Part III Third Parties and International Crimes: Armed Conflict, 14 Third Party Unilateral and Collective Responses to Armed Conflict

Author(s):  
Chinkin Christine
2020 ◽  
pp. 002234332091309
Author(s):  
Casper Sakstrup

Uncertainty about capabilities or resolve is a prominent explanation for war between states. However, we know comparatively little about uncertainty as a cause of armed conflict between domestic actors. This article proposes that irregular leader change in a neighboring country generates uncertainty about third-party resolve and thus increases the likelihood of intrastate armed conflict. I argue that domestic actors take potential third parties’ capabilities and resolve into account when bargaining, that neighboring countries are important potential third parties, and that irregular leader change among these potential third parties results in uncertainty because there is an increased risk of foreign policy change combined with limited access to information. With uncertain estimates of third-party resolve, the risk of bargaining failure and armed conflict increases. Global spatial analyses spanning 1946–2014 corroborate the argument. As expected, I find that irregular leader change in one or more neighboring countries increases the probability of intrastate armed conflict onset. The results are robust across three different distance thresholds for neighboring countries, using time and country fixed effects and several alternative model specifications. Overall, this article advances our knowledge about uncertainty as a cause of civil war and sheds new light on the adverse consequences of irregular leader change.


Author(s):  
Jaroslav Tir ◽  
Johannes Karreth

After surveying the literature on the causes, consequences, and management of civil wars, we argue that novel ways of examining civil war management are needed. We advocate for a developmental view of civil wars in order to better understand how to prevent the escalation of low-level armed conflict to full-scale civil war. To prevent full-scale civil war, third parties need to (a) respond swiftly, (b) have the will and ability to impose tangible costs on (and offer benefits to) governments and rebels, and (c) remain involved over the long term. Our analysis shows that typical third-party civil war management approaches (mediation, peacekeeping, and intervention) fail to adequately address at least one of these issues. This motivates our argument in favor of focusing on a different type of third party that could arguably play a particularly constructive role in civil war prevention: highly structured intergovernmental organizations.


2016 ◽  
Vol 21 (1) ◽  
pp. 43-74 ◽  
Author(s):  
Prakash Bhattarai

A growing field within mediation research explores issues of third-party coordination. The existing literature highlights third-party coordination as a problematic but extremely important conflict intervention strategy, but lacks an in-depth explanation of fundamental aspects of third-party coordination. Considering this research gap, this study explores a fundamental theme related to third-party coordination: the influence of third-party relationship dynamics. This theme is elaborated by means of an analysis of two case studies: the Maoist armed conflict of Nepal and the Moro conflict of the Philippines. My research finds that power differences among third parties, their attitudes towards each other, differences in intervention strategies and priorities, the nature of conflicts, and the actions taken by the conflicting parties are key contextual factors that influence the dynamics of third-party relationships. Successful coordination is more likely when there is interdependence and a sense of respect between third parties.


2010 ◽  
Vol 5 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Joel Potter ◽  
John L. Scott

Research on third-party intervention into conflict has accelerated in recent years. Although some studies have explicitly assumed that third parties only value peace, recent theory has modeled parties to a conflict more flexibly. In addition, empirical results provide evidence that third-party motives are more complex than straightforward peacemaking. In particular, although the United Nations attempts peacemaking missions, evidence suggests that United Nations interventions prolong conflict. We sample the literature on interventions and offer directions for further research. On the empirical side, we suggest that third-party research should exploit recent applications of statistical modeling that unravel the complexity created by the fact that the decision to intervene in a conflict may depend on the same factors that contribute to the duration of the conflict. On the theoretical side, in contrast to previous studies, we suggest modeling the destruction that armed conflict causes as a choice variable.


2018 ◽  
pp. 101
Author(s):  
Rafael Lara González

ResumenPese a su ubicuidad en la práctica contractual, las cláusulas de franquicia han recibido tratamiento incidental en la doctrina. La discusión sobre ellas se ha enfocado en los contratos de seguros de responsabilidad civil, y en la interpretación del artículo 76 de la Ley española de Contrato de Seguro. En este contexto se ha tratado de establecer si el asegurador puede o no oponer la cláusula de franquicia al tercero perjudicado. El presente trabajo analiza la cláusula de franquicia en la obligación principal del asegurador, su naturaleza jurídica, y examina su relación con los terceros perjudicados. La consideración principal a este respecto estará en si nos encontramos ante un seguro obligatorio o ante un seguro voluntario de responsabilidad civil. Palabras clave: Contrato de seguro; Cláusula de franquicia; Terceroperjudicado; Responsabilidad civil.AbstractDespite their ubiquity in contractual praxis, deductible clauses have received only incidental treatment in legal doctrine. Discussion on them has focused on civil liability insurance contracts, and the interpretation of article 76 of the Spanish Law of Insurance Contracts. In this context it has been attempted to establish whether the insurer can invoke the clause to oppose the injured third party's claim. This article examines the deductible clause included in the insurer's main obligation, its legal nature, and its relation to injured third parties. The main consideration in this regard will be whether the insurance contract is of a mandatory or voluntary nature.Keywords: Insurance contract; Deductible clause; Injured third party; Civil liability.


Author(s):  
Ly Tayseng

This chapter gives an overview of the law on contract formation and third party beneficiaries in Cambodia. Much of the discussion is tentative since the new Cambodian Civil Code only entered into force from 21 December 2011 and there is little case law and academic writing fleshing out its provisions. The Code owes much to the Japanese Civil Code of 1898 and, like the latter, does not have a requirement of consideration and seldom imposes formal requirements but there are a few statutory exceptions from the principle of freedom from form. For a binding contract, the agreement of the parties is required and the offer must be made with the intention to create a legally binding obligation and becomes effective once it reaches the offeree. The new Code explicitly provides that the parties to the contract may agree to confer a right arising under the contract upon a third party. This right accrues directly from their agreement; it is not required that the third party declare its intention to accept the right.


Author(s):  
Sheng-Lin JAN

This chapter discusses the position of third party beneficiaries in Taiwan law where the principle of privity of contract is well established. Article 269 of the Taiwan Civil Code confers a right on the third party to sue for performance as long as the parties have at least impliedly agreed. This should be distinguished from a ‘spurious contract’ for the benefit of third parties where there is no agreement to permit the third party to claim. Both the aggrieved party and the third party beneficiary can sue on the contract, but only for its own loss. The debtor can only set off on a counterclaim arising from its legal relationship with the third party. Where the third party coerces the debtor into the contract, the contract can be avoided, but where the third party induces the debtor to contract with the creditor by misrepresentation, the debtor can only avoid the contract if the creditor knows or ought to have known of the misrepresentation.


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