The Permissive Intention Principle

2021 ◽  
pp. 35-50
Author(s):  
Tom Dougherty

This chapter exploits the Autonomy Argument to motivate the Permissive Intention Principle for the scope of consent. According to this principle, the scope of consent is determined by the mental content of a consent-giver’s ‘permissive intentions’. These are intentions to release another person from duties that they owe to the consent-giver. The Autonomy Argument supports the Permissive Intention Principle because there is little value to the consent-giver controlling whether they consent unless they also control what they consent to. Since permissive intentions are propositional attitudes, we can think of these intentions’ contents in contrastive terms. These intentions distinguish two sets of possible interactions, according to whether someone intends to permit these interactions. That gives us a clear way of thinking about the contents of permissive intentions without adopting the idea that someone consents ‘under a description’.

2019 ◽  
Vol 119 (3) ◽  
pp. 335-355
Author(s):  
Ethan Jerzak

Abstract I present a paradoxical combination of desires. I show why it's paradoxical, and consider ways of responding. The paradox saddles us with an unappealing trilemma: either we reject the possibility of the case by placing surprising restrictions on what we can desire, or we deny plausibly constitutive principles linking desires to the conditions under which they are satisfied, or we revise some bit of classical logic. I argue that denying the possibility of the case is unmotivated on any reasonable way of thinking about mental content, and rejecting those desire-satisfaction principles leads to revenge paradoxes. So the best response is a non-classical one, according to which certain desires are neither determinately satisfied nor determinately not satisfied. Thus, theorizing about paradoxical propositional attitudes helps constrain the space of possibilities for adequate solutions to semantic paradoxes more generally.


2020 ◽  
Vol 43 ◽  
Author(s):  
Myrthe Faber

Abstract Gilead et al. state that abstraction supports mental travel, and that mental travel critically relies on abstraction. I propose an important addition to this theoretical framework, namely that mental travel might also support abstraction. Specifically, I argue that spontaneous mental travel (mind wandering), much like data augmentation in machine learning, provides variability in mental content and context necessary for abstraction.


1970 ◽  
Vol 13 (3) ◽  
pp. 426-440
Author(s):  
Yuni Setia Ningsih

Family is a tiny scope that will bring someone to social life. The fine social order influenced by condition of every family inside it, because society is an accumulation and reflection of lifestyle, world view, even way of thinking of every individual in a family. Good or worse community at social life is depending on family condition. Family is playing important role to direct children to become good moral generation on and beneficial for society. Therefore, to realize that goal, children emotional education from early age at family scope is requirement. 


2019 ◽  
Vol 11 (3) ◽  
pp. 49
Author(s):  
Sarah Pawlett-Jackson

In this paper I offer a comparative evaluation of two types of “fundamental hope”, drawn from the writing of Rebecca Solnit and Rowan Williams respectively. Arguments can be found in both, I argue, for the foundations of a dispositional existential hope. Examining and comparing the differences between these accounts, I focus on the consequences implied for hope’s freedom and stability. I focus specifically on how these two accounts differ in their claims about the relationship between hope and (two types of) necessity. I argue that both Solnit and Williams base their claims for warranted fundamental hope on a sense of how reality is structured, taking this structure to provide grounds for a basic existential orientation that absolute despair is never the final word. For Solnit this structure is one of unpredictability; for Williams it is one of excess. While this investigation finds both accounts of fundamental hope to be plausible and insightful, I argue that Williams’s account is ultimately more satisfying on the grounds that it offers a realistic way of thinking about a hope necessitated by what it is responsive to, and more substantial in responding to what is necessary.


2014 ◽  
Vol 1 (1) ◽  
pp. 517-520
Author(s):  
Diana Elena Ranf ◽  
Elida-Tomiţa Todăriţa ◽  
Dănuţ Dumitru Dumitraşcu

AbstractEuropean funds are a development opportunity for the Romanian organizations. The research in the article aims to identify the main risk categories that the beneficiaries from Centre Region have faced, and also the effects of not considering certain risk categories in the stage of filling out the application form and also in the implementation stage of the projects have had on the development of these projects. Identifying how the organisations have managed projects during the development projects 2003-2013 finds its usefulness in the following period that is knocking on our doors: 2014-2020 that should find us better prepared and more capable of proving seriousness and professionalism. Therefore, training in projects should not end once the structural funds have been attracted, but it should be regarded as destined to modernize our way of thinking and actions in helping organisations develop their businesses.


