scholarly journals Regulating the New Self-Employed in the Uber Economy: What Role for EU Competition Law?

2018 ◽  
Vol 19 (3) ◽  
pp. 461-508 ◽  
Author(s):  
Victoria Daskalova
Keyword(s):  
Collective Bargaining ◽  
Competition Law ◽  
Eu Law ◽  
On Demand ◽  
Eu Competition Law ◽  
Bargaining Position ◽  
Regulatory Approach ◽  
Competition Rules ◽  
Micro Enterprises ◽  
The Eu

This paper discusses the role that EU competition law can play in regulating the “new self-employed”—precarious workers formally considered to be micro-enterprises. Specific attention is paid to the newest type of “new self-employed,” namely those engaged via matchmaking platforms arranging for work to be contracted on demand. Despite their unequal bargaining position, self-employed individuals are barred from collective bargaining due to the EU competition rules. This Article argues that the problem will not be solved by modifying the respective tests for “worker” and “undertaking” in EU law, or by introducing exceptions under Article 101 TFEU. This Article then adopts a regulatory approach to canvass the different legal instruments available to address exploitation concerns in the context of the Uber economy, and discusses the role that EU competition law can play in such a regime.

Antitrust Damages in EU Law

2020 ◽  
Vol 37 (1) ◽  
pp. 139-151
Author(s):  
Albertina Albors-Llorens
Keyword(s):  
Competition Law ◽  
Private Enforcement ◽  
Eu Law ◽  
Public And Private ◽  
New Era ◽  
Legal Instrument ◽  
Eu Competition Law ◽  
Competition Rules ◽  
Public And Private Enforcement ◽  
The Eu

The adoption of Directive 2014/104/EU on actions for damages for infringements of the competition rules has marked the beginning of a new era in the field of the private enforcement of the EU competition rules. The arduous legislative journey leading to the adoption of the Directive, the specific aspects pertaining to the exercise of damages actions covered by it and its attempt to establish an effective coordination between the systems of public and private enforcement have already received intense attention by antitrust scholars. However, this contribution will focus on the study of the Directive’s significance as a novel legal instrument in both the fields of EU competition law and EU law in general.

Part I Introduction, 1 Introduction

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Wijckmans Frank ◽  
Tuytschaever Filip
Keyword(s):  
Competition Law ◽  
Historical Background ◽  
Private Enforcement ◽  
Eu Law ◽  
Public And Private ◽  
The Public ◽  
Eu Competition Law ◽  
Before And After ◽  
Public And Private Enforcement ◽  
The Eu

This chapter explains the term ‘vertical agreements’ and what it covers. It addresses a number of general issues that are relevant to the EU competition law treatment of vertical agreements in general. It describes the implementation and the (public and private) enforcement of Article 101 TFEU before and after the entry into force of Regulation 1/2003. The chapter provides the historical background of both Regulation 330/2010 and Regulation 461/2010. In particular, it devotes specific attention to the nature and legal and practical consequences of soft EU competition law (in the form of notices, guidelines, etc) as opposed to hard EU competition law (provisions of primary and secondary EU law).

23. Particular sectors

2021 ◽  
pp. 1019-1055
Author(s):  
Richard Whish ◽  
David Bailey
Keyword(s):  
Competition Law ◽  
Transport Sector ◽  
Current Debate ◽  
Electronic Communications ◽  
Digital Platforms ◽  
Military Equipment ◽  
Eu Competition Law ◽  
Competition Rules ◽  
The Uk ◽  
The Eu

This chapter deals with four issues. First it will briefly examine three sectors of the economy that are wholly or partly excluded from EU competition law, namely nuclear energy, military equipment and agriculture; the special regime that once existed for coal and steel products under the former European Coal and Steel Community (‘the ECSC’) Treaty is also mentioned in passing. Secondly, it will explain the application of the EU competition rules apply to the transport sector. Thirdly, the chapter will consider the specific circumstances of four so-called ‘regulated industries’, electronic communications, post, energy and water, where a combination of legislation, regulation and competition law seek to promote competition. Last, but by no means least, the current debate concerning digital platforms is discussed where it is likely that ex ante regulatory rules will be introduced, both in the EU and the UK, to address concerns about anti-competitive conduct and a tendency towards the monopolisation of markets.

