Hot Pursuit and the Exercise of Enforcement Jurisdiction beyond the EEZ

2021 ◽  
pp. 295-337
Author(s):  
Camille Goodman
Keyword(s):  
Coastal State ◽  
Black And White ◽  
Exclusive Jurisdiction ◽  
Substantive Content ◽  
Community Interest ◽  
Use Of Technology ◽  
United Nations Convention ◽  
Effective Conservation ◽  
Conservation And Management ◽  
High Seas

This Chapter considers the enforcement of coastal State fisheries laws and regulations beyond the exclusive economic zone (EEZ) following a hot pursuit. While the general framework for hot pursuit established in the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea is clear, its substantive content and operation—particularly in situations that do not fall neatly within the black and white terms of the framework—is less clear. This Chapter considers the key challenges to this framework, and the extent to which—and the ways in which—coastal States have implemented, developed, or departed from it in practice, focusing in particular on the domestic legal basis for conducting hot pursuit, the use of technology in the conduct of hot pursuit, and cooperative approaches to hot pursuit. While recognizing that the hot pursuit doctrine must strike an appropriate balance between the sovereign rights of the coastal State to enforce its laws and the exclusive jurisdiction of the flag State over its vessels on the high seas, the Chapter argues that there is also a broader community interest to be balanced on both sides of this equation: to ensure the effective conservation and management of living resources, and preserve the freedom of navigation on the high seas. This is reflected in the Chapter’s examination of practice, which reveals that States have adopted and implemented a functional, contemporary approach to hot pursuit within the framework of the existing doctrine, which itself has proved to be at once flexible and remarkably enduring.

The Framework for Coastal State Jurisdiction over Fishing in the EEZ

2021 ◽  
pp. 25-62
Author(s):  
Camille Goodman
Keyword(s):  
Legal Framework ◽  
Highly Qualified ◽  
Coastal State ◽  
Margin Of Appreciation ◽  
Management Concepts ◽  
The Face ◽  
United Nations Convention ◽  
International Instruments ◽  
Conservation And Management

This Chapter outlines the legal framework for the regulation of living resources in the exclusive economic zone (EEZ) as established in the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (LOSC) and other relevant international instruments. It demonstrates how the LOSC seeks to balance the competing interests of coastal and flag States and argues that while the ‘non-specific’ standards established in the LOSC have subsequently been strengthened by the recognition of additional conservation and management concepts, the basic rights and obligations of coastal States remain ambiguous, open-ended, and highly qualified. In order to clarify this ambiguity, it looks beyond the basic list of rights and duties set out on the face of the LOSC to establish what coastal States must, may, and must not do in exercising their sovereign rights over living resources in the EEZ. It examines the approaches taken by international courts and tribunals in reviewing the innovations and interpretations offered by coastal States in their implementation of the LOSC, and identifies the broader, normative principles that constrain and enable coastal State jurisdiction in the EEZ. This includes discussion of the rules of due regard and due diligence, the role of the margin of appreciation doctrine, and the extent to which a coastal State may act to protect—or prevent interference with—its sovereign rights. The Chapter concludes by drawing these concepts together to outline the basic framework that governs the continuum of jurisdiction over living resources in the EEZ.

The Barents Sea Loophole Agreement: A "Coastal State" Solution to a Straddling Stock Problem

1999 ◽  
Vol 14 (4) ◽  
pp. 467-490 ◽  
Author(s):  
Robin R Churchill
Keyword(s):  
Barents Sea ◽  
State Solution ◽  
Fishing Rights ◽  
Fish Stocks ◽  
Coastal State ◽  
The Barents Sea ◽  
Unregulated Fishing ◽  
Conservation And Management ◽  
High Seas

AbstractIn May 1999 Iceland, Norway and Russia signed an agreement (the "Loophole Agreement") designed to resolve a six-year dispute over unregulated fishing by Icelandic vessels for straddling stocks in an enclave ("the Loophole") of high seas in the central Barents Sea. The Agreement, which gives Iceland fishing rights in the Norwegian and Russian EEZs in return for ceasing fishing in the Loophole, is an example of direct co-operation between coastal and high seas fishing states over the management of straddling fish stocks on the high seas which the 1995 UN Agreement on the Conservation and Management of Straddling Fish Stocks envisages as a possible alternative to management through a regional fisheries organisation. The article explains why the parties have chosen this model rather than utilising the existing regional fisheries organisation or establishing a new regional fisheries arrangement; and compares the Loophole Agreement with arrangements for some other high seas enclaves.

