Japan

2021 ◽  
pp. 123-156
Author(s):  
Matthew S. Shugart ◽  
Matthew E. Bergman ◽  
Cory L. Struthers ◽  
Ellis S. Krauss ◽  
Robert J. Pekkanen
Keyword(s):  
Democratic Party ◽  
Electoral System ◽  
System Change ◽  
Electoral Reform ◽  
Socialist Party ◽  
Issue Ownership ◽  
Considerable Evidence ◽  
Liberal Democratic ◽  
Personnel Practices ◽  
Model Apply

This chapter focuses on the case of Japan, and its electoral reform, analyzing both the current mixed-member majoritarian (MMM) system and its former single nontransferable vote (SNTV) system. The chapter tests for impacts of electoral system change in the Liberal Democratic Party’s assignment of members to committees in the House of Representative of the Diet. It finds that the some aspects of the expertise model apply more strongly under MMM than under SNTV, but that the party follows the logic of the electoral–constituency model more than the expertise model, even under MMM. Both findings conform to theoretical expectations. The chapter also analyzes the main alternative parties in each electoral system era: the Japan Socialist Party (under SNTV) and the Democratic Party of Japan (under MMM). For these two left-leaning parties, we find considerable evidence that a party’s issue ownership matters to party personnel practices.

Electoral Reform and the Fate of Factions: The Case of Japan's Liberal Democratic Party

1999 ◽  
Vol 29 (1) ◽  
pp. 33-56 ◽  
Author(s):  
GARY W. COX ◽  
FRANCES McCALL ROSENBLUTH ◽  
MICHAEL F. THIES
Keyword(s):  
Democratic Party ◽  
Presidential Elections ◽  
Liberal Democratic Party ◽  
Electoral System ◽  
Electoral Reform ◽  
The Other ◽  
Liberal Democratic ◽  
Leaders And Followers ◽  
Short Run

For years, scholars and pundits have blamed Japan's single, non-transferable vote (SNTV) electoral system for the factions that divide and organize the ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP). In January 1994, Japan abandoned SNTV, and the first election under the new rules occurred in October 1996. If SNTV did in fact sustain the factions, it makes sense that the factional structure ought to have weakened under the new rules. In this article, we provide an informal model of what the old factional exchange between leaders and followers was like and investigate the extent to which the terms of this exchange, and hence the characteristics of Japanese factionalism, have begun to change under the new rules. We expect and find the largest decline in factional leaders' role in the area of nominations, and the slightest changes, at least in the short run, in the allocation of posts. On the other side of the exchange, we find that followers appear less willing to march to their leaders' tunes in LDP presidential elections.

Electoral Origins of Japanese Socialists' Stagnation

1997 ◽  
Vol 30 (1) ◽  
pp. 55-77 ◽  
Author(s):  
MASARU KOHNO
Keyword(s):  
Empirical Evidence ◽  
Democratic Party ◽  
Alternative Explanation ◽  
Liberal Democratic Party ◽  
Electoral System ◽  
Socialist Party ◽  
Liberal Democratic

Why did the Japan Socialist Party (JSP) cling to its original leftist policies for so long? Traditionally, the JSP's failure to become a credible alternative to the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) has been explained in terms of either the legacy of its disastrous coalition experience in the early postwar years, the party's organizational reliance on unionized labor, or its nervousness about the reactionary element in the LDP. None of these existing explanations is convincing, given that the adherence to its leftist policies had self-defeating electoral consequences for the JSP. This article explores an alternative explanation and provides empirical evidence which illustrates the link between the JSP's misfortune and the Japanese electoral system existing from 1947 to 1994.

scholarly journals Coordinating nominations: how to deal with an incumbent surplus after electoral reform

2022 ◽  
pp. 1-18
Author(s):  
Jochen Rehmert
Keyword(s):  
Democratic Party ◽  
Local Level ◽  
Liberal Democratic Party ◽  
Electoral System ◽  
Electoral Reform ◽  
System Reform ◽  
Liberal Democratic ◽  
Level Data ◽  
Electoral Reforms ◽  
Micro Level

Abstract How do parties and candidates react to electoral system reform? While the literature on causes and consequences of electoral reforms is receiving increasing attention, we lack a systematic micro-level account on how parties and candidates adopt to changes in electoral rules and district boundaries. This paper examines the case of the Japanese Liberal Democrats to explore how the party has managed to accommodate a surplus of incumbents to a reduced number of nominal tier seats following the 1994 electoral reform. By using micro-level data, I examine how the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) has matched candidates based on their expected electoral strength and ideological positioning to new districts. Moreover, I investigate how the newly instituted party-list allowed the LDP to avoid its disintegration at the local level by systematically defusing local stand-offs through the handing out of promising list positions. My findings help to understand how the LDP could avoid its disintegration and could continue to dominate Japanese politics until today.

