Part 1 The Cold War Era (1945–89), 5 The Soviet Intervention in Hungary—1956

Author(s):  
Lieblich Eliav

In late October 1956, the Soviet army crushed a burgeoning rebellion in Hungary, ostensibly upon the invitation of the Hungarian government, and allegedly in conformity with the provisions of the Warsaw Pact. While the intervention was widely condemned, international law could not prevent the Soviet invasion nor secure the USSR's withdrawal from Hungary. Seven decades later, this Chapter analyses the Soviet intervention under jus ad bellum. It focuses on the positions of relevant actors in real-time, as well as on the enduring aspects of the affair. As the Chapter reveals, the Hungary intervention presented dilemmas that plague the law on the use of force even in contemporary times. It raised questions that remain burning today, such as the role of consent in legalizing external forcible intervention, the ability of international law to face superpowers, and the dialectics between effectiveness and legitimacy in the determination of lawful authority during internal strife.

2018 ◽  
Vol 32 (01) ◽  
pp. 111-130 ◽  
Author(s):  
Isha Jain ◽  
Bhavesh Seth

AbstractNearly three decades after the Cold War, the present-day hostilities between India and Pakistan have shifted the focus of the threat of nuclear escalation to South Asia. It is in this context that this article seeks to assess the legality of India’s military nuclear doctrine under international law.Academic literature on the use of nuclear weapons has largely shied away from discussing the legality of specific military doctrines or ‘policies of deterrence’ of the nuclear weapon states, treating them as issues of military strategy that are beyond the realm of international law. This article hopes to challenge that dichotomy.Though several branches of international law are relevant to any discussion on nuclear weapons, this article shall only examine India’s nuclear doctrine through the lens of jus ad bellum. Specifically, this article shall focus on whether India’s nuclear doctrine constitutes a threat to use force, and if so, whether such threat is lawful. The article concludes that India’s nuclear doctrine can be construed to be a specific threat to use force against Pakistan, and that such threat may be unlawful for contemplating the disproportionate use of force.


2011 ◽  
Vol 7 (1) ◽  
pp. 87-94 ◽  
Author(s):  
Aidan Hehir

The three books reviewed here all address the question of the efficacy of international law and advance concerns about its future trajectory, albeit in contrasting ways. As has been well documented, the role of international law – specifically in the regulation of the use of force – has undergone significant scrutiny in the post-Cold War era. To a much greater extent than during the Cold War, contemporary conflicts and crises are invariably discussed with reference to international law, and the legality of a particular use of force has become a significant factor in assessing its legitimacy; one need only think of the importance placed on the legality of the 2003 invasion of Iraq. This increase in prominence suggests that international law has become more important, and unsurprisingly those used to the discipline's previous role as exotic curio have welcomed this sudden promotion (Robertson, 2000).


Author(s):  
Hafner Gerhard

This contribution discusses the intervention of five member states of the Warsaw Pact Organization under the leading role of the Soviet Union in the CSSR in August 1968, which terminated the “Prague Spring” in a forceful manner. After presenting the facts of this intervention and its reasons, it describes the legal positions of the protagonists of this intervention as well as that of the states condemning it, as presented in particular in the Security Council. It then examines the legality of this intervention against general international law and the particular views of the Soviet doctrine existing at that time, defending some sort of socialist (regional) international law. This case stresses the requirement of valid consent for the presence of foreign troops in a country and denies the legality of any justification solely based on the necessity to maintain the political system within a state.


Author(s):  
Marc Weller

This chapter examines the role of international law in preventing war and armed conflict. It begins by discussing three approaches to war and peace: the realist approach, the managerial approach, and the utopian visionary approach. It then considers some of the features of the United Nations system that were drawn from the League of Nations experience, including enforcement, dispute resolution, rule of law, prohibition of the use of force, and self-defence. The chapter also analyses how the UN Security Council deals with armed attacks undertaken by non-state actors, such as acts of terrorism. Finally, it outlines new challenges to the law on the use of force, particularly the new potential for armed conflict following the end of the Cold War, the issue of humanitarian intervention, and claims to enforcement of global community values.


Author(s):  
Gray Christine

This chapter focuses on the role of the UN, illustrating the interpretation and application in practice of Chapter VII of the UN Charter and the development through practice of the institution of peacekeeping. The aim of the drafters of the UN Charter was not only to prohibit the unilateral use of force by states in Article 2(4) but also to centralize control of the use of force in the Security Council under Chapter VII. However, the formal scheme of Chapter VII under which the Security Council would have its own standing army and respond to breaches of the peace, threats to the peace, and acts of aggression did not stand up to the pressure of the Cold War. The chapter shows how peacekeeping has evolved since the end of the Cold War and examines recent proposals for reform.