scholarly journals The Implementation of the ECN+ Directive in Hungary and Lessons Beyond

2019 ◽  
Vol 12 (19) ◽  
pp. 55-90 ◽  
Author(s):  
Katalin J. Cseres
Keyword(s):  
Competition Law ◽  
Member States ◽  
Eu Member States ◽  
Law And Policy ◽  
Eu Competition Law ◽  
National Competition ◽  
Competition Rules ◽  
Institutional Aspects ◽  
Shed Light ◽  
The Eu

In order to facilitate national competition authorities (NCAs) in their application of EU competition rules, the EU legislator adopted Directive 2019/1/EU. The Directive’s aim is to empower the competition authorities of the Member States to be more effective enforcers of competition law and to ensure the proper functioning of the internal market. The so-called ECN+ Directive introduces minimum harmonisation rules allowing competition authorities to have common investigative, decision-making (notably fining decisions) and enforcement powers. The Directive, furthermore, sets minimum safeguards for the NCAs’ independence, accountability and resources as well as harmonizes leniency programmes including the coordination of national leniency programmes with each other and with that of the European Commission. This paper critically analyzes the legal and policy developments that paved the way for the adoption of this Directive. Moreover, it examines the changes the implementation of the Directive is likely to generate in current Hungarian law and policy of competition protection. The focus of the paper’s assessment is on the institutional aspects of the Directive and the enforcement of Articles 101 and 102 TFEU, in particular the mechanisms for ensuring independence and accountability of the NCAs. Through the assessment of the Hungarian implementation, the paper aims to shed light on a broader context of the Directive and the enforcement of EU competition law in EU Member States. The paper shows that the implementation of the Directive may fail to translate into (more) effective enforcement without an effective institutional capacity on the side of the NCAs, and in the broader legal and constitutional context of competition law and its multilevel enforcement

Rule of Law Values in the Decentralized Public Enforcement of EU Competition Law

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Katalin J Cseres
Keyword(s):  
Law Enforcement ◽  
Rule Of Law ◽  
Competition Law ◽  
Public Enforcement ◽  
Competition Law Enforcement ◽  
Governance Model ◽  
Eu Competition Law ◽  
Competition Rules ◽  
Consistent Application ◽  
The Eu

This chapter evaluates the functioning of the decentralized public enforcement of EU competition law. The analysis focuses on the effectiveness of the decentralized enforcement, which relies on Rule of Law principles. It has been argued that Rule of Law principles are a prerequisite for effective competition law enforcement. Aside from that, assessing the effectiveness of the decentralized enforcement framework also takes account of the problems of multilevel governance which have emerged as a result of the decentralization of enforcement powers and the creation of parallel competences for the Commission and national actors which made it essential to guarantee uniform and consistent application of the EU competition rules. Centrifugal pulls from the Member States towards their national legal systems and centripetal pushes from the Commission create uniformity and consistency in this multilevel system. Analysing these bottom-up and top-down approaches allows us to analyse decentralized enforcement as a specific governance model.

Market Competition

2019 ◽  
pp. 99-130
Author(s):  
Anu Bradford
Keyword(s):  
Market Competition ◽  
Competition Law ◽  
Critical Dimension ◽  
Single Market ◽  
Global Effect ◽  
Eu Competition Law ◽  
Competition Rules ◽  
Regulatory Capacity ◽  
Key Aspects ◽  
The Eu

Chapter 4 discusses competition law, which offers one of the most prominent examples of the EU’s global regulatory hegemony. This chapter first introduces the key aspects of EU competition law. It then explains why the EU has chosen to build an extensive regulatory capacity in this area, illustrating how competition law forms a critical dimension of the EU’s broader, single market program. Following that, it offers examples of the de facto and de jure Brussels Effects pertaining to competition regulation. These examples illustrate that the de jure Brussels Effect has been extensive. At the same time, the occurrence of the de facto Brussels Effect often turns to the question of non-divisibility, at times enabling while at times limiting the global effect of EU competition rules.

