scholarly journals International Law and the War in Iraq

2003 ◽  
Vol 97 (3) ◽  
pp. 563-576 ◽  
Author(s):  
John Yoo

In his speech before the United Nations (UN) in September 2002, President George W. Bush characterized the possible use of force against Iraq as necessary to enforce existing Security Council resolutions and to eliminate a dangerous threat to international peace and security. The Security Council responded by adopting Resolution 1441, which found Iraq to be in material breach of previous Security Council resolutions and threatened serious consequences for further intransigence. When Iraq refused to fully comply with these resolutions, the United States led an ad hoc “coalition of the willing” that invaded Iraq on March 19,2003, quickly defeated Iraq’s armed forces, and ended the regime of Saddam Hussein and the Ba’ath party. On May 1,2003, President Bush announced that major combat operations in Iraq had ended. At the time of this writing, the United States has assumed the position of an occupying power that is responsible for rebuilding Iraq, as recognized by the Security Council in Resolution 1483.

1963 ◽  
Vol 17 (1) ◽  
pp. 226-230

The Security Council discussed this question at its 1022nd–1025th meetings, on October 23–25, 1962. It had before it a letter dated October 22, 1962, from the permanent representative of the United States, in which it was stated that the establishment of missile bases in Cuba constituted a grave threat to the peace and security of the world; a letter of the same date from the permanent representative of Cuba, claiming that the United States naval blockade of Cuba constituted an act of war; and a letter also dated October 22 from the deputy permanent representative of the Soviet Union, emphasizing that Soviet assistance to Cuba was exclusively designed to improve Cuba's defensive capacity and that the United States government had committed a provocative act and an unprecedented violation of international law in its blockade.


1954 ◽  
Vol 8 (4) ◽  
pp. 513-517

The question of the threat to Thailand was discussed by the Security Council at its 673d and 674th meetings. After again explaining the reasons for his government's belief that the condition of tension in the general region in which Thailand was located would, if continued, endanger the maintenance of international peace and security, the Thai representative, Pote Sarasin, again requested that the Peace Observation Commission establish a sub-commission of from three to five members to dispatch observers to Thailand and to visit Thailand itself if it were deemed necessary. The Thai draft differed from earlier Thai proposals, however, in that the original mandate of the sub-commission applie only to the territory of Thailand; if the sub-commission felt that it could not adequately accomplish its mission without observation or visit in states contiguous to Thailand, the Peace Observation Commission or the Security Council could issue the necessary instructions. Representatives of New Zealand, Turkey, Brazil, China, the United Kingdom, the United States, Denmark, Colombia and France spoke in support of the Thai draft. They denied, as had been alleged by the Soviet representative (Tsarapkin) at an earlier meeting, that Council consideration or action on this question would be detrimental to the success of the negotiations between the Foreign Ministers of the United States, United Kingdom, France, Chinese People's Republic, Soviet Union and other states in Geneva. While agreeing that it would be impropitious for the Council to consider directly the situation in Indochina as long as it was being discussed in Geneva, they argued that the question raised by Thailand was quite separate and that the Council had a duty to comply with the Thai request.


1956 ◽  
Vol 10 (3) ◽  
pp. 423-428

At the request of the United States the Council began consideration on March 26, 1956 of the extent of compliance by Israel and the Arab states with the Armistice Agreements and with the Security Council's resolutions of March 30, 1955, September 8, 1955 and January 19, 1956. The representatives of Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon and Syria took part in the Council's discussions. The Council had before it a draft resolution submitted by the United States in the preambular part of which the Council recalled the three earlier resolutions; noted that in each of these resolutions the Chief of Staff of the Truce Supervision Organization and the parties to the General Armistice Agreements concerned had been requested by the Council to undertake certain specific steps for the purpose of ensuring that the tensions along the armistice lines should be reduced; and noted with grave concern that despite the efforts of the Chief of Staff the proposed steps had not been carried out. Under the terms of the operative part of the resolution, the Council 1) considered that the situation currently prevailing between the parties concerning the enforcement of the Armistice Agreements and the compliance given to the above-mentioned resolutions of the Council was such that its continuance was likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security; 2) requested the Secretary-General to undertake, as a matter of urgent concern, a survey of the various aspects of enforcement of and compliance with the four General Armistice Agreements and the three earlier resolutions;


