Threats, deportability and aid: The politics of refugee rentier states and regional stability

In 2012, 2016 and 2018–2019, Pakistan threatened to expel Afghan refugees and in 2015, 2016 and 2019, Kenya threatened to demolish the Dadaab camp and expel Somali refugees. Following the threats, the governments extracted more than $300 million aid, combined. Why did these states succeed in extracting aid despite their relatively weak status and not bordering the target of their blackmail? This article first situates refugee expulsion within the literature on refugee policies, migration diplomacy and refugee rentier states. Second, in two cases – Somalis in Kenya and Afghans in Pakistan – I show how states used the threat of expulsion to construct and leverage the deportability of their refugee communities as a foreign policy tool. States used the legal uncertainty around deportability to channel threats and violence toward refugees, but the primary audience of the threats were not refugees, but the international community. Officials in Kenya and Pakistan used threats paired with six-month or one-year delays as negotiation tactics to extract aid. Surprisingly, states that were generous hosts to refugees become strategically important because of their role in providing regional stability, which turned otherwise weak states into important allies that could threaten expulsion and extract aid from superpowers.

Ethically questionable negotiation tactics: the differential roles of national, societal and individual cultural values

PurposeThe purpose of this study is to refine theory of negotiation by empirically investigating the extent to which national-, societal- and individual-level cultures relate to negotiators' tendency to endorse questionable negotiation tactics.Design/methodology/approachTo assess the hypothesized relationships between culture and ethically questionable negotiation tactics at three cultural levels of analysis, the authors collected data from Turks who reside in Turkey and in Germany and from Greeks who reside in Greece and in Cyprus. Respondents' national-level cultural values were inferred from their nationality, respondents' societal-level cultural values were inferred from their country of residency, and respondents' individual-level cultural values were inferred from their discrete and unique individuality.FindingsAt the national level, the authors found that Turks in Turkey and Germany scored significantly higher than Greeks in Greece and Cyprus on the endorsement of pretending negotiation tactics. At the societal level, the authors found that Turkish negotiators in Germany displayed higher levels of lying negotiation tactics and lower levels of pretending negotiation tactics than Turkish negotiators in Turkey. Greek negotiators in Greece endorsed deceiving and lying tactics more than Greek negotiators in Cyprus. At the individual level, the authors found that negotiators who score high on vertical individualism and collectivism endorse questionable negotiation tactics significantly more than negotiators who score high on horizontal individualism and collectivism.Originality/valueThe authors empirically demonstrate how national-, societal- and individual-level cultures differentially influence negotiators' tendency to endorse questionable negotiation tactics. The study's trilevel analysis allows for integrating the societal-level theories of negotiators' acculturation and cultural adjustment to a host culture, highlighting the importance of bicultural identity.

TACTICAL COMPONENTS OF THE PROSECUTOR’S ACTIONS TO CONCLUDE A PLEA AGREEMENT FOR THE ACCUSED

The article is devoted to the study of certain tactical aspects of the he prosecutor’s participation in the conclusion of an agreement on the confession of guilt by the accused. It is concluded that it is necessary to develop a system of forensic recommendations regarding the provision of this direction of the prosecutor’s activity in court proceedings. It is stated that the institution of criminal procedure has appeared in Ukraine based on agreements, that is, a mechanism with separate contractual (compromise) elements during the resolution of criminal legal conflicts, which belongs to the so-called special orders of criminal proceedings. It is noted that, in contrast to the sufficient attention of scientists to the issues of procedural regulation of criminal proceedings based on agreements, the tactical aspects of the activities of the prosecutor almost get out of sight of scientific research, which is in no way consistent with modern challenges of combating crime. It has been established that the activities of the prosecutor to conclude an agreement on the confession of guilt by the accused and his/her judicial approval are cognitive and organizationally diverse, requiring appropriate tactical support (provision). This support will be a new direction of tactical and forensic support of the so-called compromise procedures in criminal proceedings. It should contain recommendations, at least regarding localization of an unproductive conflict between the prosecution and the accused, as well as unpredictable compromises between other participants in criminal proceedings. It should contain recommendations the availability of adequate ways to convince the accused of the futility of his/her opposition to the prosecutor and the court and the need to cooperate with them based on feedback, taking into account the specifics of professional defense and a situational analysis of one or another variant of defense tactics. In the context of the prosecutor’s activities to conclude an agreement on the plea of the accused, the most relevant is the so-called negotiation tactics. In the mainstream of the analyzed subject, it would be more expedient to call it the tactics of prosecutorial persuasion and ensuring compromise procedures in the criminal process. Its constituent elements are a system of recommendations regarding the organizational, informational and resource-personnel support of the prosecutor’s activities to conclude an agreement on the plea of the accused in order to a) make it impossible for the relevant participants in the criminal process to formally treat their duties; b) prevent unpredictable compromises between the defense and the victim, as well as prosecution witnesses; c) promote exclusively objective media coverage of the real state of affairs (in conditions of journalistic interest in a specific compromise procedure). At least, this will already become the basis for the effective use of tactics of creating conditions for the preparation and direct conclusion of an agreement on the plea of the accused.

