India’s nuclear force doctrine: Through the lens of jus ad bellum

2018 ◽  
Vol 32 (01) ◽  
pp. 111-130 ◽  
Author(s):  
Isha Jain ◽  
Bhavesh Seth
Keyword(s):  
Cold War ◽  
South Asia ◽  
International Law ◽  
Nuclear Weapons ◽  
Nuclear Force ◽  
Use Of Force ◽  
Military Strategy ◽  
Academic Literature ◽  
Jus Ad Bellum ◽  
The Cold War

AbstractNearly three decades after the Cold War, the present-day hostilities between India and Pakistan have shifted the focus of the threat of nuclear escalation to South Asia. It is in this context that this article seeks to assess the legality of India’s military nuclear doctrine under international law.Academic literature on the use of nuclear weapons has largely shied away from discussing the legality of specific military doctrines or ‘policies of deterrence’ of the nuclear weapon states, treating them as issues of military strategy that are beyond the realm of international law. This article hopes to challenge that dichotomy.Though several branches of international law are relevant to any discussion on nuclear weapons, this article shall only examine India’s nuclear doctrine through the lens of jus ad bellum. Specifically, this article shall focus on whether India’s nuclear doctrine constitutes a threat to use force, and if so, whether such threat is lawful. The article concludes that India’s nuclear doctrine can be construed to be a specific threat to use force against Pakistan, and that such threat may be unlawful for contemplating the disproportionate use of force.

Part 1 The Cold War Era (1945–89), 5 The Soviet Intervention in Hungary—1956

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lieblich Eliav
Keyword(s):  
Cold War ◽  
International Law ◽  
Real Time ◽  
Use Of Force ◽  
Warsaw Pact ◽  
Jus Ad Bellum ◽  
Soviet Invasion ◽  
The Cold War

In late October 1956, the Soviet army crushed a burgeoning rebellion in Hungary, ostensibly upon the invitation of the Hungarian government, and allegedly in conformity with the provisions of the Warsaw Pact. While the intervention was widely condemned, international law could not prevent the Soviet invasion nor secure the USSR's withdrawal from Hungary. Seven decades later, this Chapter analyses the Soviet intervention under jus ad bellum. It focuses on the positions of relevant actors in real-time, as well as on the enduring aspects of the affair. As the Chapter reveals, the Hungary intervention presented dilemmas that plague the law on the use of force even in contemporary times. It raised questions that remain burning today, such as the role of consent in legalizing external forcible intervention, the ability of international law to face superpowers, and the dialectics between effectiveness and legitimacy in the determination of lawful authority during internal strife.

“Post” As Justification: International Law and Democracy-Building after Iraq

2003 ◽  
Vol 4 (7) ◽  
pp. 709-723 ◽  
Author(s):  
Outi Korhonen
Keyword(s):  
Cold War ◽  
International Law ◽  
Use Of Force ◽  
World Politics ◽  
Political Elite ◽  
Deterrent Effect ◽  
The Political ◽  
The West ◽  
The Cold War ◽  
Democracy Building

The “post”-phase of a conflict has become the justification for both the possible action and the inaction of the Western states. It is not so much any longer that we would be averse to war in any circumstances, as the non-use of force principle in its absolute sense would require. Again, after a good fifty years of the UN and its raison d'etre – the guardianship of peace – we seem to have arrived at an era where ideological contestation no more has the deterrent effect that it did during the Cold War and, consequently, there are cases of the use of force that are accepted and even regarded as just as long as they are quick. When looking back at the NATO bombings of FRY in 1999 as the response to atrocities in Kosovo many are able to accept that ‘though illegal they were legitimate’ in some sense. This is the conclusion irrespective of whether one, at the time, was for action or inaction. Such a ‘condoning condemnation’ has become the popular middle road as so many other paradoxes in world politics. Through the cases of Afghanistan and Iraq the paradox has gained in strength. Although there is quite strong and unequivocal opposition to the wars and a condemnation for their illegality, the political elite of the West seems to be quick in forgetting scruples and taking a keen interest in the “post”-management of the targets, i.e. the states that are about to be or already have been ‘bombed into the stone age’ or into shambles in any case. There is a general rush to the “post”-phase; both in the sense that the tacit requirement for the condoning condemnation is that the action be quick – the use of force should be very limited in time – and, secondly, in the sense that already before the bombs fall (or during) the major reconstruction plans and projects are dealt. This article outlines some points of critique that could be launched at the phase when the majority cannot be bothered to re-analyze the wrongs committed ex ante.

