Absence of Consent

2021 ◽  
pp. 210-237
Author(s):  
Timothy Macklem

Consent has come to be the guardian and gatekeeper of significant elements of our personal integrity. Yet there remains uncertainty as to exactly what consent means. This paper argues that consent marks the divide between the active and the passive. We tend to assume that in our engagements with others, active and passive, there are only two possibilities, consent and non-consent, when in fact there are three. When an agent engages with a patient consent is vital, because the alternative is non-consent. When two people interact, however, consent has nothing to contribute. The law, for excellent reasons, ignores this nuance, so as to treat every absence of consent as non-consent. It does so in order to arm potential victims with a weapon for their protection. To grasp the full significance of that weapon, and to secure proper scrutiny of interaction in other settings, we need to be alive to the reality that the law dispenses with.

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
YuJin Chung ◽  
JinHo Beom ◽  
JiEun Lee ◽  
Incheol Park ◽  
Junho Cho

Abstract Background The Life Extension Medical Decision law enacted on February 4, 2018 in South Korea was the first to consider the suspension of nonsensical life-prolonging treatment, and its enactment raised big controversy in Korean society. However, there is no study on whether the actual life-prolonging treatment for patients has decreased after enforcing the law. This study aimed to compare the provision of patient consent before and after the enforcement of the law among cancer patients who visited a tertiary university hospital's emergency room to understand the effects of the law on cancer patients' clinical care. Methods This retrospective single cohort study included advanced cancer patients over 19 years of age who visited the emergency room at a tertiary university hospital. The two study periods were as follows: from February 2017 to January 2018 (before) and from May 2018 to April 2019 (after). The primary outcome was the average length of hospital stay. The consent rate for cardiopulmonary resuscitation (CPR), intubation, continuous renal replacement therapy (CRRT), and intensive care unit (ICU) admission were the secondary outcomes. Results The average length of hospital stay decreased after the law was enforced, from 4 days to 2 days (p= 0.001). The rates of direct transfers to secondary and nursing hospitals increased from 8.2% to 21.2% (p=0.001) and from 1.0% to 9.7%, respectively (p<0.001). The rate of provision of consent for admission to the ICU decreased from 6.7% to 2.3% (p=0.032). For CPR and CRRT, the rate of provision of consent decreased from 1.0% to 0.0% and from 13.9% to 8.8%, respectively, but the differences were not significant (p=0.226 and p=0.109, respectively). Conclusion According to previous research, for patients wishing only conservative treatment, the reduction in hospital stays at tertiary hospitals ultimately reduces the physical, emotional, financial burdens and also improves the quality of end-of-life at home or in a hospice facility. In this context, this research ultimately show that the purpose of the LEMD law has been achieved. Further research in several hospitals including those patients who completed the consent after hospitalization is needed to generalize the clinical implication of the LEMD law.


2020 ◽  
Vol 16 (1) ◽  
pp. 48-52
Author(s):  
John Finch

In BJNN 15(4) and BJNN 15(5), John Finch looked in detail at the role of the Mental Capacity Act 2005 and its accompanying Code in the practice of neuroscience nurses. He concluded, as have others, that the guidance offered by the Act and the Code falls short of what neuroscience nurses need in their practice. In this article, he turns his attention to the treatment of patients who can and do consent to proposed treatment. The law relating to such patients in this matter offers neither an act nor a code. The law is to be found in court decisions. It might, at first sight, appear that a practice situation in which a patient with undoubted mental capacity or, at least, sufficient mental capacity to understand and accept what is proposed, presents no legal problem. But a closer examination of mental processes encountered in patients who may be in pain, distress and pressing need reveals that communication between the treater and the treated may be subtle and complex, and that the meeting of minds required in law to ensure that a patient has genuinely agreed to a detailed proposal is anything but simple.


