Prokofiev, Soviet Influence, and the Music World in Stalinist Central Europe

2020 ◽  
pp. 405-422
Author(s):  
David G. Tompkins
Keyword(s):  
World War Ii ◽  
Soviet Union ◽  
Central Europe ◽  
The United States ◽  
Sergei Prokofiev ◽  
The West ◽  
Central European ◽  
The Soviet Union ◽  
Red Army ◽  
Definition Of

In the aftermath of World War II, the Red Army as a symbol of power was supported in many other arenas so as to counteract the rival influence of the United States on Central Europe. The Soviet Union brought new urgency to these efforts from 1948, with music—and culture more broadly—providing a case for Russia’s attractiveness and superiority with respect to the West. This chapter discusses the nature and scope of Soviet influence in the Central European music world through the examples of East Germany and Poland, and through the prism of the music and persona of Sergei Prokofiev. After his return to the USSR in 1936, Prokofiev, along with Shostakovich, became associated with the very definition of what made music Soviet and thus worthy of emulation. And even more than Shostakovich, Prokofiev and his music functioned as powerful but malleable symbols that could be appropriated by all Soviet actors for their own ends.

Choice in the West

1953 ◽  
Vol 5 (2) ◽  
pp. 133-167
Author(s):  
S. Bernard
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
World War Ii ◽  
Soviet Union ◽  
The United States ◽  
The Political ◽  
World War ◽  
The West ◽  
Political Situation ◽  
The Soviet Union ◽  
Working Out

The advent of a new administration in the United States and the passage of seven years since the end of World War II make it appropriate to review the political situation which has developed in Europe during that period and to ask what choices now are open to the West in its relations with the Soviet Union.The end of World War II found Europe torn between conflicting conceptions of international politics and of the goals that its members should seek. The democratic powers, led by the United States, viewed the world in traditional, Western, terms. The major problem, as they saw it, was one of working out a moral and legal order to which all powers could subscribe, and in which they would live. Quite independently of the environment, they assumed that one political order was both more practicable and more desirable than some other, and that their policies should be directed toward its attainment.

Why Can't Private Art “Trophies” Go Home from the War?

2010 ◽  
Vol 17 (2) ◽  
pp. 257-290 ◽  
Author(s):  
Konstantin Akinsha
Keyword(s):  
World War Ii ◽  
Soviet Union ◽  
The United States ◽  
Cultural Property ◽  
Federal Law ◽  
Public Attention ◽  
The Soviet Union ◽  
Art Works ◽  
Red Army ◽  
Cover Art

AbstractThis article is dedicated to the collection from the Bremen Kunsthalle, comprising 1715 drawings, 50 paintings, and about 3000 prints found by Soviet troops in castle of Karnzow near Berlin in May 1945. The collection was not seized by Soviet trophy brigades but was looted by soldiers and officers of the 38th Field Engineers' Brigade of the Red Army.After their return to the USSR and demobilization, some of the officers donated their loot to different museums around the Soviet Union. One of the most important parts of the collection, with 362 drawings and two paintings—among them works of Dürer, Rembrandt, Goya, and Van Gogh, was appropriated by Captain Viktor Baldin. In 1948 Baldin deposited his loot in the A. V. Shchusev State Research Museum of Architecture in Moscow. Later Baldin became the director of the museum and advocated return of the art to its rightful owners.Since the days of Gorbachev's perestroika, these art works have frequently attracted public attention and provoked fierce debates. The Federal Law on Cultural Valuables adopted in 1998 did not cover art works looted by private individuals. Rather, such conflicts have to be solved within the framework of Russian criminal law.In contrast, other works of art from the same Bremen Kunsthalle collection were restituted from the United States, Ukraine, and Estonia. Another 101 drawings and prints of the collection, seized by another member of Baldin's brigade, were returned from Russia to Bremen in 2000, but that was in “exchange” for an original mosaic from the legendary Amber Chamber. However, despite more than 20 years of efforts by German officials and endless negotiations, the Baldin Collection remains in the Russian Federation. The return of those stolen drawings any time soon now looks highly improbable. The case of the Baldin Collection became the most striking example of the Russian nonrestitution of cultural property looted during World War II.