Part I EU Competition Law Private Enforcement and the Antitrust Damages Directive, 1 Damages Actions in the Enforcement of EU Competition Law

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Rodger Barry ◽  
Ferro Miguel Sousa ◽  
Marcos Francisco
Keyword(s):  
European Commission ◽  
Competition Law ◽  
Historical Background ◽  
Private Enforcement ◽  
Eu Law ◽  
The European Union ◽  
Traditional Role ◽  
Eu Competition Law ◽  
The Eu

This chapter sets the context for the EU’s Antitrust Damages Directive of 2014 in order to understand its significance and potential impact. It first provides a historical background to EU competition law before discussing its public enforcement, focusing on the traditional role of the European Commission in enforcing the EU competition law rules. It then considers developments in EU law private enforcement, citing the role of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) and European Commission in seeking to promote and facilitate private enforcement, particularly damages actions. It also examines the experience of damages actions in the EU, the issue of collective redress, the US antitrust private enforcement context and experience, and EU private international law rules and their significance for raising damages actions across the Member States’ courts. The chapter concludes with an assessment of the development of competition law damages actions under EU law.

6. The obligations of Member States under the EU competition rules

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Richard Whish ◽  
David Bailey
Keyword(s):  
Competition Law ◽  
Member States ◽  
Eu Competition Law ◽  
Competition Rules ◽  
The Eu ◽  
Take All

This chapter examines the obligations of Member States in relation to EU competition law. Specifically, it considers the obligations that Article 4(3) TEU and Articles 37 and 106 TFEU place upon Member States. Article 4(3) requires all Member States to take all appropriate measures to ensure fulfilment of the obligations arising out of the Treaties, and to avoid any measure which could jeopardise the attainment of the EU’s objectives. Article 106 particularly obligates Member States to refrain from enacting or maintaining measures contrary to the rules provided in Article 18 and Articles 101 to 109 of the TFEU. Article 37 is concerned with the procurement of goods.

2. Overview of EU and UK competition law

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Richard Whish ◽  
David Bailey
Keyword(s):  
Competition Law ◽  
European Economic Area ◽  
Member States ◽  
European Economic ◽  
Economic Area ◽  
Eu Competition Law ◽  
Competition Rules ◽  
Competition Laws ◽  
The Relationship ◽  
The Eu

This chapter provides a brief overview of EU and UK competition law and the institutions involved in formulating, interpreting and applying competition law. It also explains the relationship between EU competition law and the domestic competition laws of the Member States, in particular in the light of Article 3 of Regulation 1/2003. The rules of the European Economic Area are briefly referred to, and the trend on the part of Member States to adopt domestic competition rules modelled on those in the EU is also noted. Three diagrams at the end of the chapter explain the institutional structure of EU and UK competition law.

Investment Arbitration and EU (Competition) Law – Lessons Learned from the Micula Saga

2020 ◽  
Vol 5 (1) ◽  
pp. 330-354
Author(s):  
Alesia Tsiabus ◽  
Guillaume Croisant
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
Competition Law ◽  
State Aid ◽  
Eu Law ◽  
Great Opportunity ◽  
Investment Arbitration ◽  
Eu Competition Law ◽  
Uk Supreme Court ◽  
The Uk ◽  
The Eu

On 19 February 2020, in the latest episode to date of the long-running Micula saga, the United Kingdom (UK) Supreme Court gave its green light to the enforcement in the (UK) of the award obtained by the Micula brothers against Romania (Award) under the 2002 Sweden-Romania bilateral investment treaty (BIT), despite the fact that the question of whether this Award constitutes state aid prohibited under EU law was pending before the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU). The Supreme Court ruled that the UK enforcement obligations under the ICSID Convention could not be affected by the EU duty of sincere cooperation, as the UK’s ratification of the ICSID Convention preceded its accession to the EU. The UK Supreme Court judgment, and the prior main episodes of the Micula saga in the framework of the ICSID, EU state aid and enforcement proceedings, offer a great opportunity to explore the increasingly tumultuous relationship between investment arbitration and EU (competition) law, in particular the compatibility of intra- EU investment arbitrations under the ICSID Convention with EU law and the coexistence of selective protections under international investment law with EU state aid law.

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