2003 ◽  
Vol 4 (7) ◽  
pp. 709-723 ◽  
Author(s):  
Outi Korhonen

The “post”-phase of a conflict has become the justification for both the possible action and the inaction of the Western states. It is not so much any longer that we would be averse to war in any circumstances, as the non-use of force principle in its absolute sense would require. Again, after a good fifty years of the UN and its raison d'etre – the guardianship of peace – we seem to have arrived at an era where ideological contestation no more has the deterrent effect that it did during the Cold War and, consequently, there are cases of the use of force that are accepted and even regarded as just as long as they are quick. When looking back at the NATO bombings of FRY in 1999 as the response to atrocities in Kosovo many are able to accept that ‘though illegal they were legitimate’ in some sense. This is the conclusion irrespective of whether one, at the time, was for action or inaction. Such a ‘condoning condemnation’ has become the popular middle road as so many other paradoxes in world politics. Through the cases of Afghanistan and Iraq the paradox has gained in strength. Although there is quite strong and unequivocal opposition to the wars and a condemnation for their illegality, the political elite of the West seems to be quick in forgetting scruples and taking a keen interest in the “post”-management of the targets, i.e. the states that are about to be or already have been ‘bombed into the stone age’ or into shambles in any case. There is a general rush to the “post”-phase; both in the sense that the tacit requirement for the condoning condemnation is that the action be quick – the use of force should be very limited in time – and, secondly, in the sense that already before the bombs fall (or during) the major reconstruction plans and projects are dealt. This article outlines some points of critique that could be launched at the phase when the majority cannot be bothered to re-analyze the wrongs committed ex ante.


Author(s):  
Hajjami Nabil

This chapter examines the legality of the 1983 American-led intervention in Grenada. It recalls the positions of the main protagonists of the crisis, including international organisations such as the United Nations, the Caribbean Community and the Organisation of Eastern Caribbean States. It then analyses the justifications of the American administration, which are mainly based on three different grounds: the protection of citizens abroad; the activation of regional mechanisms and the intervention by invitation. The conclusion assesses the precedential value of the Operation Urgent Fury. Regarding its wide condemnation, the chapter argues that reactions to the American-led intervention in Grenada can finally be deemed as a strong reaffirmation of the prohibition of the use of force in international law.


Author(s):  
Kritsiotis Dino

This contribution discusses the 1971 Indian intervention in east Pakistan. It sets out the facts and context of the crisis, the legal positions of the main protagonists (India and Pakistan), and the international community’s reactions. It then tests the legality of the Indian intervention against the international legal framework governing the use of force as it stood at the time of the events. The final section examines if, and to what extent, the case has had an impact on the further development of the jus ad bellum, in particular whether it is a precedent for humanitarian intervention.


Author(s):  
Ruys Tom

This contribution discusses the 1961 Indian intervention in Goa. It sets out the facts and context of the crisis, the legal positions of the main protagonists (India and Portugal), and the international community’s reactions. It then tests the legality of the Indian intervention against the international legal framework governing the use of force as it stood at the time of the events. The final section examines if, and to what extent, the case has had an impact on the further development of the jus ad bellum, in particular whether it has contributed to an exception to the prohibition on the use of force for the recovery of 'pre-colonial' title.


2021 ◽  
Vol 23 (2) ◽  
pp. 75-99
Author(s):  
Alanna O'Malley

In late October 1964, nearly 1,000 European and U.S. citizens were taken hostage by rebel forces in Stanleyville in northern Congo as part of an attempt to create the “People’s Republic of Congo,” an opposition regime designed to rival the pro-Western government in the capital Léopoldville (now Kinshasa). The hostages were captured to use as leverage against the advancing Armée Nationale Congolaise (ANC), led by white mercenaries as part of a Western-backed military effort to crush the rebellion. In response, Belgium and the United States launched a military intervention to rescue their citizens on 24 November 1964, publicly justifying the incursion on humanitarian grounds. In reality, the main purpose was to crush the rebellion and secure Western interests in Congo. The intervention reflected a cavalier attitude toward sovereignty, international law, and the use of force in postcolonial Africa and had the adverse effect of discrediting humanitarian reasoning as a basis for military intervention until the end of the Cold War. The massacre of tens of thousands of Congolese in Stanleyville was a unique moment in which African countries united in their criticism of Western policies and demanded firmer sovereignty in the postcolonial world.


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