Spinoza’s Theory of Scientia Intuitiva
The Ethics distinguishes three kinds of cognition (cognitio): (1) opinion or imagination (opinion vel imaginatio); (2) reason (ratio), and (3) intuitive knowledge (scientia intuitiva). This chapter explains Spinoza’s theory of the highest and most desirable kind of cognition, scientia intuitiva, and, in doing so, it answers three puzzling but fundamental questions about it. First, what are the “essences” of attributes and of things on which scientia intuitiva is said to depend? Second, given that all cognition requires an “adequate” idea of an attribute of God, in Spinoza’s view, how does scientia intuitiva differ from the other two kinds of cognition? Third, can everything be known by scientia intuitiva, in Spinoza’s view, or are some truths beyond its reach?