Managing Civil Wars from the Perspective of Their Development

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jaroslav Tir ◽  
Johannes Karreth
Keyword(s):  
Civil War ◽  
Civil Wars ◽  
Armed Conflict ◽  
Third Parties ◽  
Full Scale ◽  
Third Party ◽  
Intergovernmental Organizations ◽  
The Will ◽  
Management Approaches

After surveying the literature on the causes, consequences, and management of civil wars, we argue that novel ways of examining civil war management are needed. We advocate for a developmental view of civil wars in order to better understand how to prevent the escalation of low-level armed conflict to full-scale civil war. To prevent full-scale civil war, third parties need to (a) respond swiftly, (b) have the will and ability to impose tangible costs on (and offer benefits to) governments and rebels, and (c) remain involved over the long term. Our analysis shows that typical third-party civil war management approaches (mediation, peacekeeping, and intervention) fail to adequately address at least one of these issues. This motivates our argument in favor of focusing on a different type of third party that could arguably play a particularly constructive role in civil war prevention: highly structured intergovernmental organizations.

What’s going on next door? Irregular leader change in neighboring countries, uncertainty, and civil war

2020 ◽  
pp. 002234332091309
Author(s):  
Casper Sakstrup
Keyword(s):  
Civil War ◽  
Armed Conflict ◽  
Fixed Effects ◽  
Third Parties ◽  
Third Party ◽  
Spatial Analyses ◽  
Access To Information ◽  
Increased Risk ◽  
Foreign Policy Change ◽  
Leader Change

Uncertainty about capabilities or resolve is a prominent explanation for war between states. However, we know comparatively little about uncertainty as a cause of armed conflict between domestic actors. This article proposes that irregular leader change in a neighboring country generates uncertainty about third-party resolve and thus increases the likelihood of intrastate armed conflict. I argue that domestic actors take potential third parties’ capabilities and resolve into account when bargaining, that neighboring countries are important potential third parties, and that irregular leader change among these potential third parties results in uncertainty because there is an increased risk of foreign policy change combined with limited access to information. With uncertain estimates of third-party resolve, the risk of bargaining failure and armed conflict increases. Global spatial analyses spanning 1946–2014 corroborate the argument. As expected, I find that irregular leader change in one or more neighboring countries increases the probability of intrastate armed conflict onset. The results are robust across three different distance thresholds for neighboring countries, using time and country fixed effects and several alternative model specifications. Overall, this article advances our knowledge about uncertainty as a cause of civil war and sheds new light on the adverse consequences of irregular leader change.

The Empirical Record of Highly Structured Intergovernmental Organizations and Armed Conflict Escalation

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jaroslav Tir ◽  
Johannes Karreth
Keyword(s):  
World War Ii ◽  
Civil War ◽  
Armed Conflict ◽  
Empirical Test ◽  
Full Scale ◽  
Armed Conflicts ◽  
Intergovernmental Organizations ◽  
Main Hypothesis ◽  
Low Level ◽  
The Impact

For a systematic, empirical test of this book’s main hypothesis, we develop a research design for a quantitative analysis of low-level armed conflicts. We define these conflicts as the occurrence of politically motivated violence resulting in at least twenty-five battle deaths. The analysis examines whether low-level armed conflict escalated to full-scale civil war and surpassed a threshold of 1,000 casualties. Since World War II, roughly one-third of more than 260 separate low-level armed conflicts have escalated to civil war. Analyzing systematic patterns among these conflicts, we find strong evidence favoring our hypothesis. Countries that belong to a larger number of highly structured intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) face a significantly lower risk that emerging low-level armed conflicts on their territories escalate to full-scale civil wars. The impact of a greater number of memberships in highly structured IGOs is substantial, cutting the risk of escalation by more than half.

Third-party regime type and civil war duration

2021 ◽  
pp. 002234332097581
Author(s):  
Sara Norrevik ◽  
Mehwish Sarwari
Keyword(s):  
Civil War ◽  
Civil Wars ◽  
Armed Conflict ◽  
Third Party ◽  
Regime Type ◽  
Selection Effects ◽  
Intrastate Conflicts ◽  
Party Support ◽  
Conflict Outcomes ◽  
The Relationship

Does the regime type of a foreign intervener influence the duration of civil wars? Existing research has shown that third-party support affects the outcome of a conflict. Moreover, studies show that the type of support offered to conflict actors can determine how a war ends. While this research has offered significant implications on conflict dynamics, extant works have overlooked the importance of characteristics of foreign supporters and how their attributes can impact conflict outcomes. Focusing on foreign troop support and quantities, this article examines the relationship between the regime type of a foreign supporter and the outcome of an armed conflict. We argue that regime type of an external troop sponsor can influence war duration based on two dynamics: selection effects and signaling effects. Specifically, troop assistance provided to warring parties by democracies decreases the length of civil wars and increases the likelihood for a one-sided victory for the supported faction. The empirical findings for all intrastate conflicts during the period 1975–2012 provide evidence for our claims that the regime type of an external intervener influences the outcome of a conflict.