1987 ◽  
Vol 25 (2) ◽  
pp. 259-281 ◽  
Author(s):  
Otwin Marenin

At the conclusion of a meeting of the Armed Forces Ruling Council in October 1986, President Ibrahim Babangida turned to the Inspector- General of the Nigeria Police Force, Etim Inyang, and asked, ‘My friend, where is Anini?’. At about this time, Nigerian newspapers and journals were publishing numerous articles and editorials on the ‘Anini Challenge’, the ‘Anini Saga’, the ‘Anini Factor’, ‘Lawrence Anini – the Man, the Myth’, ‘Anini, Jack the Ripper’, and ‘Lawrence Anini: A Robin Hood in Bendel’. The Guardian asked, almost plaintively, ‘Will they ever find Anini, “The Law”?’, and when he was finally captured in early December, the cover of the magazine Thisweek blared forth, above a picture of the badly injured criminal in his hospital bed, ‘Anini. Face to Face with The Law’.


1979 ◽  
Vol 41 (1) ◽  
pp. 3-37
Author(s):  
Alpheus Thomas Mason

Every Court is the product of its time, reflecting predilections of fallible men in black robes. While wearing the magical habiliments of the law, Supreme Court justices take sides on controversial issues. From John Marshall to Warren Burger, the Court has been the guardian of some particular interest and the promoter of preferred values. Thus judicial activism, of whatever orientation, involves a paradox at the heart of constitutional orthodoxy—the Supreme Court considered as the mouthpiece of self-interpreting, self-enforcing law.


BMJ ◽  
2005 ◽  
Vol 331 (7515) ◽  
pp. 522.2
Author(s):  
Alexander S J Shaw
Keyword(s):  

2021 ◽  
Vol 5 (2) ◽  
pp. 151-159
Author(s):  
Xavier Nugraha ◽  
Kusuma Wardani Raharjo ◽  
Ahmad Ardhiansyah ◽  
Alip Pamungkas Raharjo

The Constitutional Court as the guardian of the constitution and the guardian of human rights has the duty to ensure that the Law does not contradict the constitution and does not violate human rights. One of the manifestations of this can be seen in the Constitutional Court Decision Number 1 / PUU-X / 2013, where the Constitutional Court removed the element "Some other deeds or unpleasant treatment/act" in Article 335 paragraph (1) of the Criminal Code. With the removal of the core elements of Article 335 paragraph (1) of the Criminal Code, raises questions related to the existence of the offense whether it still exists or not. Based on this, this study will examine 1) Application of Article 335 of the Criminal Code Before the Decision of the Constitutional Court Number 1 / PUU-X / 2013 and 2.) Application of Article 335 of the Criminal Code After the Decision of the Constitutional Court Number 1 / PUU-X / 2013. This research is a normative legal research with a statute approach, conceptual approach, and case approach. Based on this research, it was found that after the Constitutional Court Decision Number 1 / PUU-X / 2013 that offenses of unpleasant acts had been reconstructed into forced offenses.


2019 ◽  
Vol 1 (2) ◽  
pp. 902
Author(s):  
Rhenal Cokronegoro ◽  
Mulati .

Children are gifts from God Almighty that we must guard and that we must protect, because children are also human beings who have rights and dignity as human beings. One of the rights of the child is the right to enjoy the wealth of his parents, including inheritance. Many children whose parents experience problems, such as divorce or one or both parents die. In order for a child to do a legal act, he needs a guardian in carrying out legal actions. Guardians here have a function to represent all children's needs in carrying out legal actions. In guardianship, there is a guardian’s overseer whose function is to oversee the guardian in terms of managing the assets of the child, in this case is the Heritage Hall. The Heritage Hall has two functions, namely as guardians of supervisors in charge of guarding guardians, as well as temporary guardians. The problem here is that the Heritage Hall is not cared for by the community, so not all guardianship verdicts use the trustees in it. whereas the Law clearly stipulates that the Heritage Hall must be the trustee in every trusteeship order ordered in the State of Indonesia.


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document