Lyall, William Rowe (1788–1857)

Keyword(s):  
2017 ◽  
Vol 9 (1) ◽  
pp. 65-86
Author(s):  
Roslyn Weiss

In his critique of Anselm’s ontological argument for God’s existence, William Rowe introduces the concepts of “magico” and “magican”—defining “magicos” as magicians that do not exist, and “magicans” as magicians that do exist—to help diagnose what may have gone wrong in Anselm’s argument. As I made my way through Rowe’s intriguing article, I found myself waiting for “Godo”—and for “Godan.” I expected Rowe to invoke these counterparts to his “magico” and “magican”—a non-existing God to correspond to his non-existing magician, and an existing God to correspond to his existing magician—to complete his argument. Alas, like Vladimir and Estragon, I waited in vain: neither Godo—nor Godan—ever appeared. In what follows I shall argue that their inclusion in Rowe’s argument would have settled the matter against Anselm far more decisively than do Rowe’s forays into the murky waters of question-begging.


2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Klaas J. Kraay
Keyword(s):  
A Priori ◽  

In the central chapter of Can God Be Free?, William Rowe offers what amounts to an a priori argument for atheism. In what follows, I first clarify this argument, and I then defend it against recent criticisms due to William Hasker. Next, however, I outline four ways in which theists might plausibly reply to Rowe's argument.


Author(s):  
Revista de Filología y Lingüística

Brendan Lanctot. Beyond Civilization and Barbarism: Culture and Politics in Post-Revolutionary Argentina (1829-1852). Lewisburg, PA: Bucknell UP, 2014, 179 páginas (Reseña por Verónica Ríos).Mario A. Ortiz. La musa y la melopea: la música en el mundo conventual, la vida y el pensamiento de Sor Juana Inés de la Cruz. México D.F., México: Universidad del Claustro de Sor Juana, 2015, 192 páginas (Reseña por Dorde Cuvardic García).María Lourdes Cortés. Los amores contrariados. Gabriel García Márquez y el cine. México: Ariel, 2015, 354 páginas (Reseña por Carolina Sanabria).Palmar Álvarez-Blanco y Toni-Dorca. Contornos de la narrativa española actual (2000-2010): Un diálogo entre creadores y críticos. Madrid/Frankfurt: Iberoamericana/ Vervuert, 2011, 318 páginas (Reseña por Jorge Chen Sham).Magdalena Chocano, William Rowe y Helena Usandizaga (Eds.). Huellas del mito prehispánico en la literatura latinoamericana. Madrid/Frankfurt: Iberoamericana/ Vervuert, 2011, 439 páginas (Reseña por Jorge Chen Sham).Néstor Ponce. Diagonales del género: Estudios sobre el policial argentino. San Luis Potosí: El Colegio de San Luis, 2013, 225 páginas (Reseña por Jorge Chen Sham).Hélène Tropé (Ed.). S’opposer dans l’Espagne des XVIè et XVIIè siècles (Perspectives historiques et représentations culturelles). París: Presses Sorbonne Nouvelle, 2014, 266 páginas (Reseña por Jorge Chen Sham).


Author(s):  
Mark C. Murphy

Prior formulations of the problem of evil, for example, by J. L. Mackie, William Rowe, and Paul Draper, assume that God must have requiring reasons to prevent evils to creatures, and use that assumption as the basis for claiming that the existence (or types, or amount, or distribution) of evils in this world is either incompatible with or gives strong prima facie evidence against the existence of God. But given that God’s reasons with respect to preventing evils are justifying, not requiring, reasons, no such arguments can get off the ground. This account, which is based on a first-order theory of divine ethics, differs from skeptical theism, which is based on moral epistemology. This difference makes the account developed here immune from the most serious criticisms that have made trouble for skeptical theism.


Author(s):  
Laura W. Ekstrom

This chapter launches a new investigation of the question of God’s existence, examining it against the reality of human suffering and bringing to the fore contentious presuppositions concerning agency and value at the core of the debate. When we survey the world, we observe an enormous amount of pain, including virtually unspeakable kinds of maltreatment and agony, many instances of which seem patently unfair, unearned, and pointless. This chapter initiates the book’s argument that, in light of these observations, it is reasonable to conclude that God does not exist. The chapter critically examines and extends the work of William Rowe, John Hick, and Alvin Plantinga, taking up apparently pointless instances of suffering and the proposed justifying goods of character-building and free will.


2005 ◽  
Vol 41 (4) ◽  
pp. 453-462 ◽  
Author(s):  
WILLIAM HASKER

In his book, Can God Be Free?, William Rowe has argued that if God is unsurpassably good He cannot be free; if He is free, He cannot be unsurpassably good. After following the discussion of this topic through a number of historical figures, Rowe focuses on the recent and contemporary debate. A key claim of Rowe's is that, if there exists an endless series of better and better creatable worlds, then the existence of a morally perfect creator is impossible. I show that this argument is unsound, since a key premise can be proved false from propositions Rowe himself accepts.


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