Introduction

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jaroslav Tir ◽  
Johannes Karreth
Keyword(s):  
Civil War ◽  
Conflict Management ◽  
Civil Wars ◽  
Armed Conflict ◽  
Intergovernmental Organizations ◽  
The World Bank ◽  
Specific Subset ◽  
Self Interest ◽  
Management Techniques ◽  
Ontological Shift

We describe the deleterious consequences of civil wars and note that, despite some successes, common conflict management techniques (mediation, intervention, peacekeeping) still leave much room for improvement in managing civil wars. We argue that an ontological shift is needed, in which civil wars are considered from the perspective of their development. This would allow third parties to address the issue of civil war prevention by taking steps to ensure that nascent, low-level armed conflict does not escalate to full-scale civil war. We maintain that a specific subset of intergovernmental organizations (IGOs), highly structured IGOs [such as the World Bank or International Monetary Fund (IMF)], are particularly well positioned to engage in civil war prevention. Such IGOs have an enduring self-interest in member-state peace and stability and potent tools with which they can incentivize a return to peace.

Civil War Diffusion and Regional Motivations for Intervention

2011 ◽  
Vol 55 (6) ◽  
pp. 847-876 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jacob D. Kathman
Keyword(s):  
Civil War ◽  
Civil Wars ◽  
Third Parties ◽  
Third Party ◽  
Dynamic Measures ◽  
Regional Interests

Third-party states consider the regional destabilization consequences of civil wars when deciding to intervene. However, previous work implicitly assumes that potential interveners base their intervention decisions solely on their links to the civil war country. This approach is unlikely to reflect the regional concerns of interested parties. When a civil war is increasingly likely to infect its surrounding region, potential interveners with strong interests in those states neighboring the conflict will be more likely to intervene to contain the violence. Thus, relationships outside the civil war state—intervener dyad are causally associated with intervention. To test these arguments, the author accounts for the contagious properties of civil wars and the regional interests of third parties, constructing dynamic measures to represent the contagion threat posed to third party regional interests. Analyses of these measures support the argument that third parties are increasingly likely to intervene as the risk of diffusion increasingly threatens their regional interests.

Case Evidence: Conflict Trajectories in Indonesia, Ivory Coast, and Syria

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jaroslav Tir ◽  
Johannes Karreth
Keyword(s):  
Civil War ◽  
Ivory Coast ◽  
Armed Conflicts ◽  
East Timor ◽  
Intergovernmental Organizations ◽  
Crisis Resolution ◽  
Low Level ◽  
Qualitative Evidence ◽  
The Government

Two low-level armed conflicts, Indonesia’s East Timor and Ivory Coast’s post-2010 election crises, provide detailed qualitative evidence of highly structured intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) engaging in effective civil warpreventing activities in member-states. Highly structured IGOs threatened and sanctioned each of these states and offered (long-term) benefits conditional on successful crisis resolution. The governments were aware of and responded to these IGOs’ concerns, as did the rebels in these respective cases. The early stages of the conflict in Syria in 2011 provide a counterpoint. With Syria’s limited engagement in only few highly structured IGOs, the Syrian government ignored international calls for peace. And, without highly structured IGOs’ counterweight to curtail the government, the rebels saw little reason to stop their armed resistance. The result was a brutal and deadly civil war that continues today.

scholarly journals The Long-Term Consequences of Civil War for Migration: The Case of Tajikistan

2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michelle O'Brien
Keyword(s):  
Civil War ◽  
Armed Conflict ◽  
District Level ◽  
Policy Makers ◽  
Peace Accord ◽  
Logistic Regression Models ◽  
Individual Household ◽  
Level I ◽  
And Migration

Armed conflict is socially transformative. Although migration research has established the proximate relationship between armed conflict and increases in migration, much less attention has been paid to the long-term, or distal relationship. This research leverages the case of the 1992-1997 Tajikistani Civil War to examine the distal relationship between armed conflict and migration decisions nearly a decade after the war had ended. Using a series of logistic regression models and a selection-based endogeneity correction, I estimate the likelihood of migrating in 2006, given the intensity of conflict experience at the district level. I find that, controlling for individual, household, and district-level indicators, the legacy of conflict continues to influence migration – for men and for ‘stayers’ – nearly a decade after the peace accord was signed. Some evidence suggests that certain kinds of development projects can moderate this relationship. In conflict-affected countries, incorporating the legacy of conflict into empirical research can help scholars and policy-makers better understand migration in the aftermath of war.