A Symbol of Appeasement

2018 ◽  
pp. 96-114
Author(s):  
Laurence R. Jurdem
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
World War Ii ◽  
Soviet Union ◽  
The United States ◽  
General Assembly ◽  
The West ◽  
Policy Makers ◽  
The Soviet Union ◽  
New States ◽  
Independence Movements

One of the major concerns of writers for the publications of conservative opinion was the growth of leftist ideology that permeated much of the newly independent Third World. Many of the activist leaders who led their nations’ independence movements in Asia, Africa, and Latin America during the decades following World War II viewed the Soviet Union as an ally that was philosophically opposed to European imperialism. It was within the General Assembly of the United Nations that these new states began to exert their influence. Since the founding of the institution in 1945, the United States had been able to exert a large amount of influence in the major decisions taken up by the UN. The independent nations that now occupied the diplomatic chamber were determined to redress the economic injustices they believed had been committed against them by the West. Commentators who contributed to these publications were frustrated by the inability of American policy makers to stand up to the rampant criticism of the United States and its democratic values and believed that this represented another example of the decline of US foreign policy.

The Anti-Hitler Coalition: From Enmity to Military Alliance — A Formula for Success

2020 ◽  
Vol 12 (3) ◽  
pp. 7-44
Author(s):  
A. Yu. Borisov
Keyword(s):  
World War Ii ◽  
Soviet Union ◽  
World Order ◽  
The United States ◽  
Nazi Germany ◽  
World War ◽  
Military Alliance ◽  
The Soviet Union ◽  
Red Army ◽  
History Of

It is unfortunate to note again today that World War II did not end, it continues in the form of the war of memory. Politicians and scholars who stand as ideological successors of collaborators are trying to rewrite the history of those tragic days, to downplay the role of the Soviet Union in the victory over fascism. They try to revive certain political myths, which have been debunked long ago, that the Soviet Union and the Nazi Germany bear equal responsibility for the outbreak of World War II, that the Red Army did not liberate Eastern Europe but ‘occupied’ it. In order to combat these attempts it is necessary to examine once again a turbulent history of the inter-war period and, particularly, the reasons why all attempts to form a united antifascist front had failed in the 1930s, but eventually led to the formation of the anti-Hitler coalition.The paper focuses on a complex set of political considerations, including cooperation and confrontation, mutual suspicions and a fervent desire to find an ally in the face of growing international tensions, which all together determined the dynamics of relations within a strategic triangle of the Soviet Union — the United States — Great Britain in the late 1930s and early 1940s. The paper shows how all attempts to establish a collective security system during the prewar period had shattered faced with the policy of appeasement, which allowed the Nazi Germany to occupy much of Europe. Only the Soviet Union’s entry into the war changed the course of the conflict and made a decisive contribution to the victory over fascist aggressors. The author emphasizes that at such crucial moment of history I.V. Stalin, F.D. Roosevelt and W. Churchill raised to that challenge, demonstrating realism, common sense and willingness to cooperate. Although within the anti-Hitler coalition there was a number of pending issues, which triggered tensions between the Allies, their leaders managed to move beyond old grievances, ideological differences and short-term political interests, to realize that they have a common strategic goal in the struggle against Nazism. According to the author, this is the foundation for success of the anti-Hitler coalition and, at the same time, the key lesson for contemporary politicians. The very emergence of the anti-Hitler coalition represented a watershed in the history of the 20th century, which has determined a way forward for the whole humanity and laid the foundations for the world order for the next fifty years.

