23. Particular sectors

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Richard Whish ◽  
David Bailey
Keyword(s):  
Nuclear Energy ◽  
Competition Law ◽  
Transport Sector ◽  
Electronic Communications ◽  
Military Equipment ◽  
Eu Competition Law ◽  
Competition Rules ◽  
Regulated Industries ◽  
The Eu ◽  
The Way

This chapter deals with three issues. First it examines those sectors of the economy that are wholly or partly excluded from EU competition law, namely nuclear energy, military equipment and agriculture; the special regime for coal and steel products under the former European Coal and Steel Community (‘the ECSC’) Treaty is briefly referred to. Secondly, it describes how the EU competition rules apply to the transport sector. Finally, the chapter considers the specific circumstances of so-called ‘regulated industries’ such as electronic communications, post and energy and the way in which EU and UK competition law apply to them. Constraints of space mean that these matters can be described only in outline; references to specialised literature on the application of competition law to particular sectors will be provided where appropriate.

23. Particular sectors

2021 ◽  
pp. 1019-1055
Author(s):  
Richard Whish ◽  
David Bailey
Keyword(s):  
Competition Law ◽  
Transport Sector ◽  
Current Debate ◽  
Electronic Communications ◽  
Digital Platforms ◽  
Military Equipment ◽  
Eu Competition Law ◽  
Competition Rules ◽  
The Uk ◽  
The Eu

This chapter deals with four issues. First it will briefly examine three sectors of the economy that are wholly or partly excluded from EU competition law, namely nuclear energy, military equipment and agriculture; the special regime that once existed for coal and steel products under the former European Coal and Steel Community (‘the ECSC’) Treaty is also mentioned in passing. Secondly, it will explain the application of the EU competition rules apply to the transport sector. Thirdly, the chapter will consider the specific circumstances of four so-called ‘regulated industries’, electronic communications, post, energy and water, where a combination of legislation, regulation and competition law seek to promote competition. Last, but by no means least, the current debate concerning digital platforms is discussed where it is likely that ex ante regulatory rules will be introduced, both in the EU and the UK, to address concerns about anti-competitive conduct and a tendency towards the monopolisation of markets.

Concentrations in the Aviation Sector: How to maintain the level playing field for airlines and airports?

2021 ◽  
Vol 24 (3) ◽  
pp. 485-511
Author(s):  
Valentine Lemonnier
Keyword(s):  
Competition Law ◽  
Air Transport ◽  
Transport Sector ◽  
Level Playing Field ◽  
Playing Field ◽  
Market Participants ◽  
Free Competition ◽  
Eu Competition Law ◽  
Different Types ◽  
The Eu

Before the Covid-19 pandemic hit, the scheduled passenger air transport sector was already subject to several horizontal concentrations. The mix of free competition and strict regularization in the air transport sector in the EU raises the question whether the current framework will still be able to provide a level playing field to the market participants, notably airlines and airports. The study focusses on how EU competition law has influenced horizontal concentrations (i.e. mergers and horizontal co-operations) in the scheduled passenger air transport sector. The results of the discussion are the basis for a reflection of the effects of different types of horizontal concentrations on the negotiation power of airlines vis-à-vis airports. A third focus of the study is the identification of regulatory weaknesses with regard to airport financing under the Airport Charges Directive (Directive 2009/12/EC), how those weaknesses benefit airlines and how they might interfere with efforts made under the application of competition law.

scholarly journals The Implementation of the ECN+ Directive in Hungary and Lessons Beyond

2019 ◽  
Vol 12 (19) ◽  
pp. 55-90 ◽  
Author(s):  
Katalin J. Cseres
Keyword(s):  
Competition Law ◽  
Member States ◽  
Eu Member States ◽  
Law And Policy ◽  
Eu Competition Law ◽  
National Competition ◽  
Competition Rules ◽  
Institutional Aspects ◽  
Shed Light ◽  
The Eu