The Liberal Democratic Party: Its adaptability and predominance in Japanese politics for 60 years

2018 ◽  
Vol 4 (1) ◽  
pp. 8-22
Author(s):  
Michio Umeda
Keyword(s):  
Economic Development ◽  
Presidential Election ◽  
Democratic Party ◽  
Japanese Society ◽  
Liberal Democratic Party ◽  
Electoral Reform ◽  
Party Organization ◽  
Allocation System ◽  
Japanese Politics ◽  
Liberal Democratic

This article discusses the origin and continuity of the predominance of the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) in Japanese politics since the party’s formation in 1955. The LDP experienced two crises in its history, the first owing to the transformation of Japanese society by rapid economic development during the 1960–1970s, and the second due to the electoral reform in 1994 and the challenge from the Democratic Party of Japan thereafter. I argue that the LDP’s continuous success is attributable to its adaptability to new environments: the party overcame the first crisis by shifting the policy focus, reorganizing its support base and the party organization to achieve intraparty consensus. It coped with the second crisis by forming a coalition with the Clean Government Party and reforming the party’s presidential election and the ministerial post-allocation system. The article concludes with a summary and a brief discussion regarding the future of the LDP.

Ending the LDP Hegemony: Party Cooperation in Japan. By Ray Christensen. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 2000. 228p. $52.00 cloth, $27.95 paper.

2001 ◽  
Vol 95 (1) ◽  
pp. 231-232
Author(s):  
Kenji Hayao
Keyword(s):  
Democratic Party ◽  
Party System ◽  
Liberal Democratic Party ◽  
Party Politics ◽  
Socialist Party ◽  
Coalition Government ◽  
Japanese Politics ◽  
Liberal Democratic ◽  
2000 Election

The Japanese party system has been in flux in recent years. In 1993, two groups defected from the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) and joined with the opposition to form a broadly based coalition government. A year later, the LDP regained power by creating a coalition government with its ideological opponent, the Japan Socialist Party (JSP). Both events shocked virtually everyone at the time. The LDP had been in power for so long-almost 40 years-that it seemed almost inconceivable that it could lose power. For just as long, the JSP had been the main opposition. By the 2000 election, a dozen parties had come and gone, the JSP's strength dropped to a very small fraction of what it was a decade earlier, and the LDP had to turn to various coalition partners to maintain its control of government. All this is quite puzzling to even close watchers of Japanese politics, because party politics, especially the role of opposition parties, has been a relatively understudied area. For those who want to make sense of how these events came to pass, Ray Christensen's Ending the LDP Hegemony will be very helpful.

scholarly journals Electoral incentives, policy compromise, and coalition durability: Japan's LDP–Komeito Government in a mixed electoral system

2018 ◽  
Vol 20 (1) ◽  
pp. 53-73 ◽  
Author(s):  
Adam P. Liff ◽  
Ko Maeda
Keyword(s):  
Political Parties ◽  
Security Policy ◽  
Democratic Party ◽  
Liberal Democratic Party ◽  
Electoral System ◽  
Japanese Politics ◽  
Electoral Incentives ◽  
Coalition Politics ◽  
Liberal Democratic ◽  
Mixed Electoral System

AbstractPolitical parties’ behavior in coalition formation is commonly explained by their policy-, vote-, and office-seeking incentives. From these perspectives, the 20-year partnership of Japan's ruling conservative Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) and its pacifistic Komeito junior coalition partner is an anomalous case. The longevity, closeness, and nature of their unlikely partnership challenges core assumptions in existing theories of coalition politics. LDP–Komeito cooperation has sustained for two decades despite vastly different support bases and ideological differences on fundamental policy issues. LDP leaders also show no signs of abandoning the much smaller Komeito despite enjoying a single-party majority. We argue that the remarkable durability of this puzzling partnership results primarily from the two parties’ electoral incentives and what has effectively become codependence under Japan's mixed electoral system. Our analysis also demonstrates that being in a coalition can induce significant policy compromises, even from a much larger senior partner. Beyond theoretical implications, these phenomena yield important real-world consequences for Japanese politics: especially, a far less dominant LDP than the party's Diet seat total suggests, and Komeito's remarkable ability to punch significantly above its weight and constrain its far larger senior partner, even on the latter's major national security policy priorities.

