scholarly journals Divine Commands and Secular Demands: On Darwall on Anscombe on 'Modern Moral Philosophy'

Mind ◽  
2014 ◽  
Vol 123 (492) ◽  
pp. 1095-1122 ◽  
Author(s):  
R. Stern
Keyword(s):  
Moral Philosophy ◽  
Divine Commands ◽  
Modern Moral Philosophy

Morality and Social Human Nature

2020 ◽  
pp. 109-119
Author(s):  
Terence Irwin
Keyword(s):  
Human Nature ◽  
Moral Philosophy ◽  
Natural Law ◽  
Natural Basis ◽  
Moral Principles ◽  
Middle Way ◽  
Important Link ◽  
Moral Basis ◽  
Divine Commands ◽  
Modern Moral Philosophy

One important link that connects mediaeval and modern moral philosophy is the theory of natural law and the natural basis of moral rightness and wrongness. Suarez claims to defend a ‘middle way’ between the views of Aquinas and the voluntarists (Scotus and Ockham). Since natural law is genuine law, it depends on commands, and therefore on divine commands. But the precepts of natural law are not the principles of morality. Right and wrong are constituted by facts about human nature, and not by any commands, divine or human. Suarez therefore is to some extent a voluntarist about natural law, but a naturalist and objectivist about morality. Grotius agrees with Suarez that the moral basis of natural law consists in facts about human nature. These facts support objective moral principles that do not depend on the laws of any particular state.

Elizabeth Anscombe versus the World

2021 ◽  
pp. 135-170
Author(s):  
Benjamin J.B. Lipscomb
Keyword(s):  
Moral Philosophy ◽  
Original Work ◽  
Early Career ◽  
Honorary Degree ◽  
The World ◽  
Harry Truman ◽  
Radio Broadcast ◽  
Modern Moral Philosophy

This chapter chronicles the philosophical development of the abrasive, brilliant Elizabeth Anscombe and her contribution to her friends’ implicit project of reshaping mid-century ethics: her all-out attack against “Oxford Moral Philosophy” epitomized by R.M. Hare, and her publication of the influential “Modern Moral Philosophy.” Anscombe was Wittgenstein’s apprentice and translator for much of her early career, rarely publishing original work. She was, nonetheless, a fearsome adversary of anyone she saw as glib or insufficiently serious, including C.S. Lewis and J.L. Austin. Anscombe’s real engagement with ethics began with her attempt to stop Oxford from bestowing an honorary degree on Harry Truman; she abhorred his decision to bomb Hiroshima and Nagasaki. She was invited to give a radio broadcast, “Oxford Moral Philosophy: Does It Corrupt the Youth?”—the opening salvo in a fight with R.M. Hare, which resulted in her influential essay “Modern Moral Philosophy.”

Reciprocity in Morality and Law

2013 ◽  
Vol 6 (2) ◽  
pp. 201-227 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ronit Donyets Kedar
Keyword(s):  
Social Contract ◽  
Moral Philosophy ◽  
Moral Theory ◽  
Cooperative Scheme ◽  
The Social ◽  
Mutual Advantage ◽  
The Relationship ◽  
Modern Moral Philosophy ◽  
Liberal Thought

Abstract Western liberal thought, which is rooted in the social contract tradition, views the relationship between rational contractors as fundamental to the authority of law, politics, and morality. Within this liberal discourse, dominant strands of modern moral philosophy claim that morality too is best understood in contractual terms. Accordingly, others are perceived first and foremost as autonomous, free, and equal parties to a reciprocal cooperative scheme, designed for mutual advantage. This Article aims to challenge the contractual model as an appropriate framework for morality. My claim is that the constituting concepts of contractualist thought, especially the idea of reciprocity, while perhaps fitting to law, are misplaced in morality. I argue that importing the concept of reciprocity and its conceptual habitat from law to morality yields ethical contractualism an unconvincing moral theory.

Rawls' Theory of Justice

Dialogue ◽  
1974 ◽  
Vol 13 (1) ◽  
pp. 139-159 ◽  
Author(s):  
A. M. Macleod
Keyword(s):  
Moral Philosophy ◽  
Viable Alternative ◽  
Theory Of Justice ◽  
Moral Conception ◽  
Modern Moral Philosophy ◽  
Utilitarian Theory ◽  
The Way

Rawls' main aim in A Theory of Justice is to provide a viable alternative to the utilitarianism which has dominated so much modern moral philosophy. Although philosophers have long recognised the difficulties in the way of acceptance of a utilitarian account of judgments of justice, they have often responded by seeking merely to reformulate the principle of utility. Other philosophers, with a juster appreciation of the seriousness of these difficulties, have been prepared to reject utilitarianism in all its guises, but they have failed (in Rawl's opinion) “to construct a workable and systematic moral conception to oppose it”. What is needed, beyond a powerful reaffirmation of the familiar objections to utilitarian accounts of justice, is the careful elaboration of a radically non-utilitarian theory of justice. It is this need which Rawls sets out to meet in his book.

Virtue, Rule-Following, and Absolute Prohibitions

2019 ◽  
Vol 5 (1) ◽  
pp. 78-97
Author(s):  
JEREMY REID
Keyword(s):  
Virtue Ethics ◽  
Moral Philosophy ◽  
Virtuous Person ◽  
Rule Following ◽  
Moral Rules ◽  
Seminal Article ◽  
Modern Moral Philosophy ◽  
Taking Responsibility

AbstractIn her seminal article ‘Modern Moral Philosophy’ (1958) Elizabeth Anscombe argued that we need a new ethics, one that uses virtue terms to generate absolute prohibitions against certain act-types. Leading contemporary virtue ethicists have not taken up Anscombe's challenge in justifying absolute prohibitions and have generally downplayed the role of rule-following in their normative theories. That they have not done so is primarily because contemporary virtue ethicists have focused on what is sufficient for characterizing the deliberation and action of the fully virtuous person, and rule-following is inadequate for this task. In this article, I take up Anscombe's challenge by showing that rule-following is necessary for virtuous agency, and that virtue ethics can justify absolute prohibitions. First, I offer a possibility proof by showing how virtue ethics can generate absolute prohibitions in three ways: by considering actions that directly manifest vice or that cannot be performed virtuously; actions that are prohibited by one's institutional roles and practical identities; and actions that are prohibited by the prescriptions of the wise. I then seek to show why virtue ethicists should incorporate rule-following and absolute prohibitions into their theories. I emphasize the central role that rules have in the development of virtue, then motivate the stronger view that fully virtuous agents follow moral rules by considering the importance of hope, uncertainty about consequences, and taking responsibility for what eventuates. Finally, I provide an account of what Anscombe called a ‘corrupt mind’, explaining how our understanding of virtue is corrupted if we think that virtue may require us to do vicious actions.

Anscombe on Brute Facts and Human Affairs

2020 ◽  
Vol 87 ◽  
pp. 85-99
Author(s):  
Rachael Wiseman
Keyword(s):  
Moral Philosophy ◽  
Philosophy Of Action ◽  
Philosophy Of Psychology ◽  
Starting Point ◽  
Modern Moral Philosophy

AbstractIn ‘Modern Moral Philosophy’ Anscombe writes: ‘It is not profitable at present for us to do moral philosophy. It should be laid aside at any rate until we have an adequate philosophy of psychology, in which we are conspicuously lacking’. In consideration of this Anscombe appeals to the relation of ‘brute-relative-to’ which holds between facts and descriptions of human affairs. This paper describes the reorientation in philosophy of action that this relation aims to effect and examines the claim that this reorientation makes possible the sort of philosophy of psychology that can provide a starting point for ethics.

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