scholarly journals 865The dynamics of SES-related health inequality across the lifecycle and the role of selective mortality

2021 ◽  
Vol 50 (Supplement_1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Dennis Petrie ◽  
Paul Allanson ◽  
Linkun Chen ◽  
Ulf Gerdtham

Abstract Background The positive cross-sectional association between health and SES often strengthens at younger ages before peaking at middle ages and then weakening at older ages. Selective mortality is a possible reason for the weakening relationship at older ages but current evidence for this is limited. Methods This paper uncovers the changing nature of the inter-dependence between SES and health over the lifecycle by further developing and applying longitudinal inequality decomposition techniques which account for mortality. We examine changes in SES-related health inequality for rolling age cohorts by gender for Australia (using the Household, Income and Labour Dynamics in Australia (HILDA) survey) and the United Kingdom (using the Understanding Society survey). Results We find for young men in both countries that the simultaneous co-movement in both health and income plays the major role in increasing health inequalities. At middle ages the poor start to lose health more quickly than the rich but at older ages selective mortality plays the major role with the poor more likely to die than the rich which also has an indirect effect of making morbidity losses seem less concentrated among the poor. Conclusions Selective mortality plays a major role in weakening the relationship between SES and health at older ages. Past studies have missed identifying the full effect of selective mortality. Key messages SES-related health inequalities accumulate throughout the lifecycle, even in older ages.

Traditio ◽  
1974 ◽  
Vol 30 ◽  
pp. 285-324 ◽  
Author(s):  
Alexander Murray

Some people say the Western world is in a mess, and what it needs is to rediscover its religion. Of the two chief kinds of objection made to this idea, scientific and social, the second is probably nearer the centre of debate now. Its main form, put broadly, is the theory that religion is a device promoted by the rich to stop the poor rebelling. A social theory like this has an historical dimension. To tell if it is true, data are needed about what people have actually done, rich or poor. Since history so far has mostly been about the great, the need for data is all the keener in respect of the poor. The aim of this article is to add, in the context of this general debate, to known data about poor men's religion, from an especially crucial and obscure period: the central Middle Ages.


2017 ◽  
Vol 5 (3) ◽  
pp. 1-11 ◽  
Author(s):  
Prince Peprah ◽  
Emmanuel Mawuli Abalo ◽  
Jones Amoako ◽  
Julius Nyonyo ◽  
Williams Agyemang Duah ◽  
...  

AbstractThe prevailing literature on poverty-environment links mostly presents a rather deterministic view of the nexus between poverty and the environment, revolving around the negative impact of the poor on the environment. Specifically, in Ghana, empirical evidence on the prevalence of forest degradation is sparse because the requisite data are often difficult to obtain. Using a qualitative approach, data collected through in-depth interviews with 45 randomly selected participants and 5 purposively selected key informants (Traditional Authorities) and using a thematic analysis, the poverty-environment, specifically the forest degradation nexus was verified. This cross-sectional study leads the authors to posit that poverty has a minimal negative effect on major forest degradation in Ghana. The study found that the poor were rather conscious, and future-oriented with regard to the environment, specifically forests owing to how their livelihoods and survival are directly linked to their immediate environment. The results suggest that the poverty-environment nexus could be country, or context-specific and varies between geographical and historical contexts. By implication, the seemingly universal assertion that the poor are those who cause major deforestation in communities could be problematic. Henceforth, the study maintains that it would be a fallacy to make generalisations that poverty is the main cause of major forest degradation, since the link between poverty and the environment is very context-specific. We argued on the premise that reduction of poverty in Ghana may not lead to the reduction of forest degradation. Joint implementation of holistic poverty-environment strategies that incorporate both the poor and the rich should be adopted to curb the wanton forest degradation in Ghana.


2018 ◽  
Vol 28 (1) ◽  
pp. 70-85 ◽  
Author(s):  
Olivier Jacques ◽  
Alain Noël

In 1998, Walter Korpi and Joakim Palme proposed a political and institutional explanation to account for the greater redistributive success of welfare states that relied more on universal than on targeted programmes. Effective redistribution, they argued, resulted less from a Robin Hood logic – taking from the rich to give to the poor – than from a broad and egalitarian provision of services and transfers. Hence, the paradox: a country obtained more redistribution when it took from all to give to all than when it sought to take from the rich to help the poor. Recent studies, however, failed to confirm the existence of this paradox. This article suggests that the original argument was theoretically sound but inadequately operationalized. Korpi and Palme measured universalism indirectly, not by the design or character of social programmes, but rather by their outcomes, namely, by their income effects. These outcomes, however, are influenced by exogenous factors. We use two new Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) indicators to capture universalism directly, through the institutional design of social programmes: (1) the percentage of social benefits that are means or income tested and (2) the proportion of private spending in total social expenditures. These two indicators are combined into a universalism index and tested with a time-series cross-sectional design for 20 OECD countries between 2000 and 2011. This approach, we argue, better captures institutional design, in a way that is consistent with Korpi and Palme’s original argument, and it suggests that there is still a paradox of redistribution in the 21st-century welfare state.


1962 ◽  
Vol 13 (2) ◽  
pp. 172-185 ◽  
Author(s):  
Giles Constable

The system of compulsory tithes in the Middle Ages has long been used by protestant and liberal historians as a stick with which to beat the medieval Church. ‘This most harassing and oppressive form of taxation’, wrote H. C. Lea in his well-known History of the Inquisition, ‘had long been the cause of incurable trouble, aggravated by the rapacity with which it was enforced, even to the pitiful collections of the gleaner’. Von Inama-Sternegg remarked on the growing hatred of tithes in the tenth, eleventh, and twelfth centuries, especially among the small free landholders, ‘upon whom the burden of tithes must have fallen most heavily’. Gioacchino Volpe said that tithes were ‘the more hated because they oppressed the rich less than the poor, the dependents on seigneurial estates less than the small free proprietors to whose ruin they contributed…. At that time tithes were both an ecclesiastical and secular oppression, a double offence against religious sentiment and popular misery’. G. G. Coulton, writing before the introduction in England of an income tax at a rate of over ten per cent., proclaimed that before the Reformation tithes ‘constituted a land tax, income tax and death duty far more onerous than any known to modern times, and proportionately unpopular’.


