What’s going on next door? Irregular leader change in neighboring countries, uncertainty, and civil war

2020 ◽  
pp. 002234332091309
Author(s):  
Casper Sakstrup

Uncertainty about capabilities or resolve is a prominent explanation for war between states. However, we know comparatively little about uncertainty as a cause of armed conflict between domestic actors. This article proposes that irregular leader change in a neighboring country generates uncertainty about third-party resolve and thus increases the likelihood of intrastate armed conflict. I argue that domestic actors take potential third parties’ capabilities and resolve into account when bargaining, that neighboring countries are important potential third parties, and that irregular leader change among these potential third parties results in uncertainty because there is an increased risk of foreign policy change combined with limited access to information. With uncertain estimates of third-party resolve, the risk of bargaining failure and armed conflict increases. Global spatial analyses spanning 1946–2014 corroborate the argument. As expected, I find that irregular leader change in one or more neighboring countries increases the probability of intrastate armed conflict onset. The results are robust across three different distance thresholds for neighboring countries, using time and country fixed effects and several alternative model specifications. Overall, this article advances our knowledge about uncertainty as a cause of civil war and sheds new light on the adverse consequences of irregular leader change.

Author(s):  
Jaroslav Tir ◽  
Johannes Karreth

After surveying the literature on the causes, consequences, and management of civil wars, we argue that novel ways of examining civil war management are needed. We advocate for a developmental view of civil wars in order to better understand how to prevent the escalation of low-level armed conflict to full-scale civil war. To prevent full-scale civil war, third parties need to (a) respond swiftly, (b) have the will and ability to impose tangible costs on (and offer benefits to) governments and rebels, and (c) remain involved over the long term. Our analysis shows that typical third-party civil war management approaches (mediation, peacekeeping, and intervention) fail to adequately address at least one of these issues. This motivates our argument in favor of focusing on a different type of third party that could arguably play a particularly constructive role in civil war prevention: highly structured intergovernmental organizations.


2016 ◽  
Vol 21 (1) ◽  
pp. 43-74 ◽  
Author(s):  
Prakash Bhattarai

A growing field within mediation research explores issues of third-party coordination. The existing literature highlights third-party coordination as a problematic but extremely important conflict intervention strategy, but lacks an in-depth explanation of fundamental aspects of third-party coordination. Considering this research gap, this study explores a fundamental theme related to third-party coordination: the influence of third-party relationship dynamics. This theme is elaborated by means of an analysis of two case studies: the Maoist armed conflict of Nepal and the Moro conflict of the Philippines. My research finds that power differences among third parties, their attitudes towards each other, differences in intervention strategies and priorities, the nature of conflicts, and the actions taken by the conflicting parties are key contextual factors that influence the dynamics of third-party relationships. Successful coordination is more likely when there is interdependence and a sense of respect between third parties.


2021 ◽  
pp. 002234332097581
Author(s):  
Sara Norrevik ◽  
Mehwish Sarwari

Does the regime type of a foreign intervener influence the duration of civil wars? Existing research has shown that third-party support affects the outcome of a conflict. Moreover, studies show that the type of support offered to conflict actors can determine how a war ends. While this research has offered significant implications on conflict dynamics, extant works have overlooked the importance of characteristics of foreign supporters and how their attributes can impact conflict outcomes. Focusing on foreign troop support and quantities, this article examines the relationship between the regime type of a foreign supporter and the outcome of an armed conflict. We argue that regime type of an external troop sponsor can influence war duration based on two dynamics: selection effects and signaling effects. Specifically, troop assistance provided to warring parties by democracies decreases the length of civil wars and increases the likelihood for a one-sided victory for the supported faction. The empirical findings for all intrastate conflicts during the period 1975–2012 provide evidence for our claims that the regime type of an external intervener influences the outcome of a conflict.


2016 ◽  
Vol 62 (1) ◽  
pp. 119-142 ◽  
Author(s):  
Nizan Feldman ◽  
Tal Sadeh

Few studies explain how wars affect trade with third parties. We argue that wartime trade policies should raise trade with friendly and enemy-hostile third parties but reduce trade with hostile and enemy-friendly third parties. At the same time, the private motivation of firms and households may be incompatible with national wartime trade policies and constrain the effectiveness of wartime trade policies. Our directed dyadic data set consists of almost all of the states from 1885 to 2000. Running a high definition fixed effects regression with two-way clustering of standard errors, we find that hostile third parties tended to reduce trade with a combatant state by roughly 30 percent. In addition, trade with third parties friendly to the enemy fell by a similar magnitude. In contrast, on average, war hardly affected trade with third parties because of substitution of war-ridden markets with third-party business partners.


