scholarly journals Ownership and Governance

2021 ◽  
pp. 427-442
Author(s):  
Brian L. Connelly
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Hedge Funds ◽  
The State ◽  
Share Repurchases ◽  
Corporate Ownership ◽  
Considerable Influence ◽  
Costs And Benefits ◽  
Firm Level ◽  
Short Sellers ◽  
Business Press

Shareholders have, in recent years, imposed considerable influence on firms and the managers that run them. Their role has become so prevalent that hedge funds, activist investors, and short sellers dominate the headlines of the popular business press. Academics are desperately trying to keep up with the furious pace of change and incorporate emerging phenomena into theories of corporate governance. To facilitate this process, this chapter reviews the key forms of corporate ownership and describes ways in which they affect firm-level outcomes. The chapter identifies five issues about which ownership scholars disagree: the competitive influence of common shareholding, the costs and benefits of excess control, the consequences of share repurchases, the threat of short sellers, and the value-creating prospects of shareholder-nominated directors. The chapter describes the state of each debate with the hope that strategy scholars, in the years ahead, will add nuance to what we know about these pressing matters.

scholarly journals Corporate Governance Mechanisms, Ownership and Firm Value: Evidence from Listed Chinese Firms

2020 ◽  
Vol 8 (2) ◽  
pp. 20 ◽  
Author(s):  
Yusheng Kong ◽  
Takuriramunashe Famba ◽  
Grace Chituku-Dzimiro ◽  
Huaping Sun ◽  
Ophias Kurauone
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Firm Value ◽  
Ownership Concentration ◽  
Institutional Setting ◽  
Tobin’S Q ◽  
Governance Mechanism ◽  
Corporate Ownership ◽  
Firm Level ◽  
Tobin's Q ◽  
Negative Effect

This study analyzes corporate ownership as a corporate governance mechanism and its role in creating firm value. Previous research shows that there is no convergence on the firm-value corporate ownership relationship. Most research in this area takes a cross national approach ignoring the uniqueness of each institutional setting particularly those of emerging nations. Using a unique firm level dataset, we investigate how corporate control nature and ownership concentration affect the value of Chinese listed firms. First, non-state owned control is associated with a higher Tobin’s Q while a negative premium is found for state owned. Using the hybrid and the correlated random effects model we confirm a U-shaped non-linear relationship between ownership concentration and Tobin’s Q, implying that firm value first decreases and then increases as block holders own more shares. Further investigation reveals that the negative effect of ownership concentration is weaker when a firm equity nature is non-state owned enterprises (non-SOEs) compared to state-owned enterprises (SOEs). While ownership concentration appears to be an efficient mechanism for corporate governance its effect is weaker for SOEs compared to non-SOEs. The results support privatization of SOEs, sound reforms such as the split share structure reform as crucial for the development of China’s stock market.

Firm, institutional and short sellers’ trading behavior around share repurchases

2021 ◽  
Vol ahead-of-print (ahead-of-print) ◽  
Author(s):  
Reuben Segara ◽  
Jin Young Yang
Keyword(s):  
Institutional Investors ◽  
Regression Models ◽  
Design Methodology ◽  
Short Selling ◽  
Share Repurchases ◽  
Panel Regression ◽  
Trading Behavior ◽  
Firm Level ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Short Sellers

PurposeThis study investigates the valuation motive for increasing share repurchases: the authors analyze the trading dynamics between short sellers, institutional investors and the firm itself around share repurchases.Design/methodology/approachThe authors examine the valuation motive for share repurchases through an analysis of firm, institutional and short sellers’ trading behavior. The firm-level panel regression models using firm-quarter observations in the sample period are estimated.FindingsThe authors find that firms repurchase more intensely against increased short selling and that institutional investors trade in parallel with the repurchasing firm.Originality/valueResults suggest that firms disagree with short sellers’ intrinsic valuation of the firm, which is consistent with findings of recent studies such as Muzere (2019) and Bargeron and Bonaimé (2020).

Understanding decoupling in response to corporate governance reform pressures

2015 ◽  
Vol 23 (4) ◽  
pp. 369-382 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mario Krenn
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Design Methodology ◽  
Good Governance ◽  
Regulatory Change ◽  
Compliance Monitoring ◽  
Governance Reform ◽  
Firm Level ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Good Corporate Governance ◽  
Actual Use

Purpose – The purpose of this article is to explain under what circumstances firm-level adoption of codes of good corporate governance will more likely be superficial rather than substantive in nature. The article contains lessons for any agency or country that attempts to implement deep and lasting changes in corporate governance via codes of good corporate governance. Design/methodology/approach – The article reviews the literature on compliance with codes of good corporate governance and develops a conceptual model to explain why some firms that have formally adopted a code of good governance decouple this policy from its actual use. Findings – Decoupling in response to the issuance of codes of good corporate governance will be more attractive to firms and also more sustainable under the following conditions: firms’ compliance costs are relatively high firms’ costs of outright and visible non-compliance are relatively high and outsiders’ compliance monitoring costs are relatively high. Originality/value – The article contributes to the debate on compliance and convergence and provides policymakers with a conceptual framework for assessing the likelihood of successful regulatory change in corporate governance.