Trust and Transparency at the CSCE, 1969–1975

2016 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michael Cotey Morgan
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
World War Ii ◽  
Soviet Union ◽  
International Security ◽  
The United States ◽  
State Sovereignty ◽  
World War ◽  
Member States ◽  
The Soviet Union ◽  
Definition Of

This chapter examines the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) from 1969 to 1975. It contends that trust was both a tool and objective of the conference, detailing how, even in the absence of trust, a major international agreement was concluded with the Helsinki Final Act of 1975, the outcome of the CSCE talks. In a clear attempt to advance their respective interests, Warsaw Pact member states focused on state sovereignty and the immutability of post-World War II European borders as a cornerstone of their definition of international security, whereas North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) member states emphasized transparency, freer movement, and human rights, as well as confidence-building measures. As this chapter argues, the “tangled lines of trust and distrust” at the CSCE among the United States, the Western European countries, the neutral states, and the Soviet Union were incredibly complex, but they eventually secured the conference's success.

USSR in World War II

2020 ◽  
Vol 13 (4) ◽  
pp. 7-51
Author(s):  
M. Yu. Myagkov
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
World War Ii ◽  
Great Britain ◽  
Soviet Union ◽  
Large Scale ◽  
The United States ◽  
Peace Treaty ◽  
World War ◽  
The Soviet Union ◽  
Red Army

The article offers an overview of modern historical data on the origins, causes of World War II, the decisive role of the USSR in its victorious end, and also records the main results and lessons of World War II.Hitler's Germany was the main cause of World War II. Nazism, racial theory, mixed with far-reaching geopolitical designs, became the combustible mixture that ignited the fire of glob­al conflict. The war with the Soviet Union was planned to be waged with particular cruelty.The preconditions for the outbreak of World War II were the humiliating provisions of the Versailles Peace Treaty for the German people, as well as the attitude of the "Western de­mocracies" to Russia after 1917 and the Soviet Union as an outcast of world development. Great Britain, France, the United States chose for themselves a policy of ignoring Moscow's interests, they were more likely to cooperate with Hitler's Germany than with Soviet Russia. It was the "Munich Agreement" that became the point of no return to the beginning of the Second World War. Under these conditions, for the USSR, its own security and the conclusion of a non-aggression pact with Germany began to come to the fore, defining the "spheres of interests" of the parties in order to limit the advance of German troops towards the Soviet borders in the event of German aggression against Poland. The non-aggression pact gave the USSR just under two years to rebuild the army and consolidate its defensive potential and pushed the Soviet borders hundreds of kilometers westward. The signing of the Pact was preceded by the failure in August 1939 of the negotiations between the military mis­sions of Britain, France and the USSR, although Moscow took the Anglo-French-Soviet nego­tiations with all seriousness.The huge losses of the USSR in the summer of 1941 are explained by the following circum­stances: before the war, a large-scale modernization of the Red Army was launched, a gradu­ate of a military school did not have sufficient experience in managing an entrusted unit by June 22, 1941; the Red Army was going to bleed the enemy in border battles, stop it with short counterattacks by covering units, carry out defensive operations, and then strike a de­cisive blow into the depths of the enemy's territory, so the importance of a multi-echeloned long-term defense in 1941 was underestimated by the command of the Red Army and it was not ready for it; significant groupings of the Western Special Military District were drawn into potential salients, which was used by the Germans at the initial stage of the war; Stalin's fear of provoking Hitler to start a war led to slowness in making the most urgent and necessary decisions to bring troops to combat readiness.The Allies delayed the opening of the second front for an unreasonably long time. They, of course, achieved outstanding success in the landing operation in France, however, the en­emy's losses in only one Soviet strategic operation in the summer of 1944 ("Bagration") are not inferior, and even exceed, the enemy’s losses on the second front. One of the goals of "Bagration" was to help the Allies.Soviet soldiers liberated Europe at the cost of their lives. At the same time, Moscow could not afford to re-establish a cordon sanitaire around its borders after the war, so that anti- Soviet forces would come to power in the border states. The United States and Great Britain took all measures available to them to quickly remove from the governments of Italy, France and other Western states all the left-wing forces that in 1944-1945 had a serious impact on the politics of their countries.