Author(s):  
Muhammad Imran ◽  
Rohaida Nordin ◽  
Mohd Munzil Muhamad

This paper contributes significantly through suggestions to overcome the problem created by the disastrous US drone strikes in Pakistan. This paper evaluates incidences of the United States’ combat drone strikes in Pakistan and the damage caused to innocent people. It seeks to determine possible violations of international laws and the extent to which these strikes diminish the sovereignty of Pakistan. After the incident of 9/11, the use of combat drones in armed conflicts among states, non-state actors, disruptive groups and organisations has increased and expanded. Combat drones are controlled by operators who depend for their primary sources of information on cameras and sensors to determine their targets. Drone strikes lack identification processes causing many innocent people to be killed or injured. Drone strikes launched in non-conflict areas also increase the concerns about illegitimate interference in a state’s territorial sovereignty and violations of international laws. It covers the following questions. What are the basic principles about the use of force? What kinds of damages are caused by US drone strikes in Pakistan that violate basic human rights principles? What are the concerns of international organisations about drone strikes in Pakistan? Summarily, it covers the United States unlawful drone strikes in Pakistan and damages caused to humanity. The paper uses doctrinal qualitative analysis to situate the research within the ethical, legal and social parameters of the related statutes of international law. The research methodology adopted is evaluative, interpretive and analytical. The paper consists of 8 segments: (1) drones and the United States armed forces, (2) some basic international law principles about the use of force, (3) possible human rights violations, (4) US drone strikes diminish the sovereignty of Pakistan, (5) demands for transparency, (6) the damages caused to humanity by the drone strikes, (7) concerns of international organisations about illegitimate drone strikes causing extra judicial killings and (8) some recommendations to regulate the use of combat drones. It demonstrates that international law does not regulate the use of combat drones in armed conflict and no considerable effort has been made to bring the use of combat drones under the rule of law. Furthermore, US drone strikes in Pakistan’s territory have been done without consensus, resulting in the violation of Pakistan’s sovereignty and the killing of innocent people.


2011 ◽  
Vol 26 (2) ◽  
pp. 235-261 ◽  
Author(s):  
ZOU Keyuan

AbstractThe Charter of the United Nations designates the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) as one of the principal organs of the United Nations, assuming the “primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security”. It has the power to determine the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression, to make recommendations, and decide what measures should be taken to maintain or restore international peace and security. This article addresses a number of issues concerning how the UNSC Resolutions are enforced at sea in accordance with applicable international law and makes special reference to the circumstances in East Asia, particularly the Korean Peninsula.


Author(s):  
Nigel D. White

This chapter examines the division of competence between the UN Security Council and the UN General Assembly concerning matters of international peace and security but placed within the context of the prohibition on the use of force. Although the Security Council can authorize the use of force by states, what is not clear is whether the General Assembly can recommend that states take military action. The chapter considers the conundrum faced by the United Nations with respect to an imminent and catastrophic use of force or act of egregious violence, when the UN Security Council is deadlocked because of the lack of agreement between the permanent members. It discusses the debate over the legality of the (in)famous Uniting for Peace Resolution of 1950 within the context of the emerging principle of a Responsibility to Protect (R2P) as well as within existing principles of international law.