Nuclear arsenals: Current developments, trends and capabilities

2015 ◽  
Vol 97 (899) ◽  
pp. 563-599 ◽  
Author(s):  
Hans M. Kristensen ◽  
Matthew G. McKinzie
Keyword(s):  
Cold War ◽  
Nuclear Weapons ◽  
Nuclear Force ◽  
The United States ◽  
Radioactive Fallout ◽  
Nuclear Forces ◽  
Nuclear War ◽  
The Russian Federation ◽  
Nuclear Arms Control ◽  
The Cold War

AbstractIn this article, the highly destructive potential of global nuclear arsenals is reviewed with respect to nuclear force structures, evolution of nuclear capabilities, modernization programmes and nuclear war planning and operations. Specific nuclear forces data is presented for the United States, the Russian Federation, Great Britain, France, China, Pakistan, India, Israel and North Korea. Hypothetical, escalatory scenarios for the use of nuclear weapons are presented, including the calculated distribution of radioactive fallout. At more than seventy years since the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki and twenty-five years since the end of the Cold War, international progress on nuclear arms control and disarmament has now nearly stalled, with the emphasis shifting to modernizing and maintaining large inventories of nuclear weapons indefinitely. This perpetuates a grave risk to human health, civil society and the environment.

Part 1 The Cold War Era (1945–89), 32 The Intervention of the United States and other Eastern Caribbean States in Grenada—1983

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Hajjami Nabil
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Cold War ◽  
International Law ◽  
Use Of Force ◽  
The United States ◽  
International Organisations ◽  
Caribbean Community ◽  
The Caribbean ◽  
Eastern Caribbean ◽  
The Cold War

This chapter examines the legality of the 1983 American-led intervention in Grenada. It recalls the positions of the main protagonists of the crisis, including international organisations such as the United Nations, the Caribbean Community and the Organisation of Eastern Caribbean States. It then analyses the justifications of the American administration, which are mainly based on three different grounds: the protection of citizens abroad; the activation of regional mechanisms and the intervention by invitation. The conclusion assesses the precedential value of the Operation Urgent Fury. Regarding its wide condemnation, the chapter argues that reactions to the American-led intervention in Grenada can finally be deemed as a strong reaffirmation of the prohibition of the use of force in international law.

Part 1 The Cold War Era (1945–89), 15 The Indian Intervention into (East) Pakistan—1971

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kritsiotis Dino
Keyword(s):  
Cold War ◽  
Final Section ◽  
Humanitarian Intervention ◽  
Use Of Force ◽  
Legal Framework ◽  
Jus Ad Bellum ◽  
Cold War Era ◽  
The Cold War ◽  
Further Development

This contribution discusses the 1971 Indian intervention in east Pakistan. It sets out the facts and context of the crisis, the legal positions of the main protagonists (India and Pakistan), and the international community’s reactions. It then tests the legality of the Indian intervention against the international legal framework governing the use of force as it stood at the time of the events. The final section examines if, and to what extent, the case has had an impact on the further development of the jus ad bellum, in particular whether it is a precedent for humanitarian intervention.

Part 1 The Cold War Era (1945–89), 8 The Indian Intervention in Goa—1961

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ruys Tom
Keyword(s):  
Cold War ◽  
Final Section ◽  
Use Of Force ◽  
Legal Framework ◽  
Jus Ad Bellum ◽  
Cold War Era ◽  
The Cold War ◽  
Further Development

This contribution discusses the 1961 Indian intervention in Goa. It sets out the facts and context of the crisis, the legal positions of the main protagonists (India and Portugal), and the international community’s reactions. It then tests the legality of the Indian intervention against the international legal framework governing the use of force as it stood at the time of the events. The final section examines if, and to what extent, the case has had an impact on the further development of the jus ad bellum, in particular whether it has contributed to an exception to the prohibition on the use of force for the recovery of 'pre-colonial' title.

scholarly journals The Simba Rebellion, the Cold War, and the Stanleyville Hostages in the Congo

2021 ◽  
Vol 23 (2) ◽  
pp. 75-99
Author(s):  
Alanna O'Malley
Keyword(s):  
Adverse Effect ◽  
Cold War ◽  
International Law ◽  
Military Intervention ◽  
Use Of Force ◽  
The United States ◽  
African Countries ◽  
Western Government ◽  
Postcolonial Africa ◽  
The Cold War

