organization ◽  
Coalition Building ◽  
Weak States ◽  
The Social ◽  
Asymmetrical Power ◽  
Strategic Capability

This concluding chapter discusses that most multilateral military coalitions—including those operating under the umbrella of an international organization—are purposefully constructed by states that are most interested in the deployment of a particular operation. These pivotal states thereby instrumentalize diplomatic embeddedness; they use their diplomatic networks as a resource, as a strategic capability to construct allied cooperation. Most pivotal states are politically powerful and wealthy. Yet asymmetrical power capabilities alone often cannot account for the coalition negotiation outcomes observed in this book. Relatively weak states in fact are often able to drive a hard bargain. They are aware of the pivotal states' desire for their coalition contribution and thus hold considerable power in coalition negotiations. The social-institutional theory of multilateral military coalition building developed in this book explains the theoretical underpinnings of these dynamics in detail. The chapter then considers this book's implications for how governments, international organizations, scholars, and informed citizens analyze multilateral military coalition building and make policies to deal with it.

China will lead global coalition on cyber-sovereignty

2016 ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Regional Cooperation ◽  
Import Substitution ◽  
Status Quo ◽  
Coalition Building ◽  
Internet Governance ◽  
International Organisations ◽  
Content Type ◽  
One Belt One Road ◽  
National Boundaries ◽  
Sovereign Territory

Subject China's efforts to promote its model of internet governance. Significance The announcement that as of March 10 foreign businesses will be barred from publishing online content in China is the latest result of Beijing's determination to police the national boundaries of what it sees as its sovereign territory in cyberspace. Impacts IT and related infrastructure will become part of China's regional cooperation efforts, including the SCO and 'One Belt, One Road'. Import substitution and domestic favouritism will make China an increasingly difficult market for foreign technology suppliers. China will try to consolidate a status quo through small steps, coalition-building and participation in international organisations.

scholarly journals International organizations' responses to member state contestation: from inertia to resilience

2021 ◽  
Vol 97 (6) ◽  
pp. 1963-1981
Author(s):  
Gisela Hirschmann
Keyword(s):  
Member State ◽  
International Organizations ◽  
Coalition Building ◽  
Threat Perception ◽  
Institutional Changes ◽  
Budget Cuts ◽  
Member States ◽  
Multilateral Cooperation ◽  
Relevant Factors

Abstract International organizations (IOs) play a key role in promoting multilateral cooperation on critical transnational issues. Yet, their authority has increasingly been contested by member states that cut financial contributions or even withdraw their membership. How do IOs respond to such contestation? While the existing literature has mostly focused on reactions by other member states, I argue in this article that our understanding of IOs' responses to contestation remains incomplete without an analysis of IO bureaucracies. I propose a conceptual framework to analyse three types of bureaucratic responses: inertia, i.e. no immediate response; adaptation, i.e. institutional changes to maintain the support of the challenging member state(s); and resilience-building, i.e. developing organizational capacities to limit contestation. I argue that each of these responses is shaped by specific bureaucratic mechanisms, namely hunkering, negotiation, framing, coalition-building, shaming and professionalization. Based on a comparative within-case study analysing the reactions of the United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA) to budget cuts by the Reagan, Bush and Trump administrations, I further theorize that the organization's threat perception, the position of other member states and bureaucratic leadership are relevant factors that need to be considered to explain the variation in IO responses to contestation.

“Connecting the dots”

2021 ◽  
pp. 79-111
Author(s):  
Michael A. Messner
Keyword(s):  
Sexual Violence ◽  
Indigenous Peoples ◽  
International Organizations ◽  
Climate Justice ◽  
Coalition Building ◽  
Younger Generation ◽  
Progressive Organizations ◽  
Movement Organizations ◽  
Connecting The Dots

This chapter examines the “extension dilemma,” a quandary over how tightly activists should focus on the issue that defines their organization—in this case, peace and anti-militarism—versus how to build supportive links and coalitions with other progressive organizations. Veterans For Peace and About Face struggle with this dilemma as they forge coalitions with national and international organizations working for climate justice, decolonization and justice for Indigenous Peoples, and ending racial, gender, and sexual violence. The chapter focuses on veterans’ 2016–2017 participation in “Water Protectors’ ” mobilization at Standing Rock and VFP delegations in support of activists in Okinawa, revealing the tension between how to be supportive allies in decolonization movements, versus the dangers of imposing a “White Savior” approach to coalition work with Indigenous Peoples. This chapter shows that the younger generation of veterans has not invented coalition-building; rather, they bring an intersectional orientation to how to build bridges and forge coalitions within the larger ecology of movement organizations.