In order to facilitate national competition authorities (NCAs) in their application of EU competition rules, the EU legislator adopted Directive 2019/1/EU. The Directive’s aim is to empower the competition authorities of the Member States to be more effective enforcers of competition law and to ensure the proper functioning of the internal market. The so-called ECN+ Directive introduces minimum harmonisation rules allowing competition authorities to have common investigative, decision-making (notably fining decisions) and enforcement powers. The Directive, furthermore, sets minimum safeguards for the NCAs’ independence, accountability and resources as well as harmonizes leniency programmes including the coordination of national leniency programmes with each other and with that of the European Commission. This paper critically analyzes the legal and policy developments that paved the way for the adoption of this Directive. Moreover, it examines the changes the implementation of the Directive is likely to generate in current Hungarian law and policy of competition protection. The focus of the paper’s assessment is on the institutional aspects of the Directive and the enforcement of Articles 101 and 102 TFEU, in particular the mechanisms for ensuring independence and accountability of the NCAs. Through the assessment of the Hungarian implementation, the paper aims to shed light on a broader context of the Directive and the enforcement of EU competition law in EU Member States. The paper shows that the implementation of the Directive may fail to translate into (more) effective enforcement without an effective institutional capacity on the side of the NCAs, and in the broader legal and constitutional context of competition law and its multilevel enforcement

Rule of Law Values in the Decentralized Public Enforcement of EU Competition Law

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Katalin J Cseres
Keyword(s):  
Law Enforcement ◽  
Rule Of Law ◽  
Competition Law ◽  
Public Enforcement ◽  
Competition Law Enforcement ◽  
Governance Model ◽  
Eu Competition Law ◽  
Competition Rules ◽  
Consistent Application ◽  
The Eu

This chapter evaluates the functioning of the decentralized public enforcement of EU competition law. The analysis focuses on the effectiveness of the decentralized enforcement, which relies on Rule of Law principles. It has been argued that Rule of Law principles are a prerequisite for effective competition law enforcement. Aside from that, assessing the effectiveness of the decentralized enforcement framework also takes account of the problems of multilevel governance which have emerged as a result of the decentralization of enforcement powers and the creation of parallel competences for the Commission and national actors which made it essential to guarantee uniform and consistent application of the EU competition rules. Centrifugal pulls from the Member States towards their national legal systems and centripetal pushes from the Commission create uniformity and consistency in this multilevel system. Analysing these bottom-up and top-down approaches allows us to analyse decentralized enforcement as a specific governance model.

Market Competition

2019 ◽  
pp. 99-130
Author(s):  
Anu Bradford
Keyword(s):  
Market Competition ◽  
Competition Law ◽  
Critical Dimension ◽  
Single Market ◽  
Global Effect ◽  
Eu Competition Law ◽  
Competition Rules ◽  
Regulatory Capacity ◽  
Key Aspects ◽  
The Eu

Chapter 4 discusses competition law, which offers one of the most prominent examples of the EU’s global regulatory hegemony. This chapter first introduces the key aspects of EU competition law. It then explains why the EU has chosen to build an extensive regulatory capacity in this area, illustrating how competition law forms a critical dimension of the EU’s broader, single market program. Following that, it offers examples of the de facto and de jure Brussels Effects pertaining to competition regulation. These examples illustrate that the de jure Brussels Effect has been extensive. At the same time, the occurrence of the de facto Brussels Effect often turns to the question of non-divisibility, at times enabling while at times limiting the global effect of EU competition rules.

Antitrust Damages in EU Law

2020 ◽  
Vol 37 (1) ◽  
pp. 139-151
Author(s):  
Albertina Albors-Llorens
Keyword(s):  
Competition Law ◽  
Private Enforcement ◽  
Eu Law ◽  
Public And Private ◽  
New Era ◽  
Legal Instrument ◽  
Eu Competition Law ◽  
Competition Rules ◽  
Public And Private Enforcement ◽  
The Eu

The adoption of Directive 2014/104/EU on actions for damages for infringements of the competition rules has marked the beginning of a new era in the field of the private enforcement of the EU competition rules. The arduous legislative journey leading to the adoption of the Directive, the specific aspects pertaining to the exercise of damages actions covered by it and its attempt to establish an effective coordination between the systems of public and private enforcement have already received intense attention by antitrust scholars. However, this contribution will focus on the study of the Directive’s significance as a novel legal instrument in both the fields of EU competition law and EU law in general.

