“We’ll see you in court!”

Is there a distinctive normative force of law itself, as opposed to whatever moral or prudential reasons might speak on behalf of law? Answering this question requires attention to law as a distinctive kind of social scheme, which limits the number of degrees of freedom in interpersonal interactions and thereby structures expectations and practices in ways that create “opportunity paths” that would not otherwise exist. Such rule by law can be given a purely instrumental, external normative ground, as Hobbes argued. However, as he also argued, rules are not self-enforcing, so that the well-functioning and stability of a system of rule by law depends upon broad social presence of an array of evaluative attitudes that could robustly sustain playing one’s part in a scheme of self-constraint and mutualconstraint—rule by law as an explanatory kind. An expansion of these constraints to include those in power can underpin rule of law, giving it distinctive social dynamics as well as a distinctive character as a normative kind distinct from morality or prudence, and help explain why certain human rights have been viewed as part of the rule of law.