Seeking Safety: Avoiding Displacement and Choosing Destinations in Civil Wars

2009 ◽  
Vol 46 (3) ◽  
pp. 419-429 ◽  
Author(s):  
Abbey Steele
Keyword(s):  
Civil War ◽  
Civil Wars ◽  
Armed Groups ◽  
Community Characteristics ◽  
Armed Group ◽  
Seeking Safety ◽  
Direct Violence ◽  
Perverse Effect ◽  
Shared Characteristic

Despite civil war violence, some civilians stay in their communities. Those who leave choose one of many possible destinations. Drawing on fieldwork in Colombia, this article argues that the way armed groups target civilians explains households' decisions about displacement. When groups of civilians are targeted based on a shared characteristic — `collective' targeting — their best options for avoiding violence differ from those targeted selectively or indiscriminately. This article outlines conditions under which people can stay in contexts of collective targeting, and where they are likely to go if these conditions are not met. A civilian facing collective targeting could move to a rival group's stronghold, cluster with others similarly targeted, or seek anonymity in a city or different region. Community characteristics, such as whether it is urban or rural, as well as macro characteristics of the war, such as whether or not there is an ascriptive cleavage, shape which decisions are relatively safest, which in turn leads to implications for aggregate patterns. For example, clustering together has a perverse effect: even though hiding among others with similar characteristics may reduce an individual's likelihood of suffering direct violence, the community may be more endangered as it is perceived to be affiliated with an armed group. This then leads to a cycle of collective targeting and displacement, which has important implications for the development of warfare. In turn, this cycle and related cleavage formation may have long-term impacts on postwar stability and politics.

Competitive Intervention, Protracted Conflict, and the Global Prevalence of Civil War

2019 ◽  
Vol 63 (3) ◽  
pp. 692-706 ◽  
Author(s):  
Noel Anderson
Keyword(s):  
Civil War ◽  
Civil Wars ◽  
Qualitative Case Study ◽  
Average Duration ◽  
Third Party ◽  
Intrastate Conflict ◽  
Global Prevalence ◽  
Protracted Conflict ◽  
Internal Conflicts

Abstract This article develops a theory of competitive intervention in civil war to explain variation in the global prevalence of intrastate conflict. I describe the distortionary effects competitive interventions have on domestic bargaining processes and explain the unique strategic dilemmas they entail for third-party interveners. The theory uncovers the conditional nature of intervention under the shadow of inadvertent escalation and moves beyond popular anecdotes about “proxy wars” by deriving theoretically grounded propositions about the strategic logics motivating intervener behaviors. I then link temporal variation in patterns of competitive intervention to recent decreases in the prevalence and average duration of internal conflicts. The theory is tested with a quantitative analysis of all civil wars fought between 1975 and 2009 and a qualitative case study of the Angolan civil war (1975–1991). My results underscore the importance of a generalizable account of competitive intervention that not only explains past conflicts, but also informs contemporary policy.

Third Party Mediation of International River Disputes: Lessons from the Indus River

2009 ◽  
Vol 14 (2) ◽  
pp. 281-310 ◽  
Author(s):  
Neda Zawahri
Keyword(s):  
River Basin ◽  
Third Parties ◽  
Third Party ◽  
Indus River ◽  
International Rivers ◽  
History Of ◽  
Long Term Impact ◽  
International River

AbstractThird parties have been active in assisting adversarial states to navigate their international river disputes. By using the carrot and stick to facilitate compromise, mediators have also participated in the negotiations leading to the signing of treaties over international rivers. Yet, due to the nature of the issue confronting riparian states, the long-term impact of these efforts is likely to be unstable cooperation rather than cooperation. This is still an important contribution, because the absence of mediation efforts may contribute to an environment of conflict. However, since riparian states confront a relationship that involves the need to continuously manage disputes that arise as states develop their international rivers, a mediator may be more effective in facilitating cooperation if it assists developing states with a history of animosity to establish effectively designed river basin commissions and it oversees the implementation of treaties. Participating in the initial years of a treaty's implementation by coordinating the donor community to underwrite projects can minimize the potential disputes riparians confront. An effectively designed river basin commission can assist in facilitating cooperation long after the mediator has departed from the region. To demonstrate this argument, the article draws on the Indus River case, which has lived through four different phases. The Euphrates and Tigris Rivers are used to illustrate the argument's ability to explain other cases.

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