In late October 1964, nearly 1,000 European and U.S. citizens were taken hostage by rebel forces in Stanleyville in northern Congo as part of an attempt to create the “People’s Republic of Congo,” an opposition regime designed to rival the pro-Western government in the capital Léopoldville (now Kinshasa). The hostages were captured to use as leverage against the advancing Armée Nationale Congolaise (ANC), led by white mercenaries as part of a Western-backed military effort to crush the rebellion. In response, Belgium and the United States launched a military intervention to rescue their citizens on 24 November 1964, publicly justifying the incursion on humanitarian grounds. In reality, the main purpose was to crush the rebellion and secure Western interests in Congo. The intervention reflected a cavalier attitude toward sovereignty, international law, and the use of force in postcolonial Africa and had the adverse effect of discrediting humanitarian reasoning as a basis for military intervention until the end of the Cold War. The massacre of tens of thousands of Congolese in Stanleyville was a unique moment in which African countries united in their criticism of Western policies and demanded firmer sovereignty in the postcolonial world.

Part 1 The Cold War Era (1945–89), 36 The US Intervention in Panama—1989

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Tsagourias Nicholas
Keyword(s):  
Cold War ◽  
International Law ◽  
Use Of Force ◽  
Panama Canal ◽  
The Us ◽  
Us Government ◽  
Legal Arguments ◽  
The Right ◽  
The Cold War ◽  
Us Intervention

This chapter examines the legality of the 1989 US intervention in Panama and assesses its impact on the use of force regime. After recalling the facts of the incident, it goes on to analyse the legal arguments provided by the US government to justify its action. More specifically, the US invoked its right to protect American citizens abroad as part of its right to self-defence; the right to intervene to protect the Panama Canal provided by the Panama Canal Treaties; and the invitation of the democratically elected Leader of the Opposition. The chapter then presents the reactions of states and the views of legal commentators. It concludes by saying that the incident affirms existing law but also contributes to the development of the rules regulating the use of force in international law.

Part 1 The Cold War Era (1945–89), 33 The Israeli Raid Against the PLO Headquarters in Tunis—1985

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Pobjie Erin ◽  
Declercq Fanny ◽  
van Steenberghe Raphaël
Keyword(s):  
Cold War ◽  
International Law ◽  
International Organizations ◽  
The State ◽  
Legal Issues ◽  
Jus Ad Bellum ◽  
Cold War Era ◽  
State Actors ◽  
The Cold War ◽  
Self Defence

This chapter examines the Israeli raid against the Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO) headquarters in Tunis in 1985. It first sets out the facts and context of the raid, the positions of the main protagonists (Israel and Tunisia) and the reactions of third States and international organizations. The chapter then analyses the legal issues raised by the incident under international law as it stood at the time, and its impact on the jus ad bellum. The 1985 raid was an early example of a claimed right to exercise self-defence in response to attacks committed by non-state actors without those attacks being attributable to the state on whose territory the action in self-defence takes place. However, it is argued that this incident left unsettled whether or not such a right was accepted at the time.

Use of Force in International Law

2012 ◽  
Author(s):  
Olivier Corten
Keyword(s):  
Cold War ◽  
International Law ◽  
Use Of Force ◽  
Military Interventions ◽  
Customary International Law ◽  
Self Defense ◽  
Law Of Nations ◽  
The One ◽  
Jus Cogens ◽  
The Cold War

Use of force is a politically sensitive and legally undetermined topic. It is therefore not surprising that it constitutes a highly controversial issue. During the Cold War, various critical debates about the legality of military interventions (Korea, Vietnam, Nicaragua, Palestine, Afghanistan) were prevalent. These controversies did not disappear in the 1990s (Yugoslavia) nor in the 2000s and 2010s (Afghanistan, Iraq, Israel/Lebanon, Russia/Georgia, Libya, Syria, Ukraine, among others). A general assessment of the numerous books and articles dedicated to this issue reveals a deep ambivalence. On the one hand, no one really contests that the use of force is strictly forbidden in contemporary international law. This prohibition is recognized as a core rule of the law of nations, and even a rule of imperative international law (jus cogens). Indeed, it seems difficult to conceive any kind of legal order without at least affirming that its subjects cannot attack one another. The prohibition of the use of force is also logically linked to the notion of external sovereignty, aiming both at protecting the identity and the personality of every state and at preserving individuals “from the scourge of war” (preamble of the UN Charter). On the other hand, there are, to say the least, a great variety of interpretations of the rule. Are collective security and self-defense the only exceptions in allowing states to use force? Is the Security Council the only authority able to authorize states to use force? Under what conditions are states able to invoke self-defense? Those questions seem difficult to address, as the conventional sources are rather limited: Article 2(4) and Chapters VII and VIII of the UN Charter are far from providing explicit answers to all the questions raised. Thus, the answers can be found mainly in customary international law, with all the difficulties surrounding the task of establishing that law.

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