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Published By Philosophy Documentation Center

1949-0240

ruffin_darden ◽  
2004 ◽  
Vol 4 ◽  
pp. 129-133
Author(s):  
David M. Messick ◽  

While there seems to be little controversy about whether there is a biological or evolutionary basis for human morality, in business and other endeavors, there is considerable controversy about the nature of this basis and the proper populations in which to study this foundation. Moreover, I suggest, the most fundamental element of this basis may be the tendency of humans and other species to experience the world in evaluative terms.


ruffin_darden ◽  
2004 ◽  
Vol 4 ◽  
pp. 189-199
Author(s):  
Sandra A. Waddock ◽  

These comments on Frederick’s “The Evolutionary Firm and Its Moral (Dis)Contents” focus on two dominant themes to provide a more optimistic perspective on Frederick’s conclusions. First is the need to take a systemic orientation at the societal and ecological levels to gain a perspective on ecologizing rather than economizing. Second, is the need to take a developmental perspective, on the assumption that evolution is still occurring, and that what may be needed to get humankind to the systemic/ecologizing orientation is a higher level of awareness, greater cognitive (and moral) development than is currently prevalent.


ruffin_darden ◽  
2004 ◽  
Vol 4 ◽  
pp. 145-176
Author(s):  
William C. Frederick ◽  

The business firm, called here the Evolutionary Firm, is shown to be a phenomenon of nature. The firm’s motives, organization, productivity, strategy, and moral significance are a direct outgrowth of natural evolution. Its managers, directors, and employees are natural agents enacting and responding to biological, physical, and ecological impulses inherited over evolutionary time from ancient human ancestors. The Evolutionary Firm’s moral posture is a function of its economizing success, competitive drive, quest for market dominance, social contracting skills, and the neural algorithms found in the minds of its executives and directing managers. Behavioral, organizational, and societal contradictions arise from the normal expression of these nature-based executive impulses, so that the business corporation cannot simultaneously satisfy society’s moral expectations and perform its nature-dictated economic functions.


ruffin_darden ◽  
2004 ◽  
Vol 4 ◽  
pp. 263-287
Author(s):  
Ronald K. Mitchell ◽  

This article investigates whether there is an underlying morality in the ways that human beings seek to obtain economic security within our imperfect economy, which can be illuminated through evolutionary biology research. Two research questions are the focus of the analysis: (1) What is the transaction cognitive machinery that is specialized for the entrepreneurial task of exchange-based security-seeking? and, (2) What are the moral implications of the acquisition and use of such transaction cognitions?Evolutionary biology research suggests within concepts that are more Darwin- v. Huxley-based, an underlying morality supportive of algorithm-governed economizing arising from the behaviors that are most worthy of long-term reproduction. Evolutionarily stable algorithm-enhanced security-seeking is argued to be a new view of entrepreneurship, but one that, somewhat ironically, is grounded in a primordially-based entrepreneurial morality that is at the core of economic security.


ruffin_darden ◽  
2004 ◽  
Vol 4 ◽  
pp. 93-128 ◽  
Author(s):  
Leda Cosmides ◽  

“Ought” cannot be derived from “is,” so why should facts about human nature be of interest to business ethicists? In this article, we discuss why the nature of human nature is relevant to anyone wishing to create a more just and humane workplace and society. We begin by presenting evolutionary psychology as a research framework, and then present three examples of research that illuminate various evolved cognitive programs. The first involves the cognitive foundations of trade, including a neurocognitive mechanism specialized for a form of moral reasoning: cheater detection. The second involves the moral sentiments triggered by participating in collective actions, which are relevant to organizational behavior. The third involves the evolved programs whereby our minds socially construct groups, and how these can be harnessed to reduce racism and foster true diversity in the workplace. In each case, we discuss how what has been learned about these evolved programs might inform the study and practice of business ethics.


ruffin_darden ◽  
2004 ◽  
Vol 4 ◽  
pp. 135-144
Author(s):  
Saras D. Sarasvathy ◽  

In this paper I develop a critique of the strong adaptationist view inherent in the work of Leda Cosmides and John Tooby, as presentedat the Ruffin Lectures series in 2002. My critique proceeds in two stages. In the first stage, I advance arguments as to why I find the particular adaptation story that the authors advance for their experimental results unpersuasive even when I fully accept the value of their experimental results. In the second stage, I grant them their adaptation story and critique the implications of such stories forbusiness ethics and for future research. In sum, I argue against recasting key problems in the social sciences to fit the use of toolsdeveloped in the so-called “hard” sciences. Instead, I urge that we deal with these problems on their own terms, i.e. through their basisin and dependence on deliberate social action.


ruffin_darden ◽  
2004 ◽  
Vol 4 ◽  
pp. 43-52 ◽  
Author(s):  
Joshua D. Margolis ◽  

Efforts to trace the evolutionary antecedents of human morality introduce challenges and opportunities for business ethics. The biological precedents of responsibility suggest that human tendencies to respond morally are deeply rooted. This does not mean, however, that those tendencies are always consistent with ends human beings seek to pursue. This paper investigates the conflicts that may arise between human beings’ moral predispositions and the purposes human beings pursue.


ruffin_darden ◽  
2004 ◽  
Vol 4 ◽  
pp. 7-41
Author(s):  
Jessica C. Flack ◽  
Frans B. M. De Waal ◽  

To what degree has biology influenced and shaped the development of moral systems? One way to determine the extent to which human moral systems might be the product of natural selection is to explore behaviour in other species that is analogous and perhaps homologous to our own. Many non-human primates, for example, have similar methods to humans for resolving, managing, and preventing conflicts of interests within their groups. Such methods, which include reciprocity and food sharing, reconciliation, consolation, conflict intervention, and mediation, are the very building blocks of moral systems in that they are based on and facilitate cohesion among individuals and reflect a concerted effort by community members to find shared solutions to social conflict. Furthermore, these methods of resource distribution and conflict resolution often require or make use of capacities for empathy, sympathy, and sometimes even community concern. Non-human primates in societies in which such mechanisms are present may not be exactly moral beings, but they do show signs of a sense of social regularity that—just like the norms and rules underlying human moral conduct—promotes a mutually satisfactory modus vivendi.


ruffin_darden ◽  
2004 ◽  
Vol 4 ◽  
pp. 1-5
Author(s):  
R. Edward Freeman ◽  
Patricia H. Werhane ◽  


ruffin_darden ◽  
2004 ◽  
Vol 4 ◽  
pp. 235-238
Author(s):  
Robert A. Phillips ◽  

There are explicit claims to Darwinian thinking in numerous fields of study. A common temptation associated with this method across disciplines is to call some attributes “natural” and others “cultural” in origin. But this distinction can be dangerous—particularly when applied to ethics. When employing the Darwinian method, ideas should be evaluated in the same way whether the characteristics are described as natural or as cultural. We should ascertain the moral usefulness of a trait irrespective of its genetic basis or lack thereof. The nature/culture distinction is irrelevant to ethics. If Darwinian thinking connotes or implies an important difference, it is a dangerous idea to moral theory. I don’t believe the method denotes such a distinction, and in fact helps ethicists ask and answer many interesting questions that would not have arisen without it. But great care should be taken.


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