scholarly journals Corporate Governance, Economic Entrenchment, and Growth

2005 ◽  
Vol 43 (3) ◽  
pp. 655-720 ◽  
Author(s):  
Randall Morck ◽  
Daniel Wolfenzon ◽  
Bernard Yeung
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Capital Investment ◽  
Corporate Control ◽  
Political Influence ◽  
Institutional Development ◽  
The United States ◽  
Firm Level ◽  
Control Structures ◽  
Resource Misallocation ◽  
Property Rights Protection

Outside the United States and the United Kingdom, large corporations usually have controlling owners, who are usually very wealthy families. Pyramidal control structures, cross shareholding, and super-voting rights let such families control corporations without making a commensurate capital investment. In many countries, a few such families end up controlling considerable proportions of their countries' economies. Three points emerge. First, at the firm level, these ownership structures, because they vest dominant control rights with families who often have little real capital invested, permit a range of agency problems and hence resource misallocation. If a few families control large swaths of an economy, such corporate governance problems can attain macroeconomic importance—affecting rates of innovation, economywide resource allocation, and economic growth. If political influence depends on what one controls, rather than what one owns, the controlling owners of pyramids have greatly amplified political influence relative to their actual wealth. This influence can distort public policy regarding property rights protection, capital markets, and other institutions. We denote this phenomenon economic entrenchment, and posit a relationship between the distribution of corporate control and institutional development that generates and preserves economic entrenchment as one possible equilibrium. The literature suggests key determinants of economic entrenchment, but has many gaps where further work exploring the political economy importance of the distribution of corporate control is needed.

Tradeoffs in Corporate Governance: Evidence From Board Structures and Charter Provisions

2011 ◽  
Vol 01 (04) ◽  
pp. 667-705 ◽  
Author(s):  
Stuart L. Gillan ◽  
Jay C. Hartzell ◽  
Laura T. Starks
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Corporate Control ◽  
Board Independence ◽  
Governance Structures ◽  
Board Structure ◽  
System Of Equations ◽  
Costs And Benefits ◽  
Market For Corporate Control ◽  
Monitoring Mechanism ◽  
Three Stage Least Squares

We provide arguments and present evidence that corporate governance structures are composed of interrelated mechanisms, which are in turn endogenous responses to the costs and benefits firms face when they choose those mechanisms. Examining board structures and the use of corporate charter provisions in a sample of more than 2,300 firms over a four-year period, we find that firms cluster in their use of governance mechanisms. In particular, the set of charter provisions that firms use, as measured by the Gompers et al. (2003) G Index, is associated with board structure, with the laws of the state in which the firm is incorporated, and with firm and industry characteristics. We also find that some governance structures appear to serve as substitutes. Specifically, firms that have powerful boards (as measured by board independence) also have the greatest number of charter provisions, suggesting that the market for corporate control is less effective as a monitoring mechanism for these firms. In contrast, firms that have less powerful boards tend to have few charter provisions, suggesting that the market for corporate control plays a greater monitoring role at such firms. To address potential endogeneity issues, we employ three-stage least squares analysis to estimate these relationships within a system of equations. Our results from this analysis are consistent with the hypothesis that powerful boards serve as a substitute for the market for corporate control. Finally, our findings suggest that causality runs from the board to the choice of charter provisions, but not vice versa.

SHARE REPURCHASES OF FAMILY FIRMS ON CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: EVIDENCE FROM TAIWAN

2021 ◽  
Vol 21 (1) ◽  
pp. 67-87
Author(s):  
Ling-Hui Chang ◽  
Shih-Shang Hsu ◽  
Mao-Wei Hung
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Family Firms ◽  
Share Repurchases

Transnational Corporate Governance: The State of the Art and Twenty-First-Century Challenges

2021 ◽  
pp. 614-646
Author(s):  
Dionysia Katelouzou ◽  
Peer Zumbansen
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Institutional Investors ◽  
Shareholder Wealth ◽  
Performance Measure ◽  
The State ◽  
First Century ◽  
Access To Health Services ◽  
Wide Range ◽  
Shareholder Wealth Maximization ◽  
Twenty First Century

This chapter explores corporate governance as a transnational regulatory field. Mirroring the rise in importance of the idea of shareholder wealth maximization as a firm’s definitive performance measure, corporate governance became a hotly contested field of competing visions of firms’ institutional and normative infrastructure in search of creating the most advantageous conditions to attract capital in volatile markets. This shift occurred at the same time that regulatory transformations in Western postindustrial societies since the early 1980s had begun to significantly shift public service provision and state-organized frameworks for old-age security guarantees and access to health services. Today’s corporate governance laboratory is a transnational force field, fought over by a host of different state and nonstate actors and also by private actors such as institutional investors. Meanwhile, following the financial crises in 2001, 2008 and 2020 and the simultaneously growing pressure on corporations from human rights, gender equality, and environmental groups, the corporate governance debate again is shifting. This time, a diversity of issues are being discussed under the corporate governance rubric, indicating a more comprehensive engagement with the firm’s purpose and functions and its societal obligations and responsibilities. Given the crucial role of firms as the residual claimants of a wide-ranging retreat of the state from its role in guaranteeing and providing a wide range of social functions, corporate governance is a mirror for the transformation of public and private power, and it has to address the twenty-first-century challenges, including global value chains and the proliferation of institutional investors, unfolding on a planetary scale.

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