Moral Status and Moral Significance

2021 ◽  
pp. 108-122
Author(s):  
Ingmar Persson
Keyword(s):  
Moral Status ◽  
Moral Judgments ◽  
The Other ◽  
Moral Significance ◽  
Fundamental Notion ◽  
Other Hand

This chapter discusses the relations between moral status (or standing) and what the author calls moral significance. Something has moral significance just in case it morally counts for its own sake, or is something that must be taken into consideration in itself when moral judgments about what ought or ought not to be done are made. The chapter argues that the moral status of something is dependent on what is morally significant about it. Nothing can have moral status if there is not anything morally significant about it. On the other hand, something can be morally significant, even though it does not have moral status. The notion of moral significance is then the more fundamental notion and the notion of moral status could be dispensed with. In fact, it would simplify and clarify matters if it were dispensed with.

scholarly journals DET ZOOFILE ÅRHUNDREDE

1996 ◽  
Author(s):  
Anne Knudsen
Keyword(s):  
20Th Century ◽  
Moral Status ◽  
Logical Consequence ◽  
The Other ◽  
Other Hand ◽  
The Status ◽  
The One ◽  
Point Of Departure

Anne Knudsen: The Century of Zoophilia Taking as her point of departure the protests against a dying child having his last wish fulfilled because his wish was to kill a bear, the author argues that animals have achieved a higher moral status than that of humans during the 20th century. The status of animals (and of “nature”) is seen as a consequence of their muteness which on the one hånd makes it impossible for animals to lie, and which on the other hånd allows humans to imagine what animals would say, if they spoke. The development toward zoophilia is explained as a a logical consequence of the cultural naturalisation of humans, and the author draws the conclusion that we may end up entirely without animals as a category. This hypothetical situation will lead to juridical as well as philosophical complications.

Pattern and Theme in Chrétien's ‘Yvain’

Traditio ◽  
1974 ◽  
Vol 30 ◽  
pp. 145-189
Author(s):  
Edward C. Schweitzer
Keyword(s):  
Essential Elements ◽  
The Other ◽  
Common Source ◽  
Moral Significance ◽  
Other Hand ◽  
Ultimate Source ◽  
Christian Psychology ◽  
Erec Et Enide ◽  
Thematic Coherence

Yvain, Chrétien's masterpiece, has been conventionally seen as a counterpoise to Erec et Enide, attempting to reconcile the conflicting claims of love and chivalry. The several versions of this interpretation are misleading, if not quite wrong, because they divert our attention from what is special about Yvain to what it has in common with Erec. In all of them the lion is peripheral, although for Chrétien himself the lion gave the romance its name: Le Chevalier au lion. I intend to argue that Yvain is rather a critique of the Arthurian ideal, using patristic — or, if one prefers, Christian — psychology to show its hero fall victim to the sins of superbia, invidia, and ira in the first part and triumph over them in the second. Chrétien, I propose, made the lion a symbol of ira as a power of the soul and as ambivalent emotion, so that the two-part figure of the Chevalier au Lion — Yvain with his lion — dramatizes the restoration of ideal order within Yvain himself. Since the story of Yvain derives almost certainly from a Celtic source, Chrétien's originality consists not in the main events but in their disposition and in the emphasis assigned them in order to reveal their psychological and moral significance. I shall use comparisons with the Welsh story of Owein and the Lady of the Fountain to set that originality in relief, for whether the Welsh romance itself is the ultimate source of Yvain or both develop from some common source, it very likely approximates the form of the story prior to Chrétien's revision. It contains all the essential elements of Chrétien's romance — except Yvain's meeting with the hermit and the dispute between the daughters of the Lord of Noire Espine — masterly in detail but loosely connected, without moral focus or thematic coherence. Yvain, on the other hand, is distinguished, as this essay will try to show, by Chrétien's use of a progression of parallel incidents, together with the symbolic figure of the lion, to reveal gradually the meaning of the whole.