Trade Negotiations at the (Possible) End of Multilateral Institutionalism

2020 ◽  
Vol 25 (1) ◽  
pp. 31-52
Author(s):  
J.P Singh
Keyword(s):  
International Organizations ◽  
Uruguay Round ◽  
Negotiation Process ◽  
Coalition Building ◽  
Trade Negotiations ◽  
Doha Round ◽  
Building Trade ◽  
Trade Offs ◽  
Negotiation Tactics ◽  
The World

Abstract Multilateral negotiations are often facilitated through international organizations, but are not coterminous with them. This essay advances a few ‘mid-level’ propositions with respect to the negotiation structure that provides an overall context and the negotiation process where tactics guide the exchange of concessions. In terms of negotiation structure, a stable institutional structure is giving rise to a transitional one resulting in system spoilers in international negotiations leading to deadlocks and no-agreements. The bargaining phases are marked with games of chicken and grand-standing making it hard to effectively practice common negotiation tactics such as coalition-building, trade-offs and linkages. The article provides examples from the Uruguay Round and the breakdown of the Doha Round of trade negotiations through the World Trade Organization. The essay’s propositions address the breakdown of existing multilateralism through international organizations, but also document the continuation of underlying multilateral principles.

Sticks and Stones: Naming and Shaming the Human Rights Enforcement Problem

2008 ◽  
Vol 62 (4) ◽  
pp. 689-716 ◽  
Author(s):  
Emilie M. Hafner-Burton
Keyword(s):  
Human Rights ◽  
Nongovernmental Organizations ◽  
International Organizations ◽  
News Media ◽  
International Human Rights ◽  
International Pressure ◽  
International Human ◽  
Human Rights Norms ◽  
Naming And Shaming ◽  
The Relationship

“Naming and shaming” is a popular strategy to enforce international human rights norms and laws. Nongovernmental organizations, news media, and international organizations publicize countries' violations and urge reform. Evidence that these spotlights are followed by improvements is anecdotal. This article analyzes the relationship between global naming and shaming efforts and governments' human rights practices for 145 countries from 1975 to 2000. The statistics show that governments put in the spotlight for abuses continue or even ramp up some violations afterward, while reducing others. One reason is that governments' capacities for human rights improvements vary across types of violations. Another is that governments are strategically using some violations to offset other improvements they make in response to international pressure to stop violations.

Shaming and democracy: Explaining inter-state shaming in international organizations

2019 ◽  
Vol 41 (4) ◽  
pp. 538-553 ◽  
Author(s):  
Faradj Koliev
Keyword(s):  
International Organizations ◽  
International Politics ◽  
Regime Type ◽  
International Labour Organization ◽  
Norm Violations ◽  
Factors Influencing ◽  
Special Relations ◽  
Naming And Shaming ◽  
Unique Dataset ◽  
Inter State

Why do some states name and shame norm-violating states while other states abstain? Inter-state naming and shaming is typically viewed as a political tool to punish adversaries and reward allies. In this study, I propose a regime-type explanation for inter-state shaming in international politics. I pose two interrelated questions. First, are democracies more prone to condemn norm violations than non-democratic countries? Second, are democracies likely to shame each other in cases of norm violations? In search of answers to these questions, I use a unique dataset on inter-state shaming the International Labour Organization (ILO) for the period 1991–2011. In line with my main argument, the results suggest that democracies are more likely than non-democracies to engage in the shaming of norm violators, while providing no evidence for special relations between democracies. In addition, this study unpacks other factors influencing the inter-state shaming. The findings have implications for how we understand state interactions in international politics.

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