2021 ◽  
Vol 4 (2) ◽  
pp. 192-206
Author(s):  
Rahmah Kusumayani

Abstract Self defence known as an inherent right that is owned by states to protect its sovereignty from attack by other states. The international rules about self defence do not give any limitation about the type of weapon that can be used by states, including the threat or use of nuclear weapons to act self defence. In Practice, many requirements must be fulfilled by states when they claim the act of self defence. Since 2006, North Korea proclaimed its capability to develop nuclear weapons based on self defence argument. The Security Council concluded that North Korea’s development of nuclear weapon program is a threat to international peace and security and condemned such acts with sanctions based on act 41 UN Charter. The purposes of this study are to examine whether the North Korea’s nuclear program as an act of self defence and the UN Security Council’s sanctions to North Korea are in line with the principle of self defence in international law. The result of this research concludes that North Korea’s nuclear program does not meet the requirements as stated in article 51 UN Charter and customary international law regarding self defence. North Korea can not prove that the United States’ threat is jeopardy, and has a wide and dangerous effect for North Korea. Regarding the Security Council’s primary responsibility to maintain international peace and security, states must report his act of self defence to the Security Council immediately. As therefore, sanctions given by the Security Council are in line with the principle of self defence since North Korea can not fulfil the requested requirements of self defence. Keywords: Act 51 UN Charter, Korean Nuclear Development, Principle of self defence   Abstrak Hak untuk menerapkan self defence dimiliki oleh tiap negara untuk melindungi kedaulatannya dari serangan negara lain. Peraturan internasional mengenai self defence tidak membatasi jenis senjata yang dapat digunakan oleh negara, termasuk ancaman dan penggunaan senjata nuklir dalam melakukan tindakan self defence. Dalam prakteknya banyak syarat yang harus dipenuhi oleh negara-negara ketika akan mengklaim tindakan self defence. Sejak tahun 2006, Korea Utara mendeklarasikan kesiapannya dalam mengembangkan senjata nuklir dengan alasan self defence. Dewan Keamanan menganggap bahwa program pengembangan senjata nuklir Korea Utara mengancam perdamaian dan keamanan internasional dan berdasarkan Pasal 41 Piagam PBB, Dewan Keamanan memberikan sanksi kepada Korea Utara. Tujuan penelitian ini untuk mengkaji legalitas pengembangan senjata nuklir di Korea Utara atas tindakan yang diklaim negaranya sebagai self defence serta kesesuaian penerapan sanksi Dewan Keamanan PBB dengan prinsip self defence. Hasil dari penelitian ini menyatakan bahwa program senjata nuklir Korea Utara tidak memenuhi syarat yang terdapat dalam Pasal 51 Piagam PBB maupun hukum kebiasaan internasional terkait self defence. Korea Utara tidak bisa membuktikan bahwa ancaman Amerika Serikat bersifat genting dan nyata menimbulkan efek luas dan berbahaya bagi Korea Utara. Berdasarkan tugas utama Dewan Keamanan dalam menjaga kedamaian dan keamanan internasional, negara-negara harus melaporkan tindakan self defence  kepada Dewan Keamanan dengan segera. Berdasarkan uraian diatas, sanksi yang diberikan Dewan Keamanan tidak bertentangan dengan prinsip self defence karena Korea Utara tidak bisa memenuhi hal-hal yang disyaratkan untuk melakukan tindakan self defence. Kata Kunci: Pasal 51 Piagam PBB, Pengembangan Senjata Nuklir Korea Utara, Prinsip Pembelaan Diri


Author(s):  
Ellen Jenny Ravndal

This chapter explores all aspects of Trygve Lie’s interaction with the Security Council, beginning with his appointment process and the negotiation of the relative domains of the Council and the Secretary-General. This was a time when the working methods of the UN system were rapidly evolving through political negotiation and responses to external crises. It examines Lie’s personality and character, how he viewed his own responsibilities in the maintenance of international peace and security as crises arose, the legal and political tools he developed and exercised, and his changing relationship with individual permanent members and the six elected members. In the emerging Cold War, Lie’s position in the Security Council would be determined in particular by his relationships with the United States and the Soviet Union. Taking initiative in response to external crises in Iran, Palestine, Berlin, and Korea, Lie succeeded in laying foundations for an expanded political role for the Secretary-General.


2001 ◽  
Vol 14 (4) ◽  
pp. 789-828
Author(s):  
Keith Wilson

The United States is abrogating the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty in order to deploy a limited missile defence shield. Amongst other developments, this is prompting a reconsideration of the global security framework. However, a crucial element is missing from the current missile defence proposals: a clearly articulated concept of peaceful use, applicable both to outer space and to earth-space. The deployment of missile defence runs counter to emerging norms. It has effects going far beyond the abandonment or re-configuration of specific Cold War agreements. In a community of nations committed to the maintenance of international peace and security (cf. national or plurilateral security), sustainable meaning for widely used and accepted norms of peaceful use and peaceful purposes is at risk.


2019 ◽  
pp. 346-374
Author(s):  
Gleider Hernández

This chapter looks at the use of force and collective security. Today, the United Nations Charter embodies the indispensable principles of international law on the use of force. These include the prohibition on the unilateral use of force found in Article 2(4), and the recognition of the inherent right of all States to use force in self-defence found in Article 51. Finally, under Chapter VII, a collective security system centred upon the Security Council was established for the maintenance of international peace and security. A key debate over the scope of Article 2(4) is whether a new exception has been recognized which would allow the use of force motivated by humanitarian considerations. It is argued that these ‘humanitarian interventions’ would allow a State to use force to protect people in another State from gross and systematic human rights violations when the target State is unwilling or unable to act.


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