Two-Tier Moral Codes

1989 ◽  
Vol 7 (1) ◽  
pp. 112-132 ◽  
Author(s):  
Holly M. Smith
Keyword(s):  
Moral Status ◽  
The Other ◽  
Moral Principle ◽  
Moral Code ◽  
Moral Principles ◽  
Other Hand ◽  
Individual Actions ◽  
The One ◽  
In Virtue Of

A moral code consists of principles that assign moral status to individual actions – principles that evaluate acts as right or wrong, prohibited or obligatory, permissible or supererogatory. Many theorists have held that such principles must serve two distinct functions. On the one hand, they serve a theoretical function, insofar as they specify the characteristics in virtue of which acts possess their moral status. On the other hand, they serve a practical function, insofar as they provide an action-guide: a standard by reference to which a person can choose which acts to perform and which not. Although the theoretical and practical functions of moral principles are closely linked, it is not at all obvious that what enables a principle to fill one of these roles automatically equips it to fill the other. In this paper I shall briefly examine some of the reasons why a moral principle might fail to fill its practical role, i.e., be incapable of guiding decisions. I shall then sketch three common responses to this kind of failure, and examine in some detail the adequacy of one of the most popular of these responses.

On ‘Moral Expertise’

1978 ◽  
Vol 8 (1) ◽  
pp. 117-129 ◽  
Author(s):  
Béla Szabados
Keyword(s):  
Moral Judgments ◽  
The Other ◽  
Moral Code ◽  
Moral Philosopher ◽  
Moral Expertise ◽  
Other Hand ◽  
Moral Philosophers

Not so long ago it was fashionable to claim that it is not the moral philosopher's business to say what things are good or what actions we should perform. This view is succinctly stated by A. J. Ayer:There is a distinction, which is not always sufficiently marked, between the activity of a moralist, who sets out to elaborate a moral code, or to encourage its observance, and that of a moral philosopher, whose concern is not primarily to make moral judgments but to analyse their nature.On the other hand, in direct opposition to this, recently many philosophers actively moralize, in the sense that they argue for substantive normative ethical positions. In doing this they tend to assume but not to explore seriously two views: (1) that the notion of moral expertise is unproblematic, and (2) that moral philosophers in particular are moral experts. My aim in this paper is to promote the exploration of these questions. (1) is logically prior to (2). Nevertheless I begin with discussing (2); for puzzles about expertise in morals naturally emerge when one examines the credentials of candidates for the job.

Dignity and Equality in Pufendorf’s Natural Law Theory

2019 ◽  
pp. 147-168 ◽  
Author(s):  
Simone Zurbuchen
Keyword(s):  
Social Inequality ◽  
Natural Law ◽  
Moral Status ◽  
The Other ◽  
Moral Standing ◽  
Human Beings ◽  
Other Hand ◽  
Natural Law Theory ◽  
The One ◽  
In Virtue Of

The chapter explores the ambiguity of the notion of dignity in Pufendorf’s natural law theory. On the one hand, dignity (dignatio) denotes the moral status of human beings in virtue of which they have to treat each other as equals. On the other hand, Pufendorf holds dignity and natural equality to be compatible with social inequality, notably with servitude and slavery. Moreover, when he deals with the comparative value and reputation (existimatio) of human beings, he admits that their moral status is conditioned by their readiness to behave as social beings. Human beings can thus lose their basic moral standing and are then considered as common enemies of all.

scholarly journals An Internalist Dilemma—and an Externalist Solution

2013 ◽  
Vol 10 (1) ◽  
pp. 25-51 ◽  
Author(s):  
Caj Strandberg
Keyword(s):  
Moral Judgments ◽  
The Other ◽  
Strong Version ◽  
Conversational Implicature ◽  
Moral Language ◽  
Other Hand ◽  
The One

In this paper, I argue that internalism about moral judgments and motivation faces a dilemma. On the one hand, a strong version of internalism is able to explain our notion of the connection between moral language and motivation, but fails to account for the possibility that people who suffer from certain mental conditions need not be accordingly motivated. On the other hand, a weaker form of internalism avoids this difficulty, but fails to explain our notion of the connection between moral judgments and motivation. Moreover, I argue that externalism in conjunction with a pragmatic claim that employs Grice’s concept of generalized conversational implicature is able to account for both these considerations and that it consequently avoids the dilemma. Thus, there is reason to think that this view is preferable to internalism.

scholarly journals The Reception of the Non-Human Living Beings in Philosophical and Practical Approaches

2020 ◽  
pp. 18
Author(s):  
Željko Kaluđerović
Keyword(s):  
Moral Status ◽  
Animal Ethics ◽  
Applied Ethics ◽  
The Other ◽  
Other Hand ◽  
The Difference