Japanese Politics in Transition: A Theoretical Review

1993 ◽  
Vol 28 (4) ◽  
pp. 443-455 ◽  
Author(s):  
Takashi Inoguchi
Keyword(s):  
Democratic Party ◽  
Large Scale ◽  
Type System ◽  
Liberal Democratic Party ◽  
Electoral System ◽  
Vice President ◽  
Liberal Democratic ◽  
Income Tax Law ◽  
Anglo American ◽  
Party Dominance

THE END OF ONE-PARTY DOMINANCE BY THE LIBERAL Democratic Party of Japan came as abruptly as the fall of the Berlin wall four years before. It started with the debate on electoral system change, ostensibly as an attempt to curb corruption. The LDP has been plagued by a series of large-scale corruption scandals since the Recruit scandal of 1989. The latest concerned former vice-president Shin Kanemaru's alleged violation of the political money regulation law and the income tax law in 1992–93. The Prime Minister, Kiichi Miyazawa, accepting a fair degree of compromise with opposition parties, wanted to pass a bill to change the current electoral system. The LDP initially wanted to change from the system of choosing a few persons in each district by one vote to the Anglo-American type system of selecting one person in each district by one vote. The opposition wanted to change to the continental European system of proportional representation. A compromise was made by the LDP's proposal to combine the latter two systems. Then two dissenting groups emerged suddenly in the LDP. One took the exit option by forming new political parties. The other took the voice option by backing away from the Miyazawa compromise plan. Miyazawa was humiliated by his failure to have the bill enacted and a motion of no confidence was passed. He then called for a general election, which took place on 18 July 1993. The outcome did not give a majority to the LDP and subsequently a non-LDP coalition was formed to produce a non-LDP government for the first time since the foundation of the LDP in 1955

scholarly journals Between Pork and People: An Analysis of the Policy Balance in the LDP's Election Platforms

2014 ◽  
Vol 14 (3) ◽  
pp. 405-428 ◽  
Author(s):  
Christian G. Winkler
Keyword(s):  
Environmental Protection ◽  
Democratic Party ◽  
Liberal Democratic Party ◽  
Electoral Reform ◽  
Policy Mix ◽  
Pork Barrel ◽  
Liberal Democratic ◽  
Election Manifestos ◽  
Election System ◽  
The 1960S

In this article I examine changes in the election manifestos of Japan's Liberal Democratic Party. While the existing literature agrees that the LDP's policy platform has changed considerably since the introduction of the new election system in the 1990s, their analysis focuses on material policies such as pork barrel and welfare. Postmaterialist policies such as environmental protection have hardly been discussed, even though they have been relevant since pollution swept progressive mayors into power in the 1960s. I examine election platforms from 1956 through 2013, and argue that the LDP has carefully adjusted its policy mix by putting a greater emphasis on postmaterialist policies. My analysis also shows that while electoral reform has had an impact on the policy balance between postmaterialist and materialist policies as well as clientelist and programmatic policies, these changes are not linear, but vary from decade to decade.

Electoral Institutions, Hometowns, and Favored Minorities: Evidence from Japanese Electoral Reforms

2006 ◽  
Vol 59 (1) ◽  
pp. 51-82 ◽  
Author(s):  
Shigeo Hirano
Keyword(s):  
Democratic Party ◽  
Liberal Democratic Party ◽  
Electoral Reform ◽  
Data Sets ◽  
Electoral Institutions ◽  
Intergovernmental Transfers ◽  
Liberal Democratic ◽  
Geographic Patterns ◽  
Electoral Support ◽  
Electoral Reforms

This article presents evidence that electoral institutions affect the geographic distribution of both candidate electoral support and government resources. The author exploits two electoral reforms in Japan to identify the effect of institutional incentives: (1) the 1994 electoral reform from a multimember single nontransferable vote (SNTV) system to a mixed-member majoritarian (MMM) system with a single-member district (SMD) component and a proportional representation component; and (2) the 1925 electoral reform from a predominantly SMD system to a multimember SNTV system. Using several new data sets, the two main findings of this article are that (1) Japanese representatives competing in multimember SNTV districts had more geographically concentrated electoral support than those competing in SMDs and that (2) intergovernmental transfers appear to be more concentrated around Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) incumbents' home offices under the multimember SNTV system than under the MMM system. The findings in this article highlight the connection between institutions and geographic patterns of representation.

A Historical Analysis of the LDP’s 2018 Constitutional Amendment Proposals

Asian Survey ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 60 (5) ◽  
pp. 882-904
Author(s):  
Christian G. Winkler
Keyword(s):  
Democratic Party ◽  
Historical Analysis ◽  
Liberal Democratic Party ◽  
Electoral System ◽  
Status Quo ◽  
Constitutional Amendment ◽  
State Of Emergency ◽  
Liberal Democratic ◽  
Article 9 ◽  
The 1950S

In 2018 Japan’s Liberal Democratic Party announced four new proposals to amend the seven-decades-old and thus-far unamended constitution of Japan. These include adding a third paragraph to Article 9, as well as state-of-emergency provisions, support for students in need, and changes to the electoral system. By analyzing each proposal’s place in the debate on amendments dating back to the 1950s, I show that these very different proposals share one important feature that sets them apart from recent drafts aiming for wholesale reform of the constitution: they are relatively minimalist in nature. This new modesty is due to the necessity to win over other parties and voters, but it is also an attempt to cement rather than to change the LDP-made status quo.

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