7 Immunity, 7.6 Prewitt Enterprises, Inc. v Org. of Petroleum Exporting Countries , 353 F.3d 916 (11th Cir. 2003)

Author(s):  
Boon Kristen

This case addresses effective service of process of an international organization by a non-member state. The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit relied upon the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (FRCP) because the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) did not fall within the purview of the International Organizations Immunities Act (IOIA) and no other applicable treaty existed regarding the treatment of the OPEC in a United States domestic court. The decision’s reliance upon FRCP and application of foreign law resulted in the inability of the plaintiffs to bring a claim against the OPEC without its express consent.

1985 ◽  
Vol 47 ◽  
pp. 4-5
Author(s):  
Paul F. Diehl ◽  
Michael J. Montgomery

Simulation is an increasingly popular pedagogical device; much of the recent literature on the theory and practice of political science instruction attests to this. Probably the most popular simulation device is called model United Nations. In recent articles in Teaching Political Science and NEWS for Teachers of Political Science, William Hazelton and James Jacob have described Model United Nations in glowing terms, focusing on one particular conference and completely ignoring the rest of the 200 or more conferences held annually across the United States.Like Jacob and Hazelton, we recognize the great potential value of United Nations simulations in trying to illuminate the often confusing politics of international organizations. As former participants and directors of these programs, however, we are keenly aware of the shortcomings and difficulties associated with the existing structure of model U.N. programs.


1956 ◽  
Vol 10 (2) ◽  
pp. 261-275 ◽  
Author(s):  
B. E. Matecki

This article presents briefly the findings of a case study in which two questions are investigated:a) Did the idea of an International Finance Corporation, first publicly expounded by the United States International Development Advisory Board, have its source in a United States agency or in an international organization?b) What were the causes of the modification of policy announced by the United States government on November II, 1954, when it decided to support the establishment of the International Finance Corporation, and did international organizations have any part in bringing about this change of policy?


Author(s):  
Boon Kristen

The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit rejected the long-held assumption that international organizations are entitled to absolute immunity under the domestic International Organizations Immunities Act (‘IOIA’). The legal question raised by this case is: does the language of the IOIA allow for the incorporation of subsequent changes to sovereign state immunity thereby conferring a restrictive, not absolute, immunity upon international organizations? The court applied the same concept of restrictive immunity to international organizations as has been developed and applied to sovereign states. This case has important implications for the evolution of immunities of international organizations over time.


2008 ◽  
Vol 62 (4) ◽  
pp. 589-620 ◽  
Author(s):  
Randall W. Stone

International organizations are governed by two parallel sets of rules: formal rules, which embody consensual procedures, and informal rules, which allow exceptional access for powerful countries. A new data set drawn from the IMF's records of conditionality provides an opportunity to study the bargaining process within an important international organization and answer questions about the institution's autonomy. I find evidence of U.S. influence, which operates to constrain conditionality, but only in important countries that are vulnerable enough to be willing to draw on their influence with the United States. In ordinary countries under ordinary circumstances, broad authority is delegated to the IMF, which adjusts conditionality to accommodate local circumstances and domestic political opposition. The IMF has refrained from exploiting the vulnerability of particular countries to maximize the scope of conditionality.


Author(s):  
LISA DELLMUTH ◽  
JAN AART SCHOLTE ◽  
JONAS TALLBERG ◽  
SOETKIN VERHAEGEN

Scholars and policy makers debate whether elites and citizens hold different views of the legitimacy of international organizations (IOs). Until now, sparse data has limited our ability to establish such gaps and to formulate theories for explaining them. This article offers the first systematic comparative analysis of elite and citizen perceptions of the legitimacy of IOs. It examines legitimacy beliefs toward six key IOs, drawing on uniquely coordinated survey evidence from Brazil, Germany, the Philippines, Russia, and the United States. We find a notable elite–citizen gap for all six IOs, four of the five countries, and all of six different elite types. Developing an individual-level approach to legitimacy beliefs, we argue that this gap is driven by systematic differences between elites and citizens in characteristics that matter for attitudes toward IOs. Our findings suggest that deep-seated differences between elites and general publics may present major challenges for democratic and effective international cooperation.


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