6. The obligations of Member States under the EU competition rules

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Richard Whish ◽  
David Bailey
Keyword(s):  
Competition Law ◽  
Member States ◽  
Eu Competition Law ◽  
Competition Rules ◽  
The Eu ◽  
Take All

This chapter examines the obligations of Member States in relation to EU competition law. Specifically, it considers the obligations that Article 4(3) TEU and Articles 37 and 106 TFEU place upon Member States. Article 4(3) requires all Member States to take all appropriate measures to ensure fulfilment of the obligations arising out of the Treaties, and to avoid any measure which could jeopardise the attainment of the EU’s objectives. Article 106 particularly obligates Member States to refrain from enacting or maintaining measures contrary to the rules provided in Article 18 and Articles 101 to 109 of the TFEU. Article 37 is concerned with the procurement of goods.

2. Overview of EU and UK competition law

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Richard Whish ◽  
David Bailey
Keyword(s):  
Competition Law ◽  
European Economic Area ◽  
Member States ◽  
European Economic ◽  
Economic Area ◽  
Eu Competition Law ◽  
Competition Rules ◽  
Competition Laws ◽  
The Relationship ◽  
The Eu

This chapter provides a brief overview of EU and UK competition law and the institutions involved in formulating, interpreting and applying competition law. It also explains the relationship between EU competition law and the domestic competition laws of the Member States, in particular in the light of Article 3 of Regulation 1/2003. The rules of the European Economic Area are briefly referred to, and the trend on the part of Member States to adopt domestic competition rules modelled on those in the EU is also noted. Three diagrams at the end of the chapter explain the institutional structure of EU and UK competition law.

scholarly journals Regulating the New Self-Employed in the Uber Economy: What Role for EU Competition Law?

2018 ◽  
Vol 19 (3) ◽  
pp. 461-508 ◽  
Author(s):  
Victoria Daskalova
Keyword(s):  
Collective Bargaining ◽  
Competition Law ◽  
Eu Law ◽  
On Demand ◽  
Eu Competition Law ◽  
Bargaining Position ◽  
Regulatory Approach ◽  
Competition Rules ◽  
Micro Enterprises ◽  
The Eu

This paper discusses the role that EU competition law can play in regulating the “new self-employed”—precarious workers formally considered to be micro-enterprises. Specific attention is paid to the newest type of “new self-employed,” namely those engaged via matchmaking platforms arranging for work to be contracted on demand. Despite their unequal bargaining position, self-employed individuals are barred from collective bargaining due to the EU competition rules. This Article argues that the problem will not be solved by modifying the respective tests for “worker” and “undertaking” in EU law, or by introducing exceptions under Article 101 TFEU. This Article then adopts a regulatory approach to canvass the different legal instruments available to address exploitation concerns in the context of the Uber economy, and discusses the role that EU competition law can play in such a regime.

scholarly journals (Why) Did EU Net Neutrality Rules Overshoot the Mark? Internet, Disruptive Innovation and EU Competition Law & Policy

2018 ◽  
Vol 11 (18) ◽  
pp. 227-239
Author(s):  
Oles Andriychuk
Keyword(s):  
Service Providers ◽  
Competition Law ◽  
Disruptive Innovation ◽  
Net Neutrality ◽  
Internet Service Providers ◽  
Electronic Communications ◽  
Internet Service ◽  
Eu Competition Law ◽  
Disruptive Innovations ◽  
The Eu

This essay raises a number of theses in support for a more liberalised approach to EU Net Neutrality rules. It offers a graded system of levels of regulatory intervention, arguing that soft Net Neutrality rules are capable of meeting all positive objectives of regulation without causing the problems generated by hard Net Neutrality rules, such as those currently in place in the EU. Hard Net Neutrality rules prevent Internet Service Providers (ISPs) from making disruptive innovations. Meanwhile, they enable some Content and Application Providers (CAPs) to monopolise many markets via (disruptive) innovations, resulting in newly established dominant positions which have, in many instances, been abused. The hypothesis of the essay is that loosening the rules on Net Neutrality would create competition between ISPs and CAPs as well as (which is even more important) between different CAPs for limited premium speed traffic. Such newly established competition could remedy some antitrust conundrums faced by EU competition enforcers and sectorial regulators vis-à-vis disruptive innovators in the area of electronic communications.

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