Fisheries under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea

1983 ◽  
Vol 77 (4) ◽  
pp. 739-755 ◽  
Author(s):  
Shigeru Oda
Keyword(s):  
United Nations ◽  
International Law ◽  
Law Of The Sea ◽  
Coastal State ◽  
Fishery Resources ◽  
Full Control ◽  
Domestic Legislation ◽  
United Nations Convention ◽  
The United Nations ◽  
High Seas

Under the traditional rules of international law, the sea was divided into the high seas and the territorial seas and in each case different rules and regulations obtained. As for the exploitation of fishery resources, the coastal state possessed unquestioned rights to regulate any such exploitation within its territorial sea and to apply its domestic legislation fully to any person engaged in such activities. Similarly, the coastal state was free to prohibit fishing by foreigners in its territorial sea and thus to monopolize those fishery resources. On the high seas, however, no state was allowed, at least in principle, to impose its jurisdiction upon any foreign vessel, since fishing on the high seas fell under the general regime of the high seas. The existence of these two disparate regimes, namely, exploitation under the full control of the coastal state and exploitation free from interference by any country, was a fundamental presumption underlying the exploitation of fishery resources.

ICCAT: Managing or Documenting?

2009 ◽  
Vol 43 (1) ◽  
pp. 117-126 ◽  
Author(s):  
Leslie E. Straker
Keyword(s):  
United Nations ◽  
Scientific Information ◽  
Fish Stocks ◽  
Current State ◽  
Substantial Progress ◽  
United Nations Convention ◽  
Over Exploitation ◽  
Regional Fisheries Management Organizations ◽  
Effective Conservation ◽  
High Seas

AbstractThe International Commission for the Conservation of Atlantic Tunas (ICCAT) is one of the oldest regional fisheries management organizations in the business of providing stewardship to the management of high-seas fish stocks. The Commission came into force in 1969 with eight parties and today consists of 45 contracting parties. Notwithstanding nearly 40 years of experience, this organization is also confronted with the problems of over-exploitation; over-capacity; illegal, unregulated and unreported fishing; lack of adequate scientific information; and the continued decline in important high-seas fish stocks.Despite the moribund state of fish stocks in the ICCAT convention area, the organization has made significant progress with respect to the collection and analysis of fisheries information, recommendations to its parties and the dissemination of this information, all key parts of its broader objective. Nonetheless, the organization has failed to make substantial progress with regard to translating a good analysis and documenting process to the effective conservation of tuna and tuna-like species in the Atlantic. That is, the organization has failed to “close the loop” in management. The question therefore becomes, is the ICCAT merely functioning as a “documenting” organization rather than a “management” organization? This study examines the current state of fisheries stocks in the convention area, the extent to which the Commission is meeting its own mandate, and the extent to which the management principles of the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea and the United Nations Fish Stocks Agreement are being followed by ICCAT.

Flag Verification on the High Seas: Understanding Requirements for Masters and Commanders

2015 ◽  
Vol 30 (2) ◽  
pp. 335-360 ◽  
Author(s):  
Angeline Lewis
Keyword(s):  
Law Enforcement ◽  
Reasonable Doubt ◽  
Law Of The Sea ◽  
Evidence Based ◽  
Objective Evidence ◽  
United Nations Convention ◽  
Enforcement Authority ◽  
The Right ◽  
Proper Balance ◽  
High Seas

Operational reporting from the Middle East indicates that the exercise by warships of a right of visit on the high seas, in order to verify the flag of the boarded vessel, is an important part of contemporary maritime enforcement operations. However, this reliance on ‘flag verification boardings,’ pursuant to Article 110 of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 1982, challenges the proper balance of law enforcement authority against the traditional freedom of navigation. It is therefore necessary to establish clearly for both civilian masters and warship commanders where the evidentiary threshold for reasonable doubt as to the nationality of vessels lies, so as to justify non-consensual visit and search by a foreign warship. This article makes an objective, evidence-based assessment of the threshold, concluding with a caution against over-stretching the right of visit to accommodate law enforcement purposes not envisaged in the drafting of Article 110.

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