In this paper, the author explores the reception of the non-human living beings in modern philosophical and practical approaches. The analysis is aimed at examining both the views of the representatives of classical anthropocentrism, as well as the theses of the representatives of various non-anthropocentric teachings. Anthropocentrism is, in short, a worldview that is based on Aristotle's vision of man as a special being among other natural beings. Advocates of the questioning of the dominant anthropocentric perspective of the cosmos, on the other hand, are trying to establish the new relation by relativizing of the difference between humans and non-human living beings, by attributing specifically human qualities and categories, such as dignity, moral status and rights, as well as feelings, memories, communication, consciousness and thinking to non-human living beings. Non-anthropocentrists, consequently, believe that it is necessary to relax the usual strict hierarchy among beings in nature, that is, the discrediting of animals in relation to man, and that within the applied ethics, alias bioethics, it is possible, even necessary, to establish the "animal ethics".

De Rerum Natura

ruffin_darden ◽  
2004 ◽  
Vol 4 ◽  
pp. 201-220
Author(s):  
Edwin M. Hartman ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Moral Responsibility ◽  
Moral Status ◽  
Vantage Point ◽  
The Other ◽  
Good Thing ◽  
De Rerum Natura ◽  
Other Hand

Aristotelian naturalism is a good vantage point from which to consider the moral implications of evolution. Sociobiologists err in arguing that evolution is the basis for morality: not all or only moral features and institutions are selected for. Nor does the longevity of an institution argue for its moral status. On the other hand, facts about human capacities can have implications concerning human obligations, as Aristotle suggests. Aristotle’s eudaimonistic approach to ethics suggests that the notion of interests is far subtler than many have realized, and leaves open the possibility that cooperativeness may be adaptive, virtuous, and a good thing for the agent. Lawrence and Nohria argue along remarkably similar lines, and they provide evidence against those who would question the existence of character. But promising as the Aristotelian approach is, it seems to give an inadequate account of our moral responsibility to those who are not members of our community.

Law's Halo

1986 ◽  
Vol 4 (1) ◽  
pp. 15-30 ◽  
Author(s):  
Donald H. Regan
Keyword(s):  
Moral Obligation ◽  
Error Theory ◽  
The Other ◽  
Historical Account ◽  
Moral Significance ◽  
Social Fact ◽  
Other Hand ◽  
Pure Error ◽  
The Law ◽  
Just Society

Like many people these days, I believe there is no general moral obligation to obey the law. I shall explain why there is no such moral obligation – and I shall clarify what I mean when I say there is no moral obligation to obey the law – as we proceed. But also like many people, I am unhappy with a position that would say there was no moral obligation to obey the law and then say no more about the law's moral significance. In our thinking about law in a resonably just society, we have a strong inclination to invest law with a sort of moral halo. It does not feel right to suggest that law is a morally neutral social fact, nor to suggest that law is merely a useful social technique.In this essay, I shall try to account in part for law's moral halo. (Let me emphasize “in part”; I do not purport to say everything that could be said.) Because I share the widespread inclination to invest law with this halo, I shall not be interested in a merely historical account of how we come to see law with a halo – a pure “error theory” of law's halo, if you will. I want to justify the halo. On the other hand, the main way to justify the halo is to get clear just what law's moral significance is. It is unlikely that at the end of the process of clarification the halo will have exactly the shape or luminance that it had at the beginning.

A study of cometary eruptions through OH radio-lines

1999 ◽  
Vol 173 ◽  
pp. 249-254
Author(s):  
A.M. Silva ◽  
R.D. Miró
Keyword(s):  
Short Duration ◽  
Growth Curves ◽  
The Other ◽  
Initial Mass ◽  
Radio Lines ◽  
Other Hand ◽  
Sudden Rise

AbstractWe have developed a model for theH2OandOHevolution in a comet outburst, assuming that together with the gas, a distribution of icy grains is ejected. With an initial mass of icy grains of 108kg released, theH2OandOHproductions are increased up to a factor two, and the growth curves change drastically in the first two days. The model is applied to eruptions detected in theOHradio monitorings and fits well with the slow variations in the flux. On the other hand, several events of short duration appear, consisting of a sudden rise ofOHflux, followed by a sudden decay on the second day. These apparent short bursts are frequently found as precursors of a more durable eruption. We suggest that both of them are part of a unique eruption, and that the sudden decay is due to collisions that de-excite theOHmaser, when it reaches the Cometopause region located at 1.35 × 105kmfrom the nucleus.

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