Shorter Articles, Comments, and Notes: ‘Clear and Present Danger’: Responses to Terrorism

2005 ◽  
Vol 54 (1) ◽  
pp. 185-196 ◽  
Author(s):  
Vaughan Lowe

It was Oliver Wendell Holmes who used the words ‘clear and present danger’ in the judgment of the US Supreme Court in the Schenk case in 1919.1 The Court upheld the conviction of Charles Schenk, general secretary of the American Socialist Party, under the 1917 Espionage Act, which prohibited attempts to obstruct military recruitment. Schenk had distributed leaflets allegedly calculated to cause insubordination and obstruction among recruits. He argued that his conviction was incompatible with the freedom of speech guaranteed by the First Amendment.

2015 ◽  
Vol 10 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-23
Author(s):  
András Koltay

The issue of the use of religious symbols by the State, the Government, the Municipalities and Courts has emerged as a practical constitutional problem during the last quarter of a century. Contradictory examples of us Supreme Court jurisprudence prove that this issue is among the constitutional ‘hard cases’. The relatively recent appearance of the problem clearly indicates the ways in which American social conditions have changed and the transformation of us society’s attitude to religion.


2020 ◽  
Vol 4 (1) ◽  
pp. 21-39
Author(s):  
Jared Harpt

US Supreme Court Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. reshaped American free speech law through his Supreme Court opinions during World War I and after. This paper explores the oft-debated questions of whether and how Holmes’s free speech views changed between his legal education (during which he was taught that the common law’s bad tendency test allowed governments to punish any speech after it was uttered) and World War I (during which he created and developed the more expansive clear and present danger test). This paper argues that Holmes developed the underlying principles of his later free speech ideas in his writings on American common law, but that he only expressed those ideas in Supreme Court opinions after several other legal thinkers prodded him to do so.


Teisė ◽  
2012 ◽  
Vol 83 ◽  
pp. 18-36 ◽  
Author(s):  
Gediminas Mesonis

Straipsnyje analizuojama, kokią reikšmę turi skirtingos koncepcijos atskleidžiant konkrečios žmogaus teisės turinį. Konstatuojama, kad net „Vakarų“ demokratinėse valstybėse sprendžiant dėl žmogaus teisių turinio nuolat konkuruoja individualistinis ir traibalistinis požiūris į žmogaus teises. Esama koncepcijų dichotomija šiame straipsnyje iliustruojama žodžio laisvės turinio raidos kontekste. Straipsnyje į šios teisės turinio raidą žvelgiama per valstybės vėliavos teisinį statusą, analizuojant Jungtinių Amerikos Valstijų Aukščiausiojo Teismo jurisprudencijos ir kitų šalių teisinio reguliavimo patirtį. Konstatuojama, kad anglų–amerikiečių (liberalioji) žmogaus teisių ir laisvių koncepcija, spręsdama žmogaus teisės turinio problemą, prioritetą linkusi atiduoti konkretaus asmens, o ne grupės interesui.The article analyses the significance of different conceptions in disclosing the content of a concrete human right. It is stated that even in “western” democratic states, when one decides regarding the content of human rights, there is continuous competition between the individualistic and tribalistic approach to human rights. The existing dichotomy of these conceptions is illustrated in the context of the development of the content of freedom of speech. In the article the development of the content of this right is considered through the legal status of the flag, while analysing the experience of the jurisprudence of the US Supreme Court and that of legal regulation of other countries. It is stated that the Anglo-American (liberal) conception of human rights, while deciding the issue of the content of a human right, tends to give priority to the interest of a concrete person, but not that of a group.


2020 ◽  
Vol 5 (1) ◽  
pp. 6
Author(s):  
Jennifer Elaine Steele

Censorship is a centuries-old issue for the United States. The importance of intellectual freedom and the freedom of speech is particularly evident in libraries, organizations dedicated to the access and spread of information. Issues regarding censorship and intellectual freedom have even reached the US Supreme Court. The following essay serves as a history of censorship in the United States, particularly in its libraries, and how the same issues of censorship have now transitioned into the digital age.


2020 ◽  
Vol 4 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Abdul Alim

The First Amendment to the United States Constitution is an essential part of the Bill of Rights. The amendment prohibits making of any law respecting an establishment of religion, obstructing the free exercise of religion, infringing on the freedom of speech, infringing on the freedom of the press, interfering peoples assembling rights in a peaceful manner or prohibiting the petitioning for a governmental remedy of grievances. The guarantees of this Bill of Rights were subject to the limitation imposed by the free speech and press provisions of the First Amendment to the US Constitution as interpreted and applied by the Supreme Court and other courts. The United States and India are the largest democratic country and almost have similar free speech provisions in their Constitutions. This Article is intended to present the free speech provisions of the American and Indian Constitution as a basic fundamental right of human being. It is also to be examined that what is the role of Supreme Court in interpreting the freedom of speech and expression provisions. The study also tries to incorporate the comparison between the looms of both countries as far as freedom of speech is disturbed.


Author(s):  
Christoph Bezemek

This chapter assesses public insult, looking at the closely related question of ‘fighting words’ and the Supreme Court of the United States’ decision in Chaplinsky v New Hampshire. While Chaplinsky’s ‘fighting words’ exception has withered in the United States, it had found a home in Europe where insult laws are widely accepted both by the European Court of Human Rights and in domestic jurisdictions. However, the approach of the European Court is structurally different, turning not on a narrowly defined categorical exception but upon case-by-case proportionality analysis of a kind that the US Supreme Court would eschew. Considering the question of insult to public officials, the chapter focuses again on structural differences in doctrine. Expanding the focus to include the Inter-American Court of Human Rights (IACtHR) and the African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights (ACtHPR), it shows that each proceeds on a rather different conception of ‘public figure’.


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