Blending Faculty and Student Affairs Professionals

Higher education is currently facing some of the most significant stability challenges it has seen in years. Between sharp declines in state aid and revenue, as well as growing challenges from competitors (i.e., Google Career Certificates), the longstanding stability higher education has enjoyed is dwindling. As higher education looks to the future, faculty and student affairs professionals need to find intentional ways to partner, allowing utilization of resources from both parties. This chapter explores one such partnership focused on leadership and civic engagement at a small private university in the Midwest. The chapter includes a framework for collaborative success, built from multiple leadership models, learner orientation, and negotiation tactics.

The Effects of Experience on Deception in Human-Agent Negotiation

Negotiation is the complex social process by which multiple parties come to mutual agreement over a series of issues. As such, it has proven to be a key challenge problem for designing adequately social AIs that can effectively navigate this space. Artificial AI agents that are capable of negotiating must be capable of realizing policies and strategies that govern offer acceptances, offer generation, preference elicitation, and more. But the next generation of agents must also adapt to reflect their users’ experiences. The best human negotiators tend to have honed their craft through hours of practice and experience. But, not all negotiators agree on which strategic tactics to use, and endorsement of deceptive tactics in particular is a controversial topic for many negotiators. We examine the ways in which deceptive tactics are used and endorsed in non-repeated human negotiation and show that prior experience plays a key role in governing what tactics are seen as acceptable or useful in negotiation. Previous work has indicated that people that negotiate through artificial agent representatives may be more inclined to fairness than those people that negotiate directly. We present a series of three user studies that challenge this initial assumption and expand on this picture by examining the role of past experience. This work constructs a new scale for measuring endorsement of manipulative negotiation tactics and introduces its use to artificial intelligence research. It continues by presenting the results of a series of three studies that examine how negotiating experience can change what negotiation tactics and strategies human endorse. Study #1 looks at human endorsement of deceptive techniques based on prior negotiating experience as well as representative effects. Study #2 further characterizes the negativity of prior experience in relation to endorsement of deceptive techniques. Finally, in Study #3, we show that the lessons learned from the empirical observations in Study #1 and #2 can in fact be induced—by designing agents that provide a specific type of negative experience, human endorsement of deception can be predictably manipulated.

Constituency Norms Facilitate Unethical Negotiation Behavior Through Moral Disengagement

While organizations strive for ethical conduct, the activity of negotiating offers strong temptations to employ unethical tactics and secure benefits for one’s own party. In four experiments, we examined the role of constituency communication in terms of their attitudes towards (un)ethical and competitive conduct on negotiators’ willingness and actual use of unethical tactics. We find that the mere presence of a constituency already increased representatives’ willingness to engage in unethical behavior (Experiment 1). More specifically, a constituency communicating liberal (vs. strict) attitudes toward unethical conduct helps negotiators to justify transgressions and morally disengage from their behavior, resulting in an increased use of unethical negotiation tactics (Experiment 2–3). Moreover, constituents’ endorsement of competitive strategies sufficed to increase moral disengagement and unethical behavior of representative negotiators in a similar fashion (Experiment 4ab). Our results caution organizational practice against advocating explicit unethical and even competitive tactics by constituents: it eases negotiators’ moral dilemma towards unethical conduct.