A Subjective Jurisprudence
This chapter examines Justice Antonin Scalia’s jurisprudence dealing with the U.S. Constitution’s two structural axes, separation of powers and federalism. It argues that both constitutional principles are general, largely indeterminate, and easily manipulable and that Scalia construed them in light of his own subjective goals and values. He was determined to use them instrumentally to expand executive power, limit Congress, and severely restrict federal judicial power. The chapter argues that Scalia regarded separation of powers as more critical and important than federalism because it was better suited to serve his political and institutional goals and that, in joining the Rehnquist Court’s “federalism revolution” in the early twentieth century, he contradicted the position he had taken in his Senate confirmation hearing about the propriety of the Court giving special deference to Congress on federalism issues. Finally, the chapter shows that before he went on the Court, Scalia had made it clear that he viewed both separation of powers and federalism as principles that could and should be interpreted to serve the practical policy goals of the political right.