2006 ◽  
Vol 42 ◽  
pp. 140-161 ◽  
Author(s):  
Eamon Duffy

The very phrase ‘elite and popular religion’ is laden with potentially misleading polarities. In talking about elite religion or popular religion, are we contrasting notions of orthodoxy with heterodoxy or superstition, or the religion of the clergy with the religion of the laity, or the religion of the rich with the religion of the poor, or the religion of the polite and educated with the religion of the unwashed and unlettered, or the religion of the thinking individual over against the religion of the undifferentiated multitude, or the disciplined and liturgically-based official religion of the institutional Church with something more charismatic, less structured – or some permutation of any of the above?


2018 ◽  
pp. 207-220
Author(s):  
Gary S. Fields

In the literature, much attention has been paid to a number of aspects of inequality including the distinction between relative and absolute inequality, axiomatization of inequality, the Lorenz criterion for inequality comparisons, properties of various inequality measures, and inequality decomposition. In no way do I wish to argue with the main results derived in these areas. Rather, my purpose here is to add to the theory of inequality measurement by dealing with one aspect of inequality which has been largely ignored by economists and by others. This is the question of how inequality changes – in particular, whether it increases, decreases, or remains unchanged – when income grows in specified ways. The balance of this chapter deals with two distinct conceptual entities, “inequality” and “inequality measures.” The next section analyzes how “inequality” might be said to change under various types of economic growth and explores the foundations for alternative views. One approach in terms of “elitism of the rich” and “isolation of the poor” is then described. The following section looks into the behavior of “inequality measures” and the relationship between “inequality measures” and “inequality,” and a final section draws some conclusions.


Author(s):  
Paolo Delogu

The investigation takes its inspiration from the book recently dedicated by Peter Brown (Through the Eye of a Needle, 2012) to the genesis of the Christian ethics of wealth and its good use. Brown had highlighted the transition from pagan evergetism to Christian charity; from the use of wealth for public display in favor of the city and the fellow-citizens, to its dispensation to the poor, who are the representatives of Christ. Thanks to this providence the rich can gain the divine mercy and save his soul. The Church, as a mundane institution, receives the pious gifts of the rich and administers them for the relief of the poor, but the poor are considered to be the real owners of the wealth accumulated by the Church. This ideological expedient allows the Church to consider itself poor. When this cultural process is complete, the Middle Ages have arrived. My aim has been to investigate how the precepts of the ancient Fathers were received and put into practice by the Langobardic society in Italy. Given the shortage of doctrinal texts similar to those exploited by Brown, I had recourse to more humble documents such as the deeds edited by Luigi Schiaparelli in the first two volumes of the Codice Diplomatico Longobardo. It is a collection of 296 documents, for the larger part concerning foundations or endowments of churches, monasteries, senodochia and oratoria, ordered by lay devotees. Most of them come from Tuscany; a lesser number from centres of the Po plain. These texts do not have any doctrinal purpose, but they give an insight into the way in which the Christian doctrine of wealth and its good use was received and put in practice by the Langobards in the 8th century.


2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Camille Akmut

Medieval scholars, in all of their expertise, often fail to see thegreater sociological rules governing their subjects in spite of having assembledall the necessary material themselves. In the following - based on their works -we remind of the great inequalities in times of pandemics, taking the events ofthe 14th+ c. Black Death as exemplary case. Not everyone was equal in frontof death : the major divisions between ”beneficed” and ”regular” priests arerecalled (they respectively received a fixed income, while the others made vowsof poverty and subsisted on offerings), as well as the institutions that emergedaround that time - ”chantry”, ”private” services, etc. : the rich sought a faster,surer way to heaven, while the first category of priests sought a faster wayaway from death - the poor, and the working-class, and their regular priestsstayed behind, joined in common death. (Experimental history : a historianand sociologist once again steps out of their comfort zone, so as to make othersuncomfortable.)


2017 ◽  
Vol 17 (3) ◽  
pp. 319-348 ◽  
Author(s):  
William W. Franko

While most Americans appear to acknowledge the large gap between the rich and the poor in the United States, it is not clear whether the public is aware of recent changes in income inequality. Even though economic inequality has grown substantially in recent decades, studies have shown that the public’s perception of growing income disparities has remained mostly unchanged since the 1980s. This research offers an alternative approach to evaluating how public perceptions of inequality are developed. Centrally, it conceptualizes the public’s response to growing economic disparities by applying theories of macro-political behavior and place-based contextual effects to the formation of aggregate perceptions about income inequality. It is argued that most of the public relies on basic information about the economy to form attitudes about inequality and that geographic context—in this case, the American states—plays a role in how views of income disparities are produced. A new measure of state perceptions of growing economic inequality over a 25-year period is used to examine whether the public is responsive to objective changes in economic inequality. Time-series cross-sectional analyses suggest that the public’s perceptions of growing inequality are largely influenced by objective state economic indicators and state political ideology. This research has implications for how knowledgeable the public is of disparities between the rich and the poor, whether state context influences attitudes about inequality, and what role the public will have in determining how expanding income differences are addressed through government policy.


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