Cold War Exiles and the CIA

2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Benjamin Tromly
Keyword(s):  
World War Ii ◽  
Cold War ◽  
Soviet Union ◽  
The United States ◽  
West Germany ◽  
United States Government ◽  
Home Base ◽  
The Soviet Union ◽  
The Cold War ◽  
Secret War

During the height of the Cold War in the 1950s, the United States government unleashed covert operations intended to weaken the Soviet Union. As part of these efforts, the CIA undertook support of Russian exiles, populations uprooted either during World War II or by the Russian Revolution decades before. No one seemed better prepared to fight in the American secret war against communism than the uprooted Russians, whom the CIA directed to carry out propaganda, espionage, and subversion operations from their home base in West Germany. Yet the American engagement of Russian exiles had unpredictable outcomes. Drawing on recently declassified and previously untapped sources, Cold War Exiles and the CIA examines how the CIA’s Russian operations became entangled with the internal struggles of Russia abroad and also the espionage wars of the superpowers in divided Germany. What resulted was a transnational political sphere involving different groups of Russian exiles, American and German anti-communists, and spies operating on both sides of the Iron Curtain. Inadvertently, CIA’s patronage of Russian exiles forged a complex sub-front in the wider Cold War, demonstrating the ways in which the hostilities of the Cold War played out in ancillary conflicts involving proxies and non-state actors.

Military Technology Races

1999 ◽  
Vol 53 (3) ◽  
pp. 537-565 ◽  
Author(s):  
Vally Koubi
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
World War Ii ◽  
Soviet Union ◽  
The United States ◽  
Military Technology ◽  
The Soviet Union ◽  
International Distribution ◽  
Strategic Defense ◽  
Distribution Of Power ◽  
The Military

Because of the nature of modern weapons, significant innovations in arms technology have the potential to induce dramatic changes in the international distribution of power. Consider, for example, the “strategic defense initiative” (SDI), a program initiated by the United States in the early 1980s. Had the program been successfully completed, it might have led to a substantial devaluation of Soviet nuclear capabilities and put the United States in a very dominant position. It should not then come as a surprise that interstate rivalry, especially among super powers, often takes the form of a race for technological superiority. Mary Acland-Hood claims that although the United States and the Soviet Union together accounted for roughly half of the world's military expenditures in the early 1980s, their share of world military research and development (R&D) expenditures was about 80 percent. As further proof of the perceived importance of R&D, note that whereas the overall U.S. defense budget increased by 38 percent (from $225.1 billion to $311.6 billion in real terms) from 1981 to 1987, military R&D spending increased by 100 percent (from $20.97 billion to $41.96 billion). Moreover, before World War II military R&D absorbed on average less than 1 percent of the military expenditure of major powers, but since then it has grown to 11–13 percent. The emphasis on military technology is bound to become more pronounced in the future as R&D becomes the main arena for interstate competition.

The Anti-Aryan Moment: Decolonization, Diplomacy, and Race in Late Pahlavi Iran

2021 ◽  
Vol 53 (4) ◽  
pp. 691-702
Author(s):  
Firoozeh Kashani-Sabet
Keyword(s):  
South Carolina ◽  
World War Ii ◽  
Cold War ◽  
Soviet Union ◽  
The United States ◽  
World War ◽  
The Soviet Union ◽  
The Us ◽  
Anglo American ◽  
The Cold War

In 1946, the entertainer and activist Paul Robeson pondered America's intentions in Iran. In what was to become one of the first major crises of the Cold War, Iran was fighting a Soviet aggressor that did not want to leave. Robeson posed the question, “Is our State Department concerned with protecting the rights of Iran and the welfare of the Iranian people, or is it concerned with protecting Anglo-American oil in that country and the Middle East in general?” This was a loaded question. The US was pressuring the Soviet Union to withdraw its troops after its occupation of the country during World War II. Robeson wondered why America cared so much about Soviet forces in Iranian territory, when it made no mention of Anglo-American troops “in countries far removed from the United States or Great Britain.” An editorial writer for a Black journal in St. Louis posed a different variant of the question: Why did the American secretary of state, James F. Byrnes, concern himself with elections in Iran, Arabia or Azerbaijan and yet not “interfere in his home state, South Carolina, which has not had a free election since Reconstruction?”

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