2018 ◽  
Vol 69 (3) ◽  
pp. 302-315
Author(s):  
Juraj Dolník

Abstract Asking first about how the lexical meaning manifests itself as we experience it in a communicative event, the author explores the background of the ways in which we are able to perceive the meaning of words in texts. One useful way of thinking about how recipients react to the words in utterances is in terms of behavioural and actional lexical meaning. The first refers to the understanding of meaning, the second corresponds to interpretations of words when the recipient does not succeed in the process of natural understanding of words. These terms lead to questions about the rationality of language. One aspect of this rationality is the function of the intentional­emergent mechanism that adjusts the interplay of automatic and deliberate use of language. This mechanism has its roots in the fundamental human nature: we are behavioural­actional beings. Pragmatic analysis sheds light on how hearers understand and interpret what they hear with regard to their conceptual knowledge associated with words.


2020 ◽  
Vol 3 (3) ◽  
pp. 91-97
Author(s):  
Nigora Mukhamedova ◽  

The article deals with the issues based on the study of non-categorical statements in a linguistic text in modern English. The essence of scientific communication is a message, or the transmission by means of language of some mental content, including the expression of an intellectual-evaluative attitude to the subject of speech. The content of intellectual assessments is conditioned by knowledge and experience of intellectual and material activities of people.In a scientific text, this attitude can be the result of verifying the truth of what is expressed by the author himself or by another scientist or a team of researchers, as well as confirmation or refutation of apreviously formed assessment that served as the basis for further discussion


1971 ◽  
Vol 11 ◽  
pp. 163-172
Author(s):  
Arne Hedgran ◽  
Bo Lindell
Keyword(s):  

2018 ◽  
Vol 2 (2) ◽  
pp. 86-91
Author(s):  
Sally Engle Merry

This provocative question became the basis for a spirited discussion at the 2017 meeting of the American Anthropological Association. My first reaction, on hearing the question, was to ask, does anthropology care whether it matters to law? As a discipline, anthropology and the anthropology of law are producing excellent scholarship and have an active scholarly life. But in response to this forum’s provocation article, which clearly outlines the lack of courses on law and anthropology in law schools, I decided that the relevant question was, why doesn’t anthropology matter more to law than it does? The particular, most serious concern appears to be, why are there not more law and anthropology courses being offered in law schools? It is increasingly common for law faculty in the United States to have PhDs as well as JDs, so why are there so few anthropology/law PhD/JD faculty? Moreover, as there is growing consensus that law schools instil a certain way of thinking but lack preparation for the practice of law in reality and there is an explosion of interest in clinical legal training, why does this educational turn fail to provide a new role of legal anthropology, which focuses on the practice of law, in clinical legal training?


Vox Patrum ◽  
2011 ◽  
Vol 56 ◽  
pp. 339-348
Author(s):  
Bogdan Czyżewski

Although St. Basil did not live 50 years, the topic of the old age appears in his works quite often. On the other hand, it is clear that Basil does not discuss this issue in one par­ticular work or in the longer argumentation. The fragmentary statements about old age can be found in almost all his works, but most of them can be found in the correspondence of Basil. In this paper we present the most important ad the most interesting aspect of teach­ing of Basil the Great. As these certificates show that the bishop of Caesarea looked at the old age maturely, rationally estimated passage of time, which very often makes a man different. He experienced it, for example as a spiritual and physical suffering, which often were connected with his person. He saw a lot of aspect of the old age, especially its advan­tages – spiritual maturity and wisdom. What is more, he pointed also to passage of time, which leads a man to eternity, which should be prepared to, regardless how old he is. In his opinion fear is not seen opinions of St. Basil present really Christian way of thinking, well-balanced and calm.


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