Making the World Safe for Dictatorship

Author(s):  
Alexander Dukalskis

Authoritarian states try to present a positive image of themselves abroad. They invest in foreign-facing media, retain public relations firms, and showcase their successes to elite and popular foreign audiences. But there is also a darker side to these efforts. Authoritarian states try to obscure or censor bad news about their governments and often discredit their critics abroad. In extreme cases, authoritarian states intimidate, physically attack, or even murder their opponents overseas. This book is about how authoritarian states manage their image abroad using both “promotional” tactics of persuasion and “obstructive” tactics of repression. They adopt these practices to enhance their internal and external regime security or, put differently, to make their world safe for dictatorship. To substantiate these arguments, the book uses a diverse array of data, including fieldwork and author interviews, cross-national data on extraterritorial repression, examination of public relations filings with the United States government, analysis of authoritarian propaganda, media frequency analysis, and speeches and statements by authoritarian leaders. It builds a new data set—the Authoritarian Actions Abroad Database—that uses publicly available information to categorize nearly 1,200 instances in which authoritarian states repressed their critical exiles abroad, ranging from vague threats to confirmed assassinations. It also selects three cases for closer examination to understand in more detail how authoritarian states manage their image abroad using combinations of promotional and obstructive tactics: China, Rwanda, and North Korea. The result is a new way of thinking about the international dimensions of authoritarian politics.

1963 ◽  
Vol 17 (1) ◽  
pp. 226-230

The Security Council discussed this question at its 1022nd–1025th meetings, on October 23–25, 1962. It had before it a letter dated October 22, 1962, from the permanent representative of the United States, in which it was stated that the establishment of missile bases in Cuba constituted a grave threat to the peace and security of the world; a letter of the same date from the permanent representative of Cuba, claiming that the United States naval blockade of Cuba constituted an act of war; and a letter also dated October 22 from the deputy permanent representative of the Soviet Union, emphasizing that Soviet assistance to Cuba was exclusively designed to improve Cuba's defensive capacity and that the United States government had committed a provocative act and an unprecedented violation of international law in its blockade.


1962 ◽  
Vol 56 (2) ◽  
pp. 404-416 ◽  
Author(s):  
René Lemarchand

Not the least paradoxical aspect of the United Nations mandate in the Congo, as described in the three-power resolution adopted by the Security Council on November 24, 1961, is that it was designed to prevent the exercise of a right which is explicitly recognized by the Charter. In effect, by “completely rejecting the claim of the Katanga as a sovereign independent Nation” and “recognizing the government of the Republic of the Congo as exclusively responsible for the conduct of the external affairs of the Congo,” the authors of the resolution clearly denied the provincial authorities of the Katanga the right to self-determination. Similarly, the support given by the United States government to the resolution, reaffirmed in several official statements, seems hardly compatible with our long-standing moral commitment to the Wilsonian principle that “the small states of the world have a right to enjoy the same respect for their sovereignty and territorial integrity that the great and powerful states expect and insist upon.” Actually, what may at first sight appear to be a sign of inconsistency is rather a reflection of the fundamental ambiguity in the concept of self-determination.


2011 ◽  
Vol 7 (2) ◽  
pp. 114-136
Author(s):  
John A. Parnell ◽  
John E. Spillan ◽  
Marlon R. McPhattar ◽  
Donald L. Lester

The decade from 2000 until 2010 was a turbulent time for Toyota Motor Company. The carmaker came under significant criticism from the United States government, consumers throughout the world, and media critics amid allegations of poor quality control and vehicle safety concerns. Problems with accelerators and brake systems were found on several of its most popular models, a situation initially exacerbated by the slow and somewhat tentative response from top management. Toyota was accused of not addressing early warning signs that appeared several years before the crisis received intense negative publicity. Toyota struggled to retain the confidence of consumers and governmental regulators, eventually recalling approximately eight million automobiles.


2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Nouraldeen Ibrahim ◽  

When analyzing the global humanitarian crisis known as the SARS-CoV-2 virus (which causes the disease COVID-19), it is important to analyze the response of the United States so it is possible to learn from any mistakes. Since a global pandemic was completely unprecedented to the United States government, it did not have a concrete plan or solution prepared to deal with the outbreak. COVID-19 exposed the flaws in the United State's ability to deal with pandemics which, consequently, has now led to the U.S. to have the highest death toll in the world.


1987 ◽  
Vol 81 (1) ◽  
pp. 77-78 ◽  
Author(s):  
Harold G. Maier

The ultimate authority of the International Court of Justice flows from the same source as the ultimate authority of all other judicial bodies. Every court’s decisions are an authoritative source of law in a realistic sense only because they are accepted as such by the community whose controversies the court is charged to resolve. In the case of the World Court, it is the community of nations that confers that authority and under the Court’s Statute, its jurisdiction is conferred solely by the consent of the nations whose disputes it is called to adjudicate. It is for this reason that the case Nicaragua v. United States and the actions of both the Court and the United States Government in connection with it are of special importance to those who are concerned with international law.


1951 ◽  
Vol 5 (4) ◽  
pp. 855-856

In the period following the Rubber Study Group's seventh meeting, May 2 to 5, 1950, press reports from western markets indicated that the fear (and the subsequent reality) of a world crisis had lead to heavy stockpiling of rubber and to speculative buying—both of which contributed to higher prices. London financial circles, while expressing the views that the Rubber Study Group's 1950 consumption estimates were too low and that the market could bear the high prices, were reported to have taken a conservative view of the boom, fearing that the unrealistically high prices might force the United States to activate more of its synthetic rubber plants and thus make the position of natural rubber producers less secure. A press release of June 9, 1950, revealed that the United States government had directed the attention of the world's rubber producing and marketing countries to the “serious implications” of the price movements and on July 7 the Reconstruction Finance Corporation reopened three United States synthetic rubber plants with a total annual production capacity of 88,000 tons. There was a definite break in rubber prices on the London market during the week following the release, on August 14, of estimates by the Rubber Study Group Secretariat which showed that the world production of rubber for June had exceeded consumption demands. This development, which press reports indicated to have been welcomed by industry representatives in London, was largely attributed to the cessation of “panic buying”.


2018 ◽  
Vol 79 (10) ◽  
pp. 571
Author(s):  
Kyle K. Courtney

U.S. copyright law has a unique place in the world regarding federal works and copyright. Federal copyright law states that “Copyright protection under this title is not available for any work of the United States Government.”1 This is a broad and clear statement that works of the federal government are in the public domain and are free for use by all.


1949 ◽  
Vol 3 (3) ◽  
pp. 548-548

Advice and consent to ratification of the Convention of the World Meteorological Organization was given by the United States Senate on April 20, 1949. The United States instrument of ratification was deposited on May 4, 1949 in the archives of the United States Government, which had been designated by the convention as the depository government. The convention was to enter into force thirty days after the date of the deposit of the thirtieth instrument of ratification or accession. The United States was the seventeenth government to deposit its instrument of ratification. The other governments were: Australia, Byelorussian SSR, Finland, Iceland, India, Lebanon, New Zealand, Norway, Philippines, Rumania, Sweden, Switzerland, Ukrainian SSR, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Kingdom and Yugoslavia.


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document