2010 ◽  
Vol 5 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Joel Potter ◽  
John L. Scott

Research on third-party intervention into conflict has accelerated in recent years. Although some studies have explicitly assumed that third parties only value peace, recent theory has modeled parties to a conflict more flexibly. In addition, empirical results provide evidence that third-party motives are more complex than straightforward peacemaking. In particular, although the United Nations attempts peacemaking missions, evidence suggests that United Nations interventions prolong conflict. We sample the literature on interventions and offer directions for further research. On the empirical side, we suggest that third-party research should exploit recent applications of statistical modeling that unravel the complexity created by the fact that the decision to intervene in a conflict may depend on the same factors that contribute to the duration of the conflict. On the theoretical side, in contrast to previous studies, we suggest modeling the destruction that armed conflict causes as a choice variable.


2011 ◽  
Vol 55 (6) ◽  
pp. 847-876 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jacob D. Kathman

Third-party states consider the regional destabilization consequences of civil wars when deciding to intervene. However, previous work implicitly assumes that potential interveners base their intervention decisions solely on their links to the civil war country. This approach is unlikely to reflect the regional concerns of interested parties. When a civil war is increasingly likely to infect its surrounding region, potential interveners with strong interests in those states neighboring the conflict will be more likely to intervene to contain the violence. Thus, relationships outside the civil war state—intervener dyad are causally associated with intervention. To test these arguments, the author accounts for the contagious properties of civil wars and the regional interests of third parties, constructing dynamic measures to represent the contagion threat posed to third party regional interests. Analyses of these measures support the argument that third parties are increasingly likely to intervene as the risk of diffusion increasingly threatens their regional interests.


2018 ◽  
pp. 101
Author(s):  
Rafael Lara González

ResumenPese a su ubicuidad en la práctica contractual, las cláusulas de franquicia han recibido tratamiento incidental en la doctrina. La discusión sobre ellas se ha enfocado en los contratos de seguros de responsabilidad civil, y en la interpretación del artículo 76 de la Ley española de Contrato de Seguro. En este contexto se ha tratado de establecer si el asegurador puede o no oponer la cláusula de franquicia al tercero perjudicado. El presente trabajo analiza la cláusula de franquicia en la obligación principal del asegurador, su naturaleza jurídica, y examina su relación con los terceros perjudicados. La consideración principal a este respecto estará en si nos encontramos ante un seguro obligatorio o ante un seguro voluntario de responsabilidad civil. Palabras clave: Contrato de seguro; Cláusula de franquicia; Terceroperjudicado; Responsabilidad civil.AbstractDespite their ubiquity in contractual praxis, deductible clauses have received only incidental treatment in legal doctrine. Discussion on them has focused on civil liability insurance contracts, and the interpretation of article 76 of the Spanish Law of Insurance Contracts. In this context it has been attempted to establish whether the insurer can invoke the clause to oppose the injured third party's claim. This article examines the deductible clause included in the insurer's main obligation, its legal nature, and its relation to injured third parties. The main consideration in this regard will be whether the insurance contract is of a mandatory or voluntary nature.Keywords: Insurance contract; Deductible clause; Injured third party; Civil liability.


Author(s):  
Ly Tayseng

This chapter gives an overview of the law on contract formation and third party beneficiaries in Cambodia. Much of the discussion is tentative since the new Cambodian Civil Code only entered into force from 21 December 2011 and there is little case law and academic writing fleshing out its provisions. The Code owes much to the Japanese Civil Code of 1898 and, like the latter, does not have a requirement of consideration and seldom imposes formal requirements but there are a few statutory exceptions from the principle of freedom from form. For a binding contract, the agreement of the parties is required and the offer must be made with the intention to create a legally binding obligation and becomes effective once it reaches the offeree. The new Code explicitly provides that the parties to the contract may agree to confer a right arising under the contract upon a third party. This right accrues directly from their agreement; it is not required that the